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$Unique_ID{bob00345}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Japan
Chapter 7A.   National Security}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Melinda W. Cooke}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{military
forces
defense
japan
nation
united
states
japanese
security
war
see
pictures
see
figures
}
$Date{1981}
$Log{}
Title:       Japan
Book:        Japan, A Country Study
Author:      Melinda W. Cooke
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1981

Chapter 7A.   National Security

     The self-defense forces, Japan's armed services, in late 1981 were
limited in size, structure, and mission by a number of constitutional,
statutory, and informal restrictions. Prominent among these was Article 9 of
the Constitution, which stated: "The Japanese people forever renounce war as a
sovereign right of the nation or the threat or use of force as a means of
settling international disputes." The Self-Defense Forces could not be
deployed outside the nation and were forbidden to possess nuclear weapons or
any arms with offensive capability. The forces were under the complete
civilian control of the Defense Agency and subordinate to the prime minister.
Although highly trained and fully qualified to perform their defense mission,
they were small, understaffed, and underequipped, and in 1981 had never seen
action in any operation other than disaster relief.

     National defense policy has been based on maintaining the 1960 Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security with the United States, under which Japan
assumed the unilateral responsibility for its own internal security, and the
United States agreed to join in Japan's defense in case of any attack on Japan
or the territories under its control. Although the size and capability of the
Self-Defense Forces has always limited their role in the defense of the
nation, up until 1976 defense planning focused on developing forces adequate
to deal with conventional capabilities of potential regional adversaries.
Because of post-oil crisis financial constraints and other considerations,
however, in 1976 the government formulated a policy whereby the Self-Defense
Forces would be developed only to a level sufficient to repel a small-scale,
limited invasion, and the nation would depend on the United States to come to
its aid in the event of a more serious incursion.

     International instability during the 1970s and early 1980s called this
policy into question, however. The nation's reliance on oil imported over
insecure ocean routes, the expansion of Soviet military capabilities in Asia
and the Middle East, the buildup of Soviet forces on four islands to the north
of Hokkaido, which were also claimed by Japan, and the apparent end of detente
between the Soviet Union and the United States increased concern over the
nation's external security in 1981. Moreover the perceived decline in Japanese
eyes of United States military capability worldwide has raised doubts as to
the wisdom of relying so completely on the United States nuclear umbrella to
maintain security. The possible expansion of the Self-Defense Forces began to
be debated in the late 1970s, as did other previously impermissible
defense-related topics such as conscription and nuclear weapons. Proponents of
an increased defense posture have been joined by a growing number of United
States commentators who have charged that Japan has been getting a "free ride"
and should contribute more to its own self defense.

     The government values its close relations with the United States, and
considers them important to its political, economic, and military interests.
It has therefore worked to facilitate military contacts and to support the
United States diplomatically whenever possible. The government and the public,
however, have not supported any significant increase in self-defense
capability. National security, it has been believed, was as well fostered by
promoting international diplomacy and economic aid as by developing military
might. Reaction to pre-World War II militarism has persisted, preventing the
reform or expansion of the Self-Defense Forces.

     These attitudes have affected economic decisions, which in turn have
acted to constrain the growth of the nation's military. For political and
economic reasons, after 1976 it has been cabinet policy to hold defense
expenditures below 1 percent of the nation's gross national product, and
advocates of increased defense spending have not had the political clout to
force a reallocation. Moreover the purely financial decision to lower
government deficits has meant that fewer funds would be available for spending
in all areas. In consequence, the Self-Defense Forces' budgets, while high in
absolute terms, have been exceedingly low for a nation of Japan's size and
level of economic development and have not been substantial enough to finance
development of an independent military capability.

     In contrast, there were few burning issues concerning internal security
in 1981. Conditions of public order in Japan compared favorably with those in
other nations of the world. The country's free and active press and its
democratic government effectively protected the rights of all citizens. Crime
was remarkably low, and the police and legal systems were widely respected as
professional, efficient, and fair. Citizens were encouraged to recognize their
responsibilities to help maintain public order. They cooperated freely with
law enforcement officials and participated in crime prevention, juvenile
rehabilitation, and convict probation programs.

Militarism Before 1945

     Japanese aversion for things military has been of recent origin. For
centuries before 1945 military men and a strong martial tradition exerted a
powerful and at times dominant influence on national life. Although the
development of a modern army and navy came only during the Meiji period
(1868-1912), reverence for the art of war and those who practiced it had long
been characteristic of Japanese society.

     By the thirteenth century intermittent clan warfare and constant
preparation for combat had elevated a distinct warrior class, the samurai, to
a position of importance and exalted prestige in the nation. Empowered by a
nationwide, feudal, military dictatorship, the chief figure, the shogun, ruled
in the name of a figure-head emperor. By the end of the sixteenth century the
samurai dominated the social and political hierarchy that existed under the
shogun and developed into an exclusive hereditary elite. After 1603 they were
granted the sole right to bear the sword, which subsequently became the symbol
of their superior status.

     In time a customary ethical code known as Bushido (or way of the warrior)
was developed. According to this doctrine, in the performance of his military
duties the samurai was bound to accept death in battle rather than flight or
surrender and, seeing corruption or disloyalty in another, was expected to
slay the guilty one and then commit hara-kiri to vindicate his honor. As an
ideal of conduct, the code emphasized personal honesty, reverence and respect
for parents, willingness to sacrifice oneself for family honor, consideration
for the feelings of others, indifference to pain, loyalty to one's superiors,
and unquestioning obedience to duty in the face of any hardship or danger.
Notwithstanding a reality that often feel short of the ideal, Bushido had a
profound and lasting impact on the nation. Its effects were also felt during
the conduct of battle in World War II. Repeated resort to banzai charges and
the tenacity of last-ditch Japanese resistance testified to the strength and
persistence of the samurai tradition. The postwar survival of Bushido precepts
was visible in the early 1980s in the beliefs of rightist political factions.

     When Western powers began to press the nation for trade relations in the
1850s, Japan's decentralized and, by Western standards, antiquated military
forces were unable to provide an effective defense against their advances.
After the fall of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1867 and the restoration of the
Meiji emperor, de facto political and administrative power shifted to a group
of younger samurai who had been instrumental in forming the new system and
were committed to modernizing the military. They introduced drastic changes,
which cleared the way for the development of modern, European-style armed
forces.

     Conscription became universal and obligatory in 1872 and, though revolts
by samurai who were wedded to the traditional prerogatives of their class
followed, by 1880 a conscript army was firmly established. The new force
eventually made the samurai spirit its own. Loyalties formerly accorded to
feudal lords were transferred to the state and to the emperor. Upon release
from service, soldiers carried these ideals back to their home communities,
extending military-derived standards to all classes.

     An imperial rescript of 1882 called upon the new armed forces for
unquestioning loyalty to the emperor and asserted that commands from superior
officers were equivalent to commands from the emperor himself. Thenceforth the
military existed in an intimate and privileged relationship with the imperial
institution. Top-ranking military leaders were given direct access to the
emperor and the authority to transmit his pronouncements directly to the
troops. The sympathetic relationship between conscripts and officers,
particularly junior officers who were drawn mostly from the peasantry, tended
to draw the military closer to the people (see The Meiji Period [1868-1912],
ch. 1). In time most people came to look for guidance in national matters more
from military officers rather than from political leaders.

     The first test of the nation's new military capabilities, a successful
punitive expedition to Formosa in 1874, was followed by a series of military
ventures that was unmarred by defeat until World War II. Japan moved against
Korea, China, and Russia in order to secure by military means the raw
materials and strategic territories it believed necessary for the development
and protection of the homeland. The country made territorial gains in Korea,
the southern half of Sakhalin, and Manchuria. As a close ally of Britain in
World War I, it assumed control over Germany's possessions in the Pacific,
most notably the Shandong peninsula and the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall
islands.

     The power of the military grew when, without the knowledge or approval of
the civil government, the Japanese army stationed in Manchuria, better known
as the Kwantung Army, attacked Chinese forces near Mukden in 1931, quickly
occupied all the principal cities in the region, and in 1932 formed the puppet
state of Manchukuo (see Liberalism and Reaction, ch. 1). At home this quick
and inexpensive victory greatly increased the confidence of the young
nationalist officers who could rightly claim credit for it, but other officers
were sobered by the knowledge that a precedent for insubordination had been
set. That apprehension was well-founded, and in the early 1930s a series of
assassinations and conspiracies occurred within the nation and the armed
forces. In 1936 a force from the Tokyo garrison rose in open revolt. Although
the rebels were suppressed on orders of the emperor, the stage was set for
more radical military leaders gradually to assume control of the government-a
process which was completed by 1940 and lasted until a few weeks before the
surrender in World War II.

     In July 1937 a new wave of expansion on the Asian mainland began when a
local commander committed his troops without the prior consent or knowledge of
the government in Tokyo. Without being questioned or disciplined by his
superiors, the commander was promptly provided with reinforcements by the
General Staff, which by this time was strongly influenced by the younger
officers. The fighting quickly spread and before the end of 1937 had developed
into full-scale hostilities, although the formalities of a declaration of war
were omitted. Despite unexpectedly determined resistance, which cast a
sobering shadow over the hope that another quick and spectacular victory was
in the making, military difficulties in China served to enhance rather than
diminish the popularity of the military, who were portrayed as benevolent
crusaders striving to free Asia from European colonial domination. The
military's control over almost every phase of Japanese life was by now
complete, and opposition to its policies was tantamount to treason. The top
military commanders enjoyed direct access to the emperor, bypassing civilian
authority completely.

     By the summer of 1941 army members of the Japanese General Staff were
arguing for direct military action against the United States Pacific Fleet,
the only remaining obstacle to further expansion in Asia now that war in
Europe had broken out. The successful attack against Pearl Harbor on December
7, 1941, was followed by the conquest of areas in Asia and the Pacific that
had long been dominated by the Western powers. The Japanese occupied southern
Indochina; the British were forced out of Hong Kong, the Malay peninsula, and
Singapore; and Java and the Philippines fell. By mid-1942 it had been shown
that Asians not only could equal the West in military power and industrial
techniques but could surpass them. This brought an upsurge of nationalistic
feeling throughout the Far East and, except for China and the Philippines,
many Asian nationalists in the conquered areas tended to cooperate with the
victors.

     When United States air, ground, and sea power began to reverse the tides
of Japanese victories, respect for the leadership and capabilities of the
Imperial Armed Forces began to wane in the captured territories. At home,
however, respect remained high until the impact of intensive United States
aerial bombardment raised popular doubt of the military's ability to win the
war. It was not until the last days of the war, after the United States had
dropped atomic bombs on two Japanese cities, that the emperor in an
unprecedented political act compelled the General Staff to accept the terms
for surrender.

The Self-Defense Forces

     Japan's defeat in World War II, the only one in the country's history,
had a profound and lasting effect on national attitudes toward war, armed
force, and military involvement in political life. These attitudes were
immediately apparent in the willing acceptance of total disarmament and
demobilization after the war and in the alacrity with which all military
leaders were removed from positions of influence in the state. Under the
command of United States General Douglas MacArthur and in concert with the
wishes of most Japanese, Allied occupation authorities were committed to the
demilitarization and democratization of the nation. All clubs, schools, and
societies associated with the military and martial skills were eliminated.
The General Staff was abolished. Industry that could be used for military
purposes was dismantled.

     The trauma of defeat produced strong pacifist sentiments that found
expression in provisions of the United States-sponsored Constitution of
1947-forever renouncing war as an instrument for settling international
disputes and declaring that Japan would never again maintain "land, sea, or
air forces or other war potential." Subsequent governments interpreted those
provisions as not denying the nation the right to self-defense and, with the
encouragement of the United States, developed a military establishment, the
Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Antimilitarist public opinion, however, remained a
force to be reckoned with on any defense-related issue. Constitutional
challenges to the legitimacy of the SDF persisted well into the 1970s, and
even in the 1980s the government considered it necessary to tread lightly
where defense was concerned lest residual antimilitarism be aggravated and a
backlash result.

Background

     Deprived of any military capability after 1945, the nation had only
occupation forces and a few domestic police on which to rely as effective
sources of authority. Rising cold war tensions in Europe and Asia coupled with
a succession of leftist-inspired strikes and demonstrations in Japan, however,
prompted some conservative leaders to question the wisdom of unilateral
renunciation of all military capability. These sentiments were intensified in
1950 when most occupation troops were transferred to the Korean War (1950-53)
theater, leaving Japan virtually helpless to counter internal disruption and
subversion and very much aware of the need to enter into a mutual defense
relationship with the United States to guarantee the nation's external
security. Consequently, encouraged by the occupation authorities, the Japanese
government in July 1950 authorized the establishment of the National Police
Reserve consisting of 75,000 men equipped with light infantry weapons.

     Under the terms of the Security Treaty, ratified along with the Peace
Treaty between the United States and Japan in 1952, United States forces
stationed in Japan were to deal with external aggression against Japan while
Japanese forces, both ground and maritime, would deal with internal aggression
and natural disasters. Accordingly in mid-1952 the National Police Reserve was
expanded to 110,000 men and redesignated  the National Safety Force. The
Coastal Safety Force, which had been organized in 1950 as a counterpart to the
National Police Reserve, was transferred with it to the National Safety Agency
to constitute an embryonic navy.

     As the necessity for defense became more obvious, the National Safety
Force underwent further development that entailed difficult political
problems. The war renunciation clause of the Constitution continuously
provoked strong political objections to any sort of force other than
conventional police. In 1954, however, separate land, sea, and air forces for
purely defensive purposes were created within the Office of the Prime
Minister.

     In order to avoid any appearance of a revival of past militarism, Japan's
leaders were careful to emphasize constitutional guarantees of civilian
control of the government and the armed forces by the adoption of nonmilitary
terms for their organization and functions. The overall organization was
called the Defense Agency rather than the ministry of defense. The armed
forces were designated the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime
Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), instead of
the army, navy, and air force.

     Although possession of nuclear weapons is not forbidden in the
Constitution, Japan, as the only nation to experience atomic holocaust, early
expressed its abhorrence of nuclear arms and determined never to acquire them.
The Basic Atomic Energy Law of 1956 limits research, development, and
utilization of atomic power to peaceful uses, and from 1956 forward the
national leadership has adhered to a policy embodying "three non-nuclear
principles" that forbade the nation to possess or manufacture nuclear weapons
or to allow them to be introduced into the nation. In 1976 the country
ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, adopted by
the United Nations Security Council in 1968, and reiterated its intentions
never to "go nuclear."

     Public aversion, even more than legal restrictions, has precluded the
development or purchase of nuclear weapons. There has been no question that
the nation possessed the technical expertise, economic resources, and
equipment to produce nuclear arms. During the 1970s Japan developed an
ambitious nuclear energy program and began a pilot fuels-reprocessing program.
Nonetheless neither the citizens nor the government showed any intention of
acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. In 1981, quite to the contrary, the
potency of the nation's "nuclear allergy" was evidenced in both the public
outcry and the subsequent embarrassment to the government following reports
alleging that in earlier years United States ships carrying nuclear weapons
had, with the government's tacit consent, both docked in Japan and passed
through its territorial waters. However regularly military commentators might
send up trial balloons suggesting that the possession of nuclear weapons might
be necessary for self-defense and was not forbidden by the Constitution, in
the face of such deep-seated public attitudes, the government has continued to
rely on the United States for nuclear protection.

Strategic Considerations

     The expansion of Soviet military capabilities in the Far East during the
1970-81 period was of grave concern to the nation, and Japanese authorities
regularly monitored the activities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and Soviet
aircraft in the waters and air space around Japan. The Soviet Union maintains
a variety of units, including a division headquarters, on the southernmost
Kuril Islands claimed by Japan and has operated over 500 combat ships out of
Vladivostok and other Pacific ports. Its armed vessels have passed through the
Soya Strait, the Tsugaru Strait, and the Korea Strait and have sailed in the
Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk and in areas of the Pacific Ocean adjacent
to Japan. Using port and airfield facilities at Cam Rahn Bay and Da Nang,
Vietnam, ships and aircraft of the Soviet Union have had the capacity to
strike Japanese shipping lanes stretching from the Indian Ocean and the
littoral nations of Southeast Asia. Japan also has been well within the range
of SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers located in the Soviet Union. In
addition military authorities have been particularly troubled by the 1979
invasion of Afghanistan and by the disregard for Japanese sovereignty
evidenced in mid-1980 when the Soviets towed a disabled nuclear submarine
through Japanese waters against the express wishes of the Japanese government.

     Another area of strategic interest to the nation has been the Korean
peninsula. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the
Republic of Korea (South Korea) have remained implacable enemies, and in 1981
the border between them was one of the most heavily fortified in the world.
Stable and peaceful relations between the two have been considered vital to
Japan's interest: an outbreak of hostilities there would involve United States
forces stationed in Japan, presenting political and possibly security problems
for the nation in addition to interrupting flourishing trade with South Korea.
Although Japan has maintained formal diplomatic relations only with South
Korea, it has refused to contribute to that nation's defense, stating that any
aid to a foreign military establisment would violate its own Constitution.

     Events on the Asian mainland could also affect Japan. China possessed a
nuclear force capable of striking Japan, a large standing army, and a
substantial navy geared primarily to coastal defense. China itself has been
unlikely to present a direct threat to Japan; however hostilities on its
borders with Vietnam, the Soviet Union, or between China and Taiwan, could
have an indirect impact on Japanese security.

     In Japanese eyes the relative weakening of the United States defense
profile in Asia during the 1970s was of major concern. The nation had to
consider whether it could safely devote its resources to other tasks while
relying on its ally to provide Japan's external security.

     The nation was vitally dependent on maintaining access to regional and
worldwide shipping lanes and fishing areas but was incapable of defending the
sea routes upon which it relied. Its energy supplies came primarily from
Middle Eastern sources, and its tankers had to pass through the increasingly
militarized Indian Ocean, through easily closed straits, and through waters
patrolled by potentially hostile nations. While the nation in 1981 was
attempting to diversify its sources of energy, stockpiles of strategic
materials were critically low; Japan's vulnerability to interception of its
oceangoing trade was its most critical strategic weakness.

     Japan's small size, its geographically concentrated industry, and the
close proximity of potentially hostile powers render the country virtually
defenseless against a major nuclear strike. As for defense against
conventional aggression, strategy has been predominantly influenced by the
nation's elongated insular geography, its mountainous terrain, and the
nearness of the Asian mainland. The terrain favors local defense against
invasion by ground forces, but protection of the approximately 15,800
kilometer long coastline of the four main islands would present unique
problems in the event of a large-scale invasion. Potentially hostile aircraft
and missile bases are so close that timely warning even by radar facilities
might be difficult to obtain.

     Maneuver space has been limited to such an extent that ground defenses
must be virtually in place at the onset of hostilities. No point of the
country was more than 120 kilometers from the sea. Moreover the straits
separating Honshu from the other main islands constituted an obstacle
preventing the rapid movement of troops from one island to another. Within
each island, mountain barriers and narrow roads restricted troop and supply
movements. The key strategic region has been densely populated and highly
industrialized central Honshu, particularly the area from Tokyo to Kobe (see
Physical Setting, ch. 2).

Place in National Life

     Although the people have retained a deep suspicion of the armed services,
antimilitarism has moderated since the days when reaction to the defeat in
World War II and to the militarism of the past was at its most intense. Only
very rarely in the late 1970s were soldiers turned away from public ceremonies
or their children discriminated against, and not since the early 1970s has the
constitutionality of the SDF been challenged. Where in 1973 F-4 Phantom jets
were purchased without bombsights and in-flight refueling systems to ensure
that they could not be used for offensive purposes, in 1978 no such
requirements were placed on orders of F-15 Eagles. Subjects considered taboo
as late as the mid-1970s-conscription, changing the Constitution, expanding
the role of the SDF-were more widely debated in 1980-81.

     The military has continued to be viewed ambiguously, however, and fear of
militarism has persisted. Many continue to believe in the merits and efficacy
of pacifism as the nation's security doctrine. SDF personnel have not been
permitted on any university campus to pursue undergraduate or postgraduate
studies. Certain issues could still evoke public reaction, as in 1978 when the
Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the SDF had to resign after suggesting
that in the event of a surprise attack on the nation it might be dangerous to
follow legal procedures and wait to secure the prime minister's approval
before engaging the attacker.

     While the SDF were viewed more favorably in 1981 than in the past, basic
contradictions appeared to underlie public opinion regarding them. In 1980, 86
percent of those polled by the prime minister's office and 76 percent of those
by a major newspaper approved of the existence of the SDF. At the same time,
however, approximately equal numbers held favorable opinions of Article 9 of
the Constitution which, interpreted strictly, prohibited the existence of any
armed forces.

     In light of growing public willingness to confront defense issues, the
Defense Agency has sought to nourish and influence increased acceptance of the
SDF and has expressed its own opinions on the need for an enlarged defense
posture in order to prepare the public and other elements in the government to
accept that possibility. Its 1980 white paper enumerated serious weaknesses in
SDF equipment and pointed out possible threats to national security in Asia
and the Middle East.

     Increased political acceptability of the SDF has not necessarily
translated, however, into automatic support for an increased SDF role. Only 25
percent of persons polled in 1980 favored increasing the scale of the forces,
58 percent wanted them maintained at the present level, 11 percent believed
they should be reduced, and 6 percent had no opinion. In addition defense
issues have had no natural constituency in the National Diet, and though the
ruling, right-of-center Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) might have
ideologically favored an increased defense stance, the party has remained in
power by satisfying specific interests. Forced to choose between defense
spending and welfare outlays, pro-defense Diet members have not been able to
command high levels of vested-interest support and have not been as powerful
as representatives of competing interests.

     Conscious of the problematic nature of public attitudes toward the
military, the SDF has engaged extensively in civic action operations. The
forces have participated in public works projects, cooperated in managing
athletic events, taken part in annual Antarctic expeditions, and conducted
aerial surveys to report on ice conditions for fishermen and geographic
formations for construction projects. Particularly sensitive to maintaining
harmonious relations with communities close to defense bases, they have built
new roads, irrigation networks, and schools in those areas. Sound-proofing has
been installed in homes and public buildings near airfields. Despite these
measures, in some areas local resistance to military installations has
remained strong.

Missions

     Despite the nation's status as a major world power, Japan has eschewed
responsibility for regional defense. Having renounced war, the possession of
war potential, the right of belligerency, and the possession of nuclear
weaponry, it has held the view that it should possess only the minimum defense
necessary to face aggression by other nations. Within those limits, the
Self-Defense Forces Law of 1954 elaborates the basis from which various
formulations of the missions of the SDF have been derived. It states that the
ground, maritime, and air forces were to preserve the peace and independence
of the nation and maintain the national security by conducting operations on
land, sea, and in the air, respectively, in order to defend the nation against
direct and indirect aggression.

     The general framework through which these missions were to be
accomplished was stated in the Basic Policy for National Defense adopted by
the cabinet in 1957 and remaining in force in 1981. According to this
document, the nation's security would be achieved by supporting the United
Nations (UN) and international cooperation, by stabilizing domestic affairs
and enhancing public welfare; by developing gradually an effective
self-defense capability, and by dealing with external aggression through the
security treaty of 1952 and the 1960 treaty which superseded it. The
nonmilitary nature of the first two measures was regarded as evidence of the
nation's dedication to peace and its belief that such tactics were ultimately
more important in promoting national security than were military measures.

     The very general terms in which the military missions were couched left
specifics open to wide interpretation and prompted the criticism that the
nation did not possess military strategy. In the 1976 National Defense Program
Outline (NDPO) the cabinet sought to define the missions more specifically by
setting guidelines for the nation's readiness, which included specific
criteria for the maintenance and operation of the SDF. (see table 25,
Appendix). Under these guidelines, in cases of internal aggression or limited
external attack, the nation would respond promptly to bring the situation
under control. If enemy forces attacked in strength greater than Japan could
deal with alone, the SDF would engage the attacker until the United States
could come to its aid. To accomplish its missions the SDF would at all times
be vigilant; be able to respond to direct and indirect aggression; be capable
of providing command, communication, logistics, and training support; and be
available to aid in disaster relief.

     Under the outline, each of the forces was given quotas of personnel and
equipment that were deemed necessary to meet its tasks. More specific elements
of each force's mission were also named. The GSDF was to defend against ground
invasion and threats to internal security, be able to deploy to any part of
the nation, and protect the bases of all three SDF. The MSDF was to meet
invasion in the sea; guard and defend coastal waters, ports, bays, and major
straits; sweep mines; and patrol and survey the surrounding waters. The ASDF
was to render aircraft and missile interceptor capability, provide support
fighter units for maritime and ground operations, supply air reconnaissance
and air transport for all forces, and maintain airborne and stationary early
warning units.

     While more specific than earlier formulations of the SDF missions, the
1976 elaborations did not settle several important questions. Since particular
tasks were not assigned priorities, decisions regarding equipment continued to
be based on financial constraints rather than on strategic considerations. For
instance funding for major acquisitions such as destroyers was repeatedly cut,
while smaller items such as minesweepers were approved-fulfilling the
outline's quota for the minesweeping force rather than that for four escort
flotillas. The measures that the forces might take and still be acting in
self-defense were also not specified. It was unclear whether an invasion could
be stopped before it reached Japan's air space or territorial waters.

     Most important, the extent of the areas under the purview of the SDF was
not clearly delineated, especially the limits within which the MSDF was
responsible for maritime defense. Though formally assigned the defense of
territorial waters and (along with the Maritime Safety Agency) the protection
of the Japanese proclaimed 200-mile economic enforcement zone, the MSDF did
not possess the means to cover the large area that stretched from Hokkaido to
the Ryukyus. Moreover the nation relied on international trade, particularly
oil from the Mideast, and Japan-United States security arrangements did not
cover attacks on Japanese vessels in international waters. Throughout the late
1970s and early 1980s it was debated whether it was possible for Japan or any
nation to protect extended sea lanes and, if it was, would such activity
constitute legitimate self-defense. The statement by Prime Minister Suzuki
Zenko in May 1981 that Japan's defense efforts would cover several hundred
nautical miles of surrounding waters and 1,000 miles of sea lanes from
Japanese shores represented a public expression of a Defense Agency goal
formulated several years ago-it remains to be seen whether future budgets will
allow attainment of this capability.

     The SDF also had a disaster relief and internal security mission. Under
Article 83 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, units were expected to respond to
calls for assistance from prefectural governors to aid in fire-fighting,
searches for missing persons, rescues, and reinforcement of embankments and
levees in the event of flooding. As of 1981 the SDF have never been used in
police actions and appeared unlikely to be assigned any internal security
tasks in the future.