Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0026/00265.txt

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$Unique_ID{bob00265}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Israel
Chapter 3C.   Political Setting: Elite, Values, and Orientations}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Richard F. Nyrop}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{political
israel
elite
party
system
jewish
power
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population
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see
pictures
see
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}
$Date{1979}
$Log{}
Title:       Israel
Book:        Israel, A Country Study
Author:      Richard F. Nyrop
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1979

Chapter 3C.   Political Setting: Elite, Values, and Orientations

     When Israel became independent, the top echelons of its political elite
already had more than two decades of trial and error in self-government;
and the top leaders continued to dominate the political scene for another two
decades. Their paramount influence for nearly half a century both as
architects and prime movers of a Jewish national homeland has had enduring
effect on the political setting of Israel.

     The power elite, political values, and social reality entwine in complex
ways and in the process shape the character and direction of a given political
system. This holds true especially in the case of Israel, where ideological
imperatives have constituted an important part of Israeli evolution.

     The principal actors in the political arena continue to be Jews who
constitute nearly 85 percent of the population. Non-Jews, who are nearly all
Arabs, are not completely excluded from the political process, however; the
Arab minority has articulated its views through a few elected officials who
are traditionally associated with the dominant Labor Party. This pattern
appears to be changing in the mid- and late 1970s as increasing numbers of
Arab voters, especially the younger generation, are asserting themselves more
militantly through organizations and individuals calling for greater
protection of minority rights (see Other Parties, this ch.; The Arab
Minorities, ch. 2). Generally the Arabs remain attached to their political
and cultural values, but their ethnic homogeneity did not necessarily result
in their political cohesion. Internal fissures have made it difficult for them
to act in concert as a single pressure group in dealing with the Jewish
majority.

     The first generation of Israeli leaders came to Palestine mainly from
Russia and East European countries between 1900 and 1930. The Ashkenazim-as
the Jews of European origins are called, as distinguished from the Sephardim,
the Jews of Near Eastern and North African origins-were impelled by a vision
of social justice in a secure land where Jews could freely determine their own
destiny. To the early immigrants, the themes of sovereign Jewish
territoriality, egalitarianism, and an assorment of puritan ethics provided
the powerful impulses for sociopolitical action. These pioneers were
essentially socialist-Zionist with an abiding faith in the rectitude of values
that stressed, among other things, mutual assistance under the principle of
"From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs,"
abolition of private ownership of the means of production, and the idea that
man's consciousness and character are conditioned by social environment.

     Among other ideals were the themes that the Jewish land should be
developed in a collectivist agricultural framework, that well-to-do Jews in
the Diaspora should materially aid the cause of the Jewish homeland, and that
the Jews of the Diaspora should seek the fullest measure of redemption by
immigrating to the New Yishuv (see the New Yishuv, ch. 2). In addition the
democratic values of European origin in which the founding generation had been
socialized in varying intensity constituted an active force in affecting the
political orientation of Israel-before and since independence. These values
include respect for the dignity of man, for law, for education, and for the
equality of social and political rights. These are compatible with and are
reinforced by the Jewish tradition of high regard for learning.

     The value system of the first generation came to be exemplified first and
foremost in the kibbutz and to a lesser extent in the moshav (see Distinctive
Secular Institutions, ch. 2). Together these institutions held less than 10
percent of the Jewish population at any given time but have had a special
place in the society as the citadel of pioneer ideology; they gave Israel a
distinctive image of the nation as a robust, dedicated, egalitarian, farmer-or
citizen-soldier society. The kibbutz also produced a large number of national
leaders out of proportion to its small population; they provided the country
with some of its best soldiers.

     The founding fathers, including David Ben-Gurion, Itzhak Ben-Zvi, Moshe
Sharett, Levi Eshkol, and Golda Meir, in effect shaped the socioeconomic
structure and political pattern of Israel in their own image. They were
instrumental in organizing the Histadrut in 1920 and Mapai in 1930. These
organizations, along with the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency,
served as national institutions, shaping the character of the New Yishuv and
of postindependent Israel.

     From its earliest days Mapai, which had interlocked leadership with
Histadrut, dominated public life, and its legitimacy was seldom called into
question, as it was identified with the mystique of the Zionist struggle for
independence, patriotism, and the successful consolidation of statehood. The
essentially secular political values espoused by Mapai leaders were endorsed
by most of the Jewish population. The absence of countervalues made it
difficult to challenge the Mapai-controlled political mainstream. Moreover
political patterns since the 1920s have generally discouraged the rise of
radical and destabilizing tendencies. This is rooted in the strength of mutual
restraints inherent in Israel's diverse political subcultures.

     Israeli society is made up of people representing pluralistic cultural
and political backgrounds. Some Jews bear liberal European orientations, and
some were reared in authoritarian political cultures. Some are religiously
more conservative than others, and even among the Orthodox Jews, the shades of
conviction vary substantially over the role of customary Jewish laws and the
relationship between state and religion. Thus the founding fathers developed a
political system that can reconcile and accommodate the varied needs of the
New Yishuv and the Diaspora as well.

     The political system is geared to the broadest possible public
participation. Political activities are competitive and are not constrained by
any dictatorial tendencies . The agreement to disagree within the democratic
framework of conciliation has been an essential backbone of political life-an
article of faith cutting across all but a small part of extremist fringes on
the country's ideological spectrum.

     The freedom of political choice and communication is engrained in the
Jewish cultural tradition. It has lent itself to the evolution of a
politically alert electorate. The Israelis are among the best informed voters
anywhere in the world. This is partly because of a vigorous mass communication
system supported by the people. The press is as diversified as the population,
free of government cencorship except for matters affecting national security.
More than twenty newspapers are published as dailies in various languages (see
table 9, Appendix A). Radio and television are under the control of the Israel
Broadcasting Authority, which is subject to the general supervision of the
minister of culture and education. This agency is , however, autonomous and
operates under the self-governing broad of directors whose discretion over
content and presentation is only rarely interfered with.

     The freedom of partisan politics, coupled with an electoral system
resting on proportional representation, has ensured checks and balances,
making it difficult for any single party or pressure group to dictate public
life. To be sure, Orthodox religious groups have brought their influence to
bear on the secular majority of the population; this is done, however, not by
persuasion or in their own right but through a marriage of political
convenience dictated by the politics of coalition government (see Multiparty
System, this ch.). The inability of any single party to secure parliamentary
majority, inherent in the electoral system, has long placed a premium on
expediency (see The Electoral Process, this ch.). The politics of partnership
through compromise and bargaining as perfected by Mapai and its successors
contributed to the political longevity of the founding fathers, not to mention
their socialist-Zionist-egalitarian ideals.

     Political values are a product of a historically inherited social reality
as much as they are a product of a given political elite and more often than
not, both. They seldom perpetuate in a vacuum independently of objective
forces. As the society changes in temper and grows in complexity, so does
the value system. Seen in this perspective, the erosion of the founding
ideology in Israel is perhaps inevitable.

     From the mid-1960s on, a growing number of Israelis appeared to question
the relevance of the old values to changing realities. By its very nature and
given the pluralistic pressure and democratic norms of the country, the search
for relevance has been eclectic and evolutionary. The mood of assertiveness
and soul searching continued unabated, gathering momentum in response to
environmental pressures. This trend eventually has had an impact on political
competition, the composition of the power elite, and the value orientations of
the electorate.

     By the late 1960s the Israelis had witnessed the inexorable aging and
attrition of the old guard and qualitative changes in the demographic
character of the general population. Because of the patterns of immigration
and natural population increase in the years after independence, the Sabra
generation and the Sephardic population rose sharply in number, together
constituting a large majority of the population.

     By 1969 Sephardic immigrants and their descendants outnumbered their
Ashkenazic counterparts. The older Sephardim were, in general, from
authoritarian, North African and Near Eastern societies in which the European
left-wing political value spectrum had scant practical relevance. They were
not familiar with the tenets of secular socialist-Zionism and showed little
interest in it; they were accustomed to individuality and to strong
personality leadership rather than to the ideals of collectivism and of
popular sovereignty. Nonetheless the Sephardim were and are basically loyal
to the Jewish homeland as their proper place despite their lack of empathy
toward the doctrinaire socialist-Zionist themes of the Ashkenazic-dominated
political elite.

     The Sephardim constitute, as one Sephardic commentator once put it "the
second Israel"-the numerically larger (over 50 percent of the Jewish
population in the 1970s) but socially, culturally, economically, and
politically disadvantaged half of the nation. Not all Sephardim are deprived,
but nearly all the disadvantaged-almost all the 500,000 slum dwellers at the
beginning of 1977-belong to the Sephardic communities (see The Sephardim: A
Disadvantaged Majority, ch. 2). The communal gap and attendant tension has
naturally engaged the remedial efforts of successive governments, but results
have fallen far short of Sephardic expectations. The problem is rooted partly
in the political structure and process of the country; Ashkenazic dominance in
sociopolitical and economic life had been firmly institutionalized before
independence. Efforts to increase Sephardic representation have been
frustrated in light of the proportional representation system, which, as
practiced in Israel, generally favors the Ashkenazim irrespective of their
political persuasions.

     Not surprisingly, most Sephardim tended to vote against the Ashkenazic
establishment-Mapai and its heir, the Israel Labor Party. They lent support
to the major opposition led by Begin, whose hawkish posture in defense and
activism in foreign policy were seen to be generally compatible with the
Sephardic orientation. Paradoxically the Sephardim remain a principal
beneficiary of the socialist-inspired welfare system of Israel, a system built
by Mapai and sustained by the Israel Labor Party and its political ally, the
Histadrut; Begin's Likud, however, for years stood for a substantial
modification of the welfare system away from socialist emphasis (see Role of
Government, ch. 4). In any case, the Sephardic situation did not augur well
for the socialist-Zionist elite of the Israel Labor Party.

     Pressure for change has come also from the younger generation, both those
of Ashkenazic and of Sephardic origin, and from cities and villages. As a
group they had less obsession with the past than the elder generation; the
pathos of the older generation was seen to be increasingly irrelevant to new
realities. The youth of Israel were being oriented toward a strong,
industrialized, capitalist, Western-style, middle-class society as the
national norm-a trend away from socialism in general and Zionist socialism
in particular.

     Their growing concern went beyond the question of "Who is a Jew?" to
such mundane though critical issues as quality education, status, economic
rewards, and the comforts of modern life. Their primary interest has been how
to make Israel more secure from external threat and to improve the quality
of life for all-less as "Jews" than as "Israelis." The older commitment to
simplicity, frugality, self-sacrifice, and egalitarianism had only diminished
value to the young. Nevertheless the founding ideology itself remained
unaffected as a ritualized part of the political system-as the catalyst of
change in a bygone era but still constituting the foundation and symbolism
of a reconstructed, modern Israel.

     Urbanization and industrialization were equally potent forces of change;
their adulterating effect on the founding ideology has been particularly
significant. They have led to new demands, new opportunities, and new stresses
in the social and economic life affecting all social and political strata. The
older dedication to agriculture pioneering, and collectivism crumbled before
the relentless pressure of industrialization and the bridging of the gap
between urban and rural life. The once idyllic villages were defenseless
against the onslaught of bulldozers and factories, the influx of information
and new ideas through mass communication media, and the temptations of crass
materialism. The kibbutz idealism, the pride of Israel, declined in
fervor especially among the increasingly individualistic kibbutz youth.

     As the 1970s dawned the social base of politics had grown complex, and
this situation was being translated into political fluidity. A major catalyst
in the rise of a new mood was the October 1973 War-known in Israel as the Yom
Kippur War-that dealt a crushing blow to popular belief in the strength and
preparedness of Israel relative to Arab adversaries (see Security: A
Persistent National Concern, ch. 5). The result was a loss of confidence in
the power elite headed at the time by Prime Minister Meir and Minister of
Defense Moshe Dayan. Charges and countercharges concerning the allegedly
inadequate military preparations ensued after the war in which Egyptian and
Syrian forces had scored military gains. Nevertheless Meir's government
was returned to power in the eighth parliamentary election held on December
31, 1973, apparently because despite misgivings, many Israelis believed that
continuity was preferable to change and uncertainty under Begin's untried
center-right Likud.

     Meir's resignation from the premiership in April 1974 was notable for
two reasons-the crisis of leadership succession that followed and the
departure from the national scene of the last of the old guard. Her departure
triggered political infighting within the power elite of the Israel Labor
Party; the situation was aggravated by a series of scandals affecting the
Labor government. The spiraling of inflationary pressures and its adverse
effects on the bread-and-butter issues of the citizens further compounded the
difficulties of the government.

     Doubtless, the most striking political development in the 1970s was the
ascendance of a new power group after May 1977. A startling upset victory in
the ninth parliamentary election held at that time brought to the pinnacle
of power Begin's center-right Likud, ending half a century of rule by the
prolabor, socialist-Zionist Israel Labor Party. The new power elite was, on
balance, more in tune with the increasingly assertive mood of the younger
generation and of the Sephardim voters; their electoral success was based as
much on their projection of a new image as a group dedicated to Israeli
nationalism as on the defection to them of traditionally prolabor voters
(see The 1977 Election, this ch.).

     Political power in Israel has been contested within the framework of
multiparty competition and of elections held every four years. Civilian
supremacy over the military has not been challenged at any time. Factors
weighing against military interference have been the broad popular support
for and identification with the nonpartisanship of the armed forces. To be
sure, given the ever-present external threat, the military looms large in the
everyday life of Israelis. And in the years after the 1973 war, the number
of retired generals who were co-opted into the political elite rose sharply;
among these are Ezer Weizman, Moshe Dayan, Ariel (Arik) Sharon, Yigael Yadin,
Yitzhak Rabin, Haim Bar-Lev, Aharron Yariv, Yigal Allon, Israel Galili, and
Chaim Herzog. The elite status of these ex-military figures is based for the
most part on the recognition by professional party executives that military
expertise has taken on a progressively important role in the management of
national affairs. The retired generals, however, have not formed any pressure
group, singly or along party lines. The armed forces remain effectively
shielded from intrusions of partisan politics (see Political Impact, ch. 5).

     The top echelons of the 1970s were still predominantly Ashkenazim; many
of them came to Palestine during the 1930s and the 1940s. Nearly two-thirds
had university educations; about 36 percent of the whole gives their formal
education as "religious"-the approximate proportion of the general population
for whom Jewish religious principles continue to form the main frame of value
orientations. The political elite were overwhelmingly urban in residence-Tel
Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa being the three main centers; among the members of
rural residence, most were representatives of kibbutzim and to a lesser
extent, of moshavim. Occupationally the category of professional party
politicians was by far the largest single group, followed in order by lawyers,
kibbutz farmers, educators, company managers, journalists, and ex-members of
civil and military bureaucracies. Many of the elite were in the age bracket
of forty to sixty.

     As of 1978 the political elite numbered approximately 200 individuals,
excluding the broader social elite encompassing the business, religious,
educational, cultural, and agricultural groups. The number would be somewhat
larger if senior officials in such key offices as the Office of the Prime
Minister and the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and treasury were
included. The power status of individuals varies, of course, depending on
their personal reputation and the public offices they hold. The most
influential members were found in the cabinet and the inner circle of a given
power group. The 120-member Knesset was second only to the cabinet in power
and prestige; some Knesset members-those serving as cabinet ministers-were
more influential than others. Given the ingrained political pattern in which
political career is determined by the oligarchs in Israeli political life, the
elders of the major parties were also considered as part of the political
elite. Top leaders of Histadrut were also reckoned as influential politically.
In addition, the elected mayors of larger municipalities take on considerable
importance in that local politics and elections more often than not entwine
with and affect politics at the national level. On the nonpartisan level, the
president of the state, the justices of the Supreme Court, and the head of
the Office of the State Comptroller are as prestigious as the cabinet members
but are without decisionmaking responsibility.

     The criteria for entrance to elite positions are, as before, open and
highly competitive. Political parties continue to be the principal for
vehicle for mobility; under the country's electoral system of proportional
representation, participation in party politics remains essential except for
limited cases of co-optation from non-party circles. Invariably the decision
affecting individual mobility within the party system is made by a select
few in the inner sanctum of each political party, not by the electorate. This
situation places a high premium on partisan loyalty, individual competence,
and party discipline; these qualities must be demonstrated to the party
elders, not the grass roots who, unlike in other electoral systems, must vote
as members of a single national constituency.

     Personal qualities in themselves, however, are not sufficient. It appears
that, other things being equal, qualified status seekers are likely to succeed
when they have access to protektzia, the Israeli pattern of mutual assistance
through informal contacts among friends. The power of personal connection is
evidently potent, but given the broadly representative and pluralistic
character of the elite, the emergence of a socially exclusive, politically
self-perpetuating class has not been possible.

     The Israeli leaders, be they in power or in opposition, secularist,
Zionist, or ultra-Orthodox, are fundamentally loyal to the state. From all
indications they are adaptive to the changing realities of the country and
are responsive to popular needs. Their acceptance of Zionist and religious
symbols varies in fervency in light of their diverse backgrounds and
orientations, but internal cleavages have not undermined the essential unity
of the body politic. On the whole they are committed to the fullest
realization of democratic values, and their differences are centered mainly
on tactics rather than the ultimate goal of establishing a democratic,
modernized, prosperous welfare state.