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$Unique_ID{bob00218}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Indonesia
Chapter 4B.   Regional Government}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Riga Adiwoso-Suprapto}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{political
government
soeharto
military
officers
abri
abri's
economic
golkar
group}
$Date{1982}
$Log{}
Title:       Indonesia
Book:        Indonesia, A Country Study
Author:      Riga Adiwoso-Suprapto
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1982

Chapter 4B.   Regional Government

     In 1982 the territorial administration had four tiers. The first level
had 24 provinces, or propinsi (also known as regions), and three
provincial-level special territories-Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Aceh. Some 250
districts, or regencies (kabupaten), constituted the second level. The third
and fourth tiers consisted of 3,350 subdistricts, or kecamatan, and 62,900
villages, respectively.

     Indonesia inherited a diverse administrative pattern, which had been
developed to accommodate the widely divergent regional circumstances. The
question of centralization and uniformity, as opposed to decentralization, was
therefore a major political issue through the 1950s. Some argued that
centralization was essential to the creation of an effective, stable political
order, whereas others insisted that the same objective could be achieved
through a decentralized political structure, citing the tradition of local
self-rule in many of the country's far-flung island territories. Proponents of
federalism generally favored the initiation of measures for local
self-government. The first step in such a direction was a 1957 law providing
the provincial, district, and municipal authorities with popularly elected
assemblies, which in turn were to elect executive officers at the
corresponding levels.

     The incipient step was reversed in 1959 when Sukarno reinstated the 1945
Constitution and set in motion the process of Guided Democracy. The elected
local assemblies became appointive, as were the positions of locally elected
chief executives. The governor of the province became a presidential
appointee, and district chiefs, or regents, and municipal mayors were
appointed by the minister of home affairs.

     Since 1966, as part of efforts to encourage more local involvement in
developmental activities, local elections have been revived. In 1971 regional
representative assemblies (DPRD) were elected at the provincial and district
levels, but the governors, district chiefs, and mayors continued to be
appointed by the government. These officials are assisted by the
provincial-level advisory organ called the Regional Leadership Council
(Muspida), which is chaired by the provincial army commander. Other council
members include the provincial governor (vice chairman), the chief of police,
the chief prosecutor, and the district judge. In 1974 a regional autonomy act
was passed so that the governor would henceforth be elected by the
provincial-level DPRD from a list of three to five candidates prepared by the
minister of home affairs. Under the law, however, the election would become
official only when the governor-elect was formally appointed by the president.

     In the early 1980s all local authorities continued to function as
extensions of the central government, serving as they did to ensure Jakarta's
tight political and administrative grip on local affairs. There was an
unmistakable trend whereby the profile of the central government was getting
larger, if a new law on village administration enacted in 1979 was any
indication. Under this bill villages were divided into two types: villages
outside urban areas and villages within urban areas. This law makes the
villages the lowest administrative tier and seeks among other things to bring
uniformity to village administration but, more importantly, to make the
headmen accountable to the district chiefs, who are empowered under that
law to remove incompetent or corrupt headmen. Headmen of villages outside
urban areas are still elected by secret ballot, and headmen of those within
urban areas are now civil servants, appointed by the district chiefs acting in
behalf of the provincial governors. In theory, all headmen are supposed to run
their villages, as they have done in the past, but how much autonomy they are
allowed was difficult to ascertain in the early 1980s. On balance, it appears
that the real purpose of the 1979 law is to bring more government authority to
bear on the grass-roots level, so that the village administration can provide
the improved infrastructure needed for accelerating rural development.

The Government and Mass Media Communication

     The government has continued to underscore the role of communication as a
vital link in its strategy of national development. Its search for unity,
consensus, stability, and economic growth is seen as being substantially aided
by "free and responsible" mass media. In the government's view, the press can
play a constructive role by strictly adhering to the rules governing
objectivity, balance, and accuracy. The basic principle behind the
government's information policy was restated by Soeharto in February 1981
while addressing a national conference of the Indonesian Journalists
Association. He stated that, like other sectors, the Indonesian press should
develop in keeping with the nation's identity and needs and should not
"imitate the freedom of the press in other countries."

     The authorities have been concerned about the potential-positive and
negative-of the mass media. Friendly and supportive media have been seen as
essential to the government effort to convey its intentions and policies to
every segment of the population, to minimize the consequences of ethnic and
religious diversity, and to improve the country's international image. As a
result the government has remained sensitive to the problems of freedom and
restraint in public communication and has felt justified in guiding closely
the operation of the mass media. Such an effort has had the predictable
constraining effect on the mass media.

     Control of information has been ensured partly by the government
operation of television and almost all radio stations and partly by the
imposition of sanctions (such as a jail term of up to 20 days and revocation
of publication permit) on the offending journalists or media. Information
policy is under the central direction of the Department of Information, which
has at its disposal the Indonesian National News Service (Antara) and
government-subsidized newspapers, weeklies, and other periodicals. Moreover,
the department is responsible for coordination of all official public
relations activities at the provincial and district levels. The expanding
government role in the field of mass communication has also narrowed the scope
of the opposition's access to neutralize domestic and foreign news perceived
to be favorable to the Soeharto leadership.

     As of 1979 (the latest year for which information was available) 52
percent of all daily newspaper circulation was attributable to the capital
city of Jakarta. The official intention, however, was to increase the
availability of newspapers to the provinces, especially the rural areas where
roughly 80 percent of the people lived. Generally, there was more emphasis on
increasing the radio and television audiences because the electronic
media-some 20 million radio receivers and 1.6 million television sets as of
August 1980-could reach a much larger proportion of the population than could
the printed media. Many villager's illiteracy was another reason for the
official emphasis on the electronic media.

     Officially, Indonesia does not have press censorship, except for foreign
films and publications. Many printed media are private, and journalists and
publishers have generally followed what is known as "self-censorship"-a
function of their prudent sensitivity to limits of free expression and
dissent. A notable tendency in the early 1980s was the government's growing
displeasure with what it regarded as Western reporters' anti-Indonesian bias.
Convinced that some foreign correspondents and newspapers were preoccupied
with criticism and not enough praise, the authorities reacted by banning
foreign newspapers or by refusing to have these correspondents' visas renewed.

The New Order Since 1978

     In late 1977, as the Indonesians faced the near certainty of Soeharto's
reelection to a third five-year term in 1978 by the MPR, a new wave of
antiregime sentiments gained momentum among university students. Student
unrest was nothing new. There had been a major student outburst in 1974 and
minor ones intermittently thereafter. The targets of student criticism in late
1977 and in January 1978 were wide ranging, and echoes from the past were
plentiful. Student protesters, mostly from two institutions-the University of
Indonesia and the Bandung Institute of Technology-charged that the Soeharto
government was corrupt, politically repressive, intolerant of Islam, overly
dependent on foreign aid and investment, insensitive to the plight of the poor
urban and village dwellers, and permissive toward the Chinese domination of
the economy. Student activists, in the roles of self-appointed critics and
reformers, also spoke against what they called "the mere facade of
parliamentary representation."

     Increasingly apprehensive about the possibility of a rerun of the 1974
student riots, the commanding officers of the armed forces in December 1977
issued a statement pledging their unqualified support for the Soeharto
leadership, warning at the same time that they would take firm action against
anyone trying to destabilize the political system. At the height of student
unrest in January 1978, Kopkamtib intervened forcibly, cracking down on
protestors and shutting down temporarily seven independent newspapers for
reporting the student demonstrations. What disturbed the security authorities
most was a statement issued by the students opposing Soeharto's bid for
another term.

     Soeharto was reelected on March 22, 1978, and on the next day Adam Malik,
former foreign minister, was elected vice president. Both were unopposed.
Soeharto's candidacy was backed by the two opposition parties, PPP and PDI,
and by Golkar. A new cabinet was announced a week later. It was notable for
three reasons: it showed an increase in the military representation; a
reform-minded general was appointed as new minister of defense and security;
and for the first time the cabinet included no representatives of the
opposition parties. According to the 1979 edition of the Asia Yearbook,
published by the Far Eastern Economic Review, apparently Soeharto dropped the
opposition representatives because he saw "no reason to pander to the whims of
the politically truculent PPP and no reason to waste a seat on the politically
emasculated" PDI (see Political Organizations, this ch.). In late March 1978
Soeharto also appointed Sudomo as head of Kopkamtib, a post hitherto held by
the president himself.

     Soeharto's reelection coincided with the inauguration of the third
five-year development plan, Repelita III for fiscal years (FY) 1979-83. There
was a new emphasis in this plan on the official readiness to distribute the
benefits of economic development more equitably. The intention of government
planners was to narrow the disparity between urban and rural areas by
providing improved housing and health and educational services for the
villagers. Apparently, they were aware of the need to address growing popular
grievances with deteriorating living conditions, which could be exploited by
the opposition groups.

     During 1979 students and the press were subdued, and both the PPP and the
PDI were rent by fractional wranglings over positions and platforms. There
were two notable developments during the year, however. One was concerned with
the matter of presidential succession and the related question of the
transition of power from the older officers of the Generation of 1945 to the
younger generation of ABRI officers. These issues surfaced for the first time
in May 1979 when General Sumitro, then in retirement and head of Kopkamtib
until 1974, publicly stated that the next president should not necessarily be
a military man and that the matter of succession should be debated in a
constructive and open manner. A month later, General Abdul Haris Nasution,
also retired and the former minister of defense and security, indicated, apart
from endorsing Sumitro's view, that the question of presidential succession
had been discussed frequently by certain military circles "outside the
official forum." The two generals were known to be at odds with Soeharto, and
thus the topics in question were not to be heard of again in the Indonesian
printed media.

     The other notable development was concerned with ABRI's political role.
At issue was the question of whether the armed forces should throw their
weight behind Golkar, as had been the case hitherto, or whether they should
stand above all political parties as the defense establishment for all
segments of the society. Jusuf, the prime moving force since March 1978, in a
concerted drive aimed at promoting professionalism, stamping out corruption,
and boosting the morale of the common soldier, was among the principal
proponents for separating ABRI from Golkar. The issue was hotly debated at a
major Golkar conference in October 1979, but Jusuf's view, though applauded by
the PPP and PDI, was not widely shared by his peers at the top rung of the
power structure. Sudomo was said to have declared that ABRI was "absolutely
Golkar," an allusion to the necessity of military support for Golkar in the
1982 elections.

     Any doubts concerning ABRI's future political role were laid to rest in
March 1980 when Soeharto, in a speech to a group of commanding officers,
lashed out at unnamed groups that he regarded as still uncommitted to
pancasila and still beholden to "Marxism, Leninism, communism, socialism,
Marhaenism [Sukarno's brand of nationalism], nationalism, and religion." He
went on to urge ABRI to "choose its partners from like-minded groups who truly
defend the pancasila." Apparently, Soeharto's speech was an attack on the PPP
for its opposition to pancasila and quite possibly also on a group of retired
military officers who had been critical of his leadership.

     Soeharto's statement, repeated in essence in the following month, did not
go unchallenged. In May 1980 a group of 50 prominent citizens, including some
of the most respected elder statesmen, delivered a signed "statement of
concern" to the MPR. In that statement the "Petition 50" signers charged that
Soeharto had used pancasila as a tool to attack his political opponents
contrary to the original purpose of unifying the nation. The group also
criticized Soeharto for urging ABRI "to choose friend and foe on the basis of
the opinion of the authorities only" and also for creating the impression that
Soeharto was "the personification of pancasila, so that every whisper against
him can be interpreted as a stand against pancasila."

     Kopkamtib and Bakin denounced the petitioners' action as "a
constitutional coup d'etat," but no arrests were made, the reasoning being
that arrests would exacerbate a situation that did not threaten the security
of the nation. Nevertheless, they placed the petitioners under 24-hour
surveillance, indicating also that the government would strike back at them
sooner or later, one way or another. On a more positive level, however, the
government issued its own answer to the petitioners' charges. In his address
to the opening session of the DPR in August 1980, Soeharto stated that
economic development was not possible without political stability and that to
achieve economic development, without neglecting the development of the
political, sociocultural, and defense-security sectors, Indonesia must be able
to maintain "dynamic national stability." This stability, Soeharto emphasized,
could be secured only on the basis of pancasila in a true family spirit of
consultation, consensus, and mutual assistance rather than relying on
"excessive practical political activities" of a bygone, discredited era. This
was why, he continued, ABRI must remain as "the stabilizing and dynamic force
in political life and in the execution of development." Thus, it was incumbent
on ABRI to "join hands with all our national forces who unhesitatingly defend
pancasila...." It was, he stressed, "ABRI's duty to persuade and convince
those who still hesitate of the correctness of pancasila based on its
experience."

     During 1980, apart from the "statement of concern" episode, there were
tensions between university students and the government. Students continued to
defy government efforts to "normalize campus life." There were also social
tensions having ethnic-economic implications between the indigenous Indonesian
businessmen pribumi (see Glossary) and some 4 million members of the
economically powerful Chinese minority. In April anti-Chinese riots broke out
in Ujung Pandang, the capital city of South Sulawesi Province, a staunchly
Muslim area where pribumi demonstrators attacked Chinese-owned nightclubs and
massage parlors. Later in November a new round of anti-Chinese violence spread
from Solo in Central Java Province to several other nearby towns, the Chinese
community suffering considerable property damage.

     The year 1981 saw more dissidents' petitions sent to the MPR, asserting
that the Soeharto government had failed to develop a truly democratic system.
These petitions had no impact, however, partly because the local press was
told not to publicize them. Otherwise, politics were concerned, for the most
part, with what the government would regard as legitimate business.
Particularly noticeable were preliminaries for the coming parliamentary
elections in May 1982 and the outpouring of supposedly spontaneous popular
support for Soeharto's nomination for another term to begin in 1983.

     Election campaigning, limited to 30 days before voting day, was marred
somewhat by the outbreak of riots in Jakarta, which the authorities said were
started by Muslim extremists. The elections were contested by the three
political organizations, Golkar, and the two opposition parties, the PPP and
the PDI. Of some 82 million voters registered to elect 364 new parliamentary
members, about 75 million voters cast ballots. Golkar received 64.3 percent of
the valid votes, as compared with 27.8 percent for the PPP, and 7.9 percent
for the PDI. Of the 364 seats contested, Golkar captured 246 seats; the PPP,
94; and the PDI, 24 (see table 15, Appendix). These 364 representatives would
be joined by 100 more deputies appointed by the president (see Legislative
Bodies, this ch.). One notable aspect of the results that was the PPP lost to
Golkar in its traditionally safe constituencies in Jakarta and elsewhere. The
PDI's already limited strength declined further. In any case the "Petition 50"
group challenged the validity of the election results, asserting that there
were irregularities in the May 4 poll-official witnesses being prevented from
carrying out their poll functions-in the distribution of voting cards and in
vote counting. The group also complained that there were no formal
institutions through which voters could channel their protests.

     In July 1982 Soeharto announced that the fourth term of office he would
seek in March 1983 would be his last. The fourth five-year plan, due to start
in FY 1984, would be his "last dedication to the nation," and the fifth
five-year plan would be carried out by "the younger generation." At about the
same time, Sudomo stated that the armed forces were ready to ensure the
success of the presidential election in 1983. On the issue of the transfer,
Soeharto said in August 1982 that the transfer of responsibility from
generation to generation was basically a "proper and natural process," in
which the younger generation would play an increasingly larger role "in the
coming years."

The Power Structure

     Perhaps the most salient feature of the power structure has been the
remarkable stability of military predominance, which has been sustained under
ABRI's self-imposed doctrine of dual civil and military functions.
Institutionalized by both the passage of time and the force of circumstances,
the dual function has been held as an essential condition of political
stability and national economic development. In March 1981 Soeharto told the
graduating army officers of the Armed Forces Academy of the Republic of
Indonesia (Akabri) to make themselves ready to carry on the dual mission,
which he said should neither be regarded as contradicting the principles of
pancasila democracy nor be judged by the standards of "a foreign democracy."
In so exhorting these young officers, the president was reconfirming the
centrality of ABRI in the political arena as the single most powerful
institutional base of support for his leadership and as the nucleus of the
power structure that he had presided over since 1966. In 1982 ABRI's
privileged status appeared unlikely to be changed in the near future, barring
unforeseen circumstances. Its extensive roots in the political and economic
structures were deeply embedded, allowing virtually no room for the growth of
nonmilitary groups.

     Generally, the members of the governing elite were of bureaucratic
background, were centered in Jakarta and other major cities, and were largely
Javanese-traditionally the dominant ethnic group in numerical and political
terms. Many of them were nominal Muslims, or abangan, influenced to a degree
by a lingering mixture of Hindu-Buddhist and Javanese mystic beliefs (see The
Abangan Pattern, ch. 2). Non-Javanese groups from the Outer Islands (see
Glossary) and devout Muslims, or santri, who numbered about 20 percent of the
population, were underrepresented as well in the top and middle echelons of
the power hierarchy. Given the potential that such underrepresentation would
be exploited by the opposition, the Soeharto government was striving in
earnest to improve its image as the protector for all segments of the
population. Grass-roots representation through the existing three political
organizations and the efforts to distribute the benefits of economic
development more equitably were regarded by the government as sufficient
evidence of benevolent official intentions. In 1982, however, Soeharto's
credibility still seemed strained, in the eyes of a small number of vocal
opponents, because the existing political system was seen as too restrictive
and the gap between rich and poor viewed as widening.

     ABRI's preeminence was owed to many forces at work since 1945, when
senior military officers still active in the early 1980s had taken part in
the armed struggle against the Dutch for independence (see The National
Revolution, 1945-50, ch. 1). The Generation of 1945 has since formed the
mainstay of the armed forces, which in turn has been the most effective
stabilizing force in times of national emergencies. In adversity, punctuated
by the difficulty of forging a consensus out of pluralistic pulls and
pressures and by the tentativeness of party politics catering to narrow
sectional interests, ABRI has proved to be, as much by default as design, the
only cohesive and disciplined institution capable of bringing order and
stability. The force of circumstances, plus the strong paternalistic strains
in the Javanese political culture, has on balance been conducive to the
evolution of bureaucratic authoritarianism under the guidance of ABRI. Once
entrenched in positions of influence garnished with opportunities for
enrichment, the military officers have found it necessary to legitimize their
"civic mission." They have been singularly reluctant to relinquish their
privileged positions, and one notable consequence has been their indifference
to the training of civilians for future political leadership.

     For the moment, however, ABRI's domination is not open to challenge by
any other sociopolitical group. Undeniably, the armed forces have continued to
hold the edge in the level of political, administrative, and managerial skills
they collectively acquired after 1966. To be sure, ABRI's professional
reputation has been marred somewhat by a refined taste for high living that
has been attributed to some of its senior officers; but any precipitous change
designed to extricate the military from the political process might well have
far-ranging and uncertain consequences. Meanwhile, ABRI's dominance will
continue to be tempered somewhat by cooperation with career civil servants
and technocrats. If the past is any indication, the civilians as a group will
continue their role as junior partner.

     ABRI's paramountcy has been ensured by extensive representation in top
central government positions. Uniformed officers in civilian assignments, or
on the civil side of their dual function, have been far outnumbered by civil
servants, but a different perspective emerges when it is considered that ABRI
has retained a near monopoly of all sensitive government positions. This point
is cogently illustrated in an informative study by John A. MacDougall on
patterns of military domination in the Indonesian bureaucracy. According to
his study, the top 145 positions in the central government were evenly split
at the end of 1981 between military and civilian functionaries, but this was
misleading in that the military slots were concerned with decisionmaking and
supervisory responsibilities, whereas the civilian slots were related for the
most part to the highly specialized functions of a technical and supportive
nature.

     The 145 positions identified by MacDougall, the presidency aside, were
found in the State Secretariat, the cabinet, and the 17 departments. The
military share of these positions generally correlated with the degrees of
influence each department could bring to bear on guaranteeing control and
loyalty. Thus military representation was 100 percent in the case of the
Department of Home Affairs. Departments in charge of information, social
affairs, religious affairs, justice, manpower and transmigration, education
and culture, foreign affairs, and communications had more military officials
at the top levels than the civilians.

     Realistically, from the standpoint of control and supervision, the most
powerful agency, second only to the presidency, was Kopkamtib, widely feared
for its secret police functions. This agency had broad powers to deal with any
situation or issue that could be seen as affecting political stability.
Kopkamtib and Bakin maintained regional branches that worked closely with
Hankam's regional defense commands and the territorial administrations
answerable to the minister of home affairs.

     The power structure was maintained also by ABRI's firm grip on Golkar,
the government's surrogate party, which lent an appearance of broad popular
support for the incumbent regime (see Golkar, this ch.). Another source of
support was a group of retired military officers placed as directors of state
enterprises in oil, timber, tin and other minerals, and rice distribution.
These enterprises were said to be a major source of "extra-budgetary" income
for ABRI. In this regard, the pribumi were also supportive of the Soeharto
leadership evidently because they depended heavily on government contracts and
subsidies. The interests of the pribumi were primarily economic, as were those
of their Chinese counterparts with whom they have been in competition and in
cooperation as well. In 1982 the Chinese business community held dominant
positions in private banking, medium-scale manufacturing, and wholesale and
retail distribution (see Entrepreneurship, ch. 3). So influential were the
Chinese economically that they have been popularly regarded as the
behind-the-scenes partners of some powerful military officials who could grant
licenses and concessions and provide protection in exchange for monetary
favors.

     Within the power structure there was a group of mostly American-trained
economists-technocrats. As senior members of Bappenas, they have continued to
enjoy the trust of Soeharto for their creditable performance as presidential
economic aides and formulators of macroeconomic policy since the mid-1960s.
Their influence in economic policymaking appeared likely to remain as long as
the president was committed to the view that economic growth and political
stability were interlocked and mutually reinforcing. There was also another
group of intellectuals associated with the private think tank, the Center for
Strategic and Intelligence Studies, which had some influence as a major source
of innovative thinking on matters of public policy. Some intellectuals on its
staff, said to be more "nationalist" than their Bappenas counterparts,
concurrently held important government positions. Their "patron saint" was
Ali Murtopo, minister of information and one of Soeharto's longtime advisers.

     As 1982 was drawing to a close, ABRI's future as the centerpiece of the
power structure seemed securely in place, but there was speculation concerning
a possible generational shift in leadership positions. By law the last of the
Generation of 1945 will have been pensioned off by the end of 1985 upon
reaching the retirement age of 55. But there was little cause to believe that
the old soldiers would simply fade away. On the contrary, if the past was any
clue, they appeared likely to remain in control of most, if not all, top
civilian assignments by simply retiring in place or by presidential
appointment upon or after retirement. If so, young officers may gain control
of the staff and command structure, or the military side of the dual function,
leaving the civil side largely in the hands of the older officers. In such an
eventuality the doctrine of dual function may become moot or diluted in time;
but in 1982 it was unclear whether the younger officers might acquiesce in the
separation of the dual function or seek to redefine its relevance in a new
political environment.