Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0014/00144.txt

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$Unique_ID{bob00144}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Brazil
Chapter 5B.   Political Role}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Eugene K. Keefe}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{military
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air
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armed
army
arms
service
training
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see
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}
$Date{1982}
$Log{See Aircraft*0014401.scf
}
Title:       Brazil
Book:        Brazil, A Country Study
Author:      Eugene K. Keefe
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1982

Chapter 5B.   Political Role

     A line in the Brazilian military anthem declares, "we are the guardians
of the nation." The armed forces, more specifically, the regular officers of
the armed forces, have traditionally given broader meaning to the phrase than
mere defense against external foes. The military hierarchy has thought of
itself as a stabilizing force, ready to intervene when necessary for the
preservation of the country's laws and institutions. This view, however, was
not only self-asserted but was also endorsed by civilian constituent
assemblies that invariably charged the military with the duty of bolstering
the political structure. In governmental crises in 1930, 1945, 1954, and 1961,
various leading politicians and numerous writers appealed to the military to
perform the role of "moderator" that had come to be expected by politicians
and public alike (see The Vargas Era, 1930-45, ch. 1). Traditionally, the army
has been prominent in military interventions in governmental affairs and it
has been dominant in the military governments that have ruled since 1964.

     Historically, the army had thought of its political interventions as
temporary aberrations, that is, involvement in the political process until
order had been established, after which the reins of government were returned
to civilians and soldiers returned to their barracks. A turning point came in
1964, however, when the officers who perpetrated the coup labeled it a
revolution and established themselves as a new government. In late 1982 the
military hierarchy was well into its nineteenth year as the government of
Brazil, but some signs pointed to a return to democratic processes, and some
Brazilians, as well as outside observers, were of the opinion that when his
term ends in 1985, President Figueiredo might be followed by a popularly
elected president. Others thought it would be 1991 before a civilian held the
highest office (see Electoral Politics, ch. 4). The fact that Vice President
Antonio Aureliano Chaves de Mendonca-a civilian-was permitted to fulfill his
constitutional duties to assume the presidential responsibilities when
Figueiredo was hospitalized in 1981 was seen as a step toward democratization.
During a similar crisis in 1969 when President Costa e Silva was
incapacitated, the military high command stepped in immediately to push aside
the civilian vice president and keep the presidency in its own hands.

     A key institution in the formation and evolution of the broadened concept
of the military in post-World War II Brazilian life has been the Superior War
College (Escola Superior de Guerra-ESG). Created in 1949, the mission of the
college was stated as the preparation of selected military and civilian
personnel for the executive and advisory positions, especially in those
government agencies responsible for the formulation, development, planning,
and execution of national security policies. It is important to note that
high-ranking civilians have always made up a substantial part of the student
body at the ESG. A related institution having an important role in inculcating
the same concepts of national security has been the Army Command and General
Staff School (Escola de Commando e Estado Maior do Exercito-ECEME). The
curricula at both schools emphasized that the military, because of its
expertise in national security affairs, must play the leading role in
government (see Training, this ch.).

Economic and Social Role

     The Brazilian armed forces have a long tradition of participation in
so-called civic action programs and have made important contributions to the
development of the economy. These programs have resulted in substantial
achievement in the communications and transportation fields, particularly in
the vast hinterland of the huge country. The army, for example, was
responsible for much of the building of roadbeds and the tracklaying in the
extensive railroad construction program and also built many of the highways to
the remote border areas which, though largely uneconomical, had strategic
importance. Army engineer construction battalions have also erected dams,
power plants, and bridges.

     The air force, through its Directorate of Civil Aviation, was responsible
for the early development of civil air operations. In addition to subsidizing
the purchase of equipment for private airlines, the air force also instituted
airmail and passenger service to sparsely settled areas that would not have
been profitable for private companies. The navy carried out an extensive
mapping program in the Amazon Basin region through its Directorate of
Hydrographics and Navigation. Other naval components have provided rescue
operations, medical assistance and training, and literacy programs.

     An unusual contribution to the economy by individual officers of the
three armed forces has been participation as executives in various commercial
enterprises. Officers on detached service have headed state organizations,
such as the Brazilian Petroleum Corporation (Petroleo Brasileiro-Petrobras),
the Volta Redonda steel mill, the merchant marine, the postal and telegraph
service, some national railroads and airlines, the National Motor Plant, and
some aircraft factories. The military services have also built their own
equipment plants, munitions factories, and shipyards, which have provided
considerable civilian employment in addition to conserving foreign exchange by
restricting imports.

     Perhaps a surprise to some critics has been the fact that during more
than 18 years in power the military regime had not appropriated excessively
large sums of money to build up the armed forces. For the fiscal year ending
December 31, 1981, Brazil spent about US$1.7 billion on defense, which
amounted to 7.8 percent of the overall budget of the central government. For
comparison with other Latin America, countries during the same period, defense
spending in Argentina and Mexico accounted for 16.6 percent and 2.3 percent
of their overall budgets, respectively. Less money was spent on defense by the
military regime in the early 1980s than had been expended for the same purpose
by the last civilian government during the early 1960s.

     General Walter Pires de Carvalho e Albuquerque, minister of army,
speaking only for his own service, said in 1980 that the army budget had been
considerably reduced during the 1970s, and one independent estimate stated
that the central government's budget allotted to the military had been reduced
from 9.5 percent in 1976 to 7.8 percent in 1981. After the Falklands/Malvinas
war in 1982, however, Pires and his navy and air force counterparts became
vociferous in advocating much larger defense expenditures.

     In its social role the military has served as a channel for upward social
mobility. The officer class, predominantly of upper class origin in the
nineteenth century, was estimated to be approximately 80 percent of
middle-class origin in the 1980s. Because of their middle-class backgrounds,
many officers reportedly shun the ostentatious life-style of the leading
industrialists, but at the same time, they have not supported populist demands
for more equitable distribution of income. The military hierarchy tended to
view the high economic growth rate of the 1970s as a justification of its
stewardship, but it has been reluctant to accept responsibility for the
economic woes of the early 1980s and the failure of the "trickle-down" theory
to improve living conditions for the lower classes.

     In the past the armed forces had a high level of acceptance among the
general population. These attitudes were attributed not only to a long
tradition of civic action but also to the army's general avoidance of violent
confrontations with the poorest members of society who live in the shantytowns
(favelas) around the major cities. The army preferred to leave the handling of
public disorder to the police, except when the latter were unable to control a
situation considered to be dangerous. In addition, soldiers did not become
estranged from their own people, generally returning to their homes after a
year or less of conscript service. Officers have not taken on the attributes
of a separate class but have remained essentially middle class.

     As the second decade of military rule nears its end, some officers have
expressed the fear that their governing role over such a long period has hurt
their image as professional armed forces and, according to this argument, a
return to barracks is imperative. Others have argued that the country still
needs the authoritarianism of military government and, in their view, a return
to barracks would be irresponsible under existing conditions; therefore,
democratization should be a slow process extending into the distant future.
The social and political roles that the armed forces will play for the
remainder of the twentieth century hinge on the outcome of this continuous
debate within the military (see Conservative Groups, ch. 4).

Personnel

     Maintaining the strength of the armed forces-about 273,000 in late
1982-did not cause a serious drain on the overall manpower pool. The country's
population of almost 125 million, which ranked sixth in the world, easily
supported the relatively modest strength of the armed forces and would even
accommodate general mobilization without serious problems. Demographic
estimates for 1982 placed the number of males between the ages of 15 and 49 at
31,263,000, of whom 21,155,000 (67.5 percent) were judged fit for military
service. Each year about 1,393,000 Brazilians reach age 18, at which time they
become eligible for military service, although they are not usually
conscripted until age 21. Service in the armed forces is compulsory for all
males, but because of the large number of eligibles, only a few are drafted
each year. The term of service for conscripts is one year, but they are
frequently discharged one to two months before the end of their term.

     Mostly for economic reasons the army tends to assign conscripts to units
near their homes, and it is not uncommon, even for basic trainees, to spend
considerable time at home rather than at the posts to which they are assigned.
Most conscripts are drafted from cities rather than from rural areas because
most large garrisons are located in urban areas, and conscripts come from the
areas surrounding the posts. Although the army has boasted about being a
national integrating factor, Alfred Stepan, an authority on the Brazilian
military, has referred to this assertion as "a gross oversimplification." In
addition to saving money by drafting men who live near army posts, local
commanders also prefer urban youths because they are more likely literate and,
as weapons and weapon systems have become more highly technical, the need for
literate conscripts has become much greater. The conscript's tour of active
duty is usually devoted to basic training, weapons training, and unit
training, which includes some field exercises.

     Article 92 of the Constitution states: "All Brazilians are obligated to
military service or other duties necessary to the national security, under the
terms and penalties of the law." The implementing law requires military
service from all males between the ages of 21 and 45. Because only a relative
handful are selected for active duty out of the several million in the age
category, most Brazilian males fulfill their military obligation as untrained
reservists. There are different classes of reserves depending on age, previous
service, or previous training in some kind of military school. Most reservists
are untrained and, in effect, simply constitute a large manpower pool.
Although in theory, reservists should receive some training and former
conscripts should be racalled periodically for training tours, in practice,
little such training seems to take place, probably because of funding
restrictions. The viable reserve, therefore, would constitute the most recent
classes of conscripts, that is, those discharged within the preceding three or
four years. Other reservists would need extensive retraining or, in most
instances, the full cycle of training given to new conscripts.

Defense Industry

     Arms production by Brazilian industry began in a limited manner in the
early 1960s with the manufacture of rifles, pistols, and machine guns under
licenses secured from Belgium, Italy, and the United States, respectively.
From that small beginning a large, thriving industry evolved, and during the
next two decades aggressive Brazilian arms salesmen, spearheaded by military
attaches, cornered about one-tenth of the world's arms deals, ranking the
country seventh among arms exporters. In November 1981 Minister of Finance
Ernane Galveas led a group of 55 businessmen on a tour of the Middle East that
reportedly resulted in lucrative arms contracts in addition to contracts for
many other products.

     The arms business received its initial impetus from the military
governments that have ruled since 1964. Convinced that Brazil was on the way
to becoming a first-line power in the world, knowing that modernization of the
armed forces was prerequisite to that development, and lacking the necessary
capital to buy expensive weaponry abroad, the military leaders encouraged the
development of the domestic arms industry. Brazil's armed forces, however,
could not possibly absorb the production of a major arms industry, and
exports became mandatory. In a very short time the arms manufacturers had
earned reputations for producing weapons and equipment of high quality and
moderate technological complexity at reasonable prices, quickly attracting the
attention of many Third World countries. Furthermore, there were no political
connotations to the Brazilian arms deals as was so often the case with the
Soviet Union and the United States, the two leading arms exporters. Income
from arms exports was reported as US$1.2 billion in 1981 and was expected to
be about US$1.6 billion in 1982, it was predicted to reach US$2 billion in
1983.

     About 50 countries were using Brazilian military equipment or weapons in
the early 1980s. Although most sales have been to Third World countries,
others have also been attracted by the Brazilian exports. The United States,
for example, tested the Urutu along with other amphibious armored personnel
carriers in competition for employment with the Rapid Deployment Force, which
on January 1, 1983, was upgraded and redesignated the Unified Command for
South West Asia (SWA). The Urutu is made by Engesa (Engenheiros
Especializados, meaning specialized engineers), the leading manufacturer of
wheeled vehicles in Latin America. Two other armored vehicles that have become
well known to armed forces around the world are the Cascavel and the Jararaca,
also made by Engesa. Iraq purchased large quantities of Brazilian military
equipment and, in effect, became a proving ground for Engesa-built armor,
which was said to have performed admirably in combat during the Iraq-Iran
conflict in the early 1980s. In additional to its armored vehicles-named,
incidentally, after poisonous snakes-Engesa also produced a wide range of
trucks for the armed forces and for export. Engesa was located in the heavily
industrialized city of Sao Jose dos Campos in the state of Sao Paulo, about
100 kilometers northeast of the city of Sao Paulo.

     Also located in Sao Jose dos Campos was Embraer (Empresa Brasileira
Aeronautica, meaning Brazilian aeronautics enterprise), the country's foremost
manufacturer of airframes. Brazil in 1982 had not yet begun to produce
aircraft engines. In addition to its popular commercial airliner known as the
Bandeirante, Embraer also make Xingu jet trainers and Xavante jet fighters
for its own forces and for export. In 1981 Embraer was ranked among the top 10
aircraft producers in the noncommunist world.

     The EMB-110 Bandeirante was designed by the Ministry of Aeronautics as a
general-purpose military aircraft, but its civilian version has been purchased
by as many as two dozen countries, including the United States, where it has
been used by several feeder and commuter airlines. The Transport Command of
the Brazilian Air Force had about 100 Bandeirantes in inventory in 1982. The
plane's military designation is C-95. A similar aircraft, EMB-111, was
designed for maritime surveillance and designated P-95 by the air force. The
Coastal Command used 12 P-95s in its patrol operations in 1982. Power plants
(twin turboprop) for the EMB-110 and EMB-111 were supplied by Pratt and
Whitney Aircraft of Canada. The AT-26 Xavante, named after an Indian tribe, is
the Italian Aermacchi MB-326, a ground attack jet manufactured by Embraer
under license. In addition to Brazilian Air Force use in both the Tactical
Command and the Training Command, the AT-26 has also been sold to the air
forces of Paraguay and Togo, which purchased nine and six aircraft,
respectively. The Xingu (air force designation VU-9) is a twin-turboprop
general-purpose transport and advanced trainer used by the Transport Command;
it has also been used in Colombia, Britain, Belgium, and some Middle Eastern
countries. In March 1982 France received the first two Xingus of an order
placed in late 1980 for a total of 41 of the popular planes. The French will
assign 25 to the air force and 16 to the navy for transport and training
activities.

[See Aircraft: Top:The EMB-111 Sentinel (air force designation, P-95).
Maritime patrol aircraft built by Embraer; powered by Pratt & Whitney
turboprop engines. Bottom: The EMB-326GB Xavante (air force designation,
AT-26). Ground attack aircraft built by Embraer under license from Aeronautica
Macchi of Italy; powered by a Rolls Royce turbojet engine. Photographs
Courtesy Office of the Air Attache, Embassy of Brazil, Washington.]

     A new basic trainer for the Brazilian Air Force reached the production
stage in 1982, and the first aircraft-EMB-312, designated T-27 Tucano by the
air force-were scheduled for delivery to air force units before the end of
the year. A Sao Paulo newspaper reported in October 1982 that Embraer had
agreed to supply 100 Tucanos to Libya. Also reported in the development stage
was the AMX, a supersonic jet fighter that will be coproduced by Aermacchi and
Embraer with a view toward competing in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) market.

     Analysts estimated that in addition to Engesa and Embraer-the giants of
the Brazilian armaments industry-from 25 to 55 other companies were producing
various kinds of weapons and military equipment in 1982. Much of the
production was for export. National planning was such that the arms producers
did not overlap in production and did not compete with each other for
markets. Some of the companies were privately owned, some were mixed public
and private, and some were joint Brazilian-foreign enterprises. The government
also operated several army arsenals and munitions factories, as well as three
naval shipyards. As an example of joint ownership, Helibras (Helicopteros do
Brasil, meaning helicopters of Brazil) was owned jointly by Aerospatiale of
France and the state of Minas Gerais, each owning 45 percent; the remaining 10
percent was owned by Aerofoto of Brazil. Helibras began operations in 1980,
assembling Aerospatiale Lama and Ecureuil helicopters, known in Brazil as
Gaviao and Esquilo, respectively. Eventually the factory, located in Itajuba,
Minas Gerais, will manufacture helicopters rather than merely assemble them.
Another example of a joint production effort was the building of two
Niteroi-class frigates at the Rio de Janeiro Navy Yard. Four of the frigates
had been built in Britain by the Vosper-Thornycroft company on Brazilian
order. For the remaining two ships, Vosper-Thornycroft set up and directed the
construction at the Rio yard. But it was not only in collaboration with
foreign companies that ships-both naval and merchant-were being built.
Including production from its government-owned shipyards, as well as from
privately owned facilities, Brazil ranks second among the world's
shipbuilders.

     Another company located in Sao Jose dos Campos-Industria Aerospacial,
known as Avibras-has been involved in the manufacture of rockets and missiles
for several years. The respected newspaper O Estado de Sao Paulo in January
1981 referred to Avibras as "a small and mysterious industry." Actually, the
work done at Avibras, both in research and in production, has been done at
the behest of the Army Institute of Research and Development and the Army
Department of Studies and Technological Research; although much of the work
is classified, Avibras and its products have become rather well known.
Further, Avibras is not a small company as indicated in O Estado de Sao
Paulo. The Rio de Janeiro newspaper Jornal do Brasil said in April 1982 that
Avibras "will start operating the world's largest rocket factory in 1983,"
and the "bulk of its production will be earmarked for exports."

     An interesting privately owned company is Bernardini, which has
specialized in the reconditioning of old tanks. The army's tank force has
consisted primarily of 75 M-4 Sherman main battle tanks (American World War
II medium tanks) and about 250 Stuart M-3s and 300 Sherman M-41s, both
American light tanks also of World War II vintage. Bernardini has mounted
90mm cannon in the Stuart tanks and changed the engine to diesel, thus
extending the firepower, the cruising range, and the life span of the tanks.
The M-41s were also converted, extending the operating range from 180
kilometers to about 600 kilometers, and the tanks were expected to be
operational through the 1980s.

     A Chinese military delegation, visiting Brazil in 1980 to inspect the
products of Engesa, Embraer, and other armaments manufacturers, expressed
interest in the Brazilian techniques for converting old tanks. The Chinese
were evidently interested in purchasing the technology used by Bernardini,
but in late 1982 it was not known whether agreements had been reached.