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$Unique_ID{bob00138}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Brazil
Chapter 4A.   Government and Politics}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{James D. Rudolf}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{president
military
federal
government
constitution
state
congress
executive
courts
political
see
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see
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}
$Date{1982}
$Log{}
Title:       Brazil
Book:        Brazil, A Country Study
Author:      James D. Rudolf
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1982

Chapter 4A.   Government and Politics

     The Brazilian Political System in 1982 was in a crucial stage of a
process of liberalization from military dictatorship to what promised to be,
sometime within the coming decade, a return to liberal democracy directed by
civilians. The political dynamics of this process, known as abertura
(literally, opening), involved the interaction of popular pressure from below
and, from above, the extensive powers of the executive branch of government
and its coercive mechanism, both of which remained in the hands of the armed
forces. Although abertura was protracted, the holding of the scheduled
popular elections of November 1982 was the most important indication to date
that it would proceed on course into the mid-1980s, when a successor would be
chosen to President Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo, who in 1979 had
been chosen as the nation's fifth military president since the coup d'etat of
April 1964.

     Economic factors posed one of the greatest threats to abertura. After
increasing to record levels between 1968 and 1974, Brazil's growth rate
gradually slowed after the shock of 1973-74 oil price hikes and was negative
in 1981, a year that also saw inflation reach over 100 percent and the foreign
debt hit record heights. Analysts agreed that the economy had the strength to
overcome these difficulties. The timing, however-when the population was
being allowed, for the first time in many years, to make its own wage demands
heard-was most inopportune. The specter of popular demands for redress of past
losses had been raised during the late 1970s in widespread labor strikes, but
in the early years of the new decade, the government had skillfully combined
"carrots" and "sticks" to mute wage demands. This issue would become
increasingly vital, however, as abertura proceeded.

     Another long-term threat to abertura (although in the short run it may
have made it easier for Brazil's military leaders to initiate and proceed with
the process) lies in the relatively undeveloped nature of Brazil's political
institutions. As labor unions were weak, so were interest groups representing
business, students, agriculturalists, and other sectors of society that one
might expect to be highly organized in a nation as large as Brazil. Political
parties also lacked an in-depth organizational capacity. Analysts explain
this phenomenon as a product of Brazil's patrimonial heritage: deference to
one's "superior" in his or her immediate environment (be it farm, factory,
neighborhood, or village) runs deep in Brazilian society. In politics this is
translated into political bossism, called coronelismo in traditional rural
Brazilian society, which began a slow death in the 1950s but continued to play
a major, if declining, role in the 1980s. This tradition was reinforced by the
corporatist threads that ran through the regime of President Getulio Vargas in
the 1930s and 1940s as well as the post-1964 military regime. In Brazil's
entire history, liberal democratic institutions, such as interest groups and
political parties, had a chance to develop only during the Second Republic
(1946-64). While this inexperience in popular government may have made it
easier for the nation's military leaders to loosen the reins of power, it also
made the future uncertain due to a lack of strong democratic traditions.

     The people were nearly unanimous in their support of abertura. Its only
apparent opponents were found in a segment of the armed forces known as the
hard-liners, which had been quite powerful in the early 1970s, although its
influence steadily declined thereafter. By the early 1980s the hard-liners,
who wanted military rule to be perpetuated indefinitely, had been removed
from a number of top positions of authority. There was, in other words, a
growing consensus within the armed forces to return to its purely  military,
professional role in society.

     A consensus also existed among Brazilian elites that their nation, having
one of the largest, richest, and most dynamic societies in the Third World,
was destined in time to become a major world power. Brazil's increasingly
far-reaching diplomatic and commercial ties had significantly raised its
stature among the developing nations at the same time that they reduced the
nation's dependence on the northern industrialized nations. The United States
remained Brazil's single most important foreign relation, although by the
early 1980s its significance had been declining for a full decade as Brazil
diversified its foreign contacts. Two especially interesting aspects of
Brazil's foreign policy were the somewhat surprisingly small military
component of its growing power and the widespread public support that Brazil's
new directions in foreign policy had attained. Foreign policy was virtually
absent as an issue in the otherwise bitter 1982 election campaign.

Structure of Government

Constitutional Structure

     Brazilian constitutions, by and large, have served to legitimize existing
political institutions rather than to provide for future continuity. The
1967 Constitution, the nation's sixth, superseded the 1946 constitution, which
had guided Brazil during 18 years of democratic rule during the Second
Republic. Between the 1964 coup d'etat and the promulgation of the 1967
Constitution, four so-called Institutional Acts and a large number of
Complementary Acts were decreed by the military government that modified the
1946 constitution as necessary in order to legitimize the imposition of the
dictatorship. The 1967 Constitution, which was promulgated on January 24 of
that year by the rubber-stamp Congress, was essentially a reconfirmation of
the modifications of the three previous years.

     The 1967 Constitution was frequently and substantially amended during
its first 15 years as Brazil's highest law. By 1982 over half of its original
200 articles had been altered through one of 22 constitutional amendments
promulgated by the military government,and 10 additional articles had been
added. After 1967, a further 15 or more Institutional Acts and many additional
Complementary Acts had been decreed to modify Brazilian constitutional law; by
1982, however, these had all been either abrogated or incorporated into the
constitutional amendments.

     The 1967 Constitution changed the formal name of the country from the
United States of Brazil to the Federative Republic of Brazil (Republica
Federativa do Brasil). In spite of the name change, the provisions of the 1967
Constitution significantly increase the power of the federal (or central)
government with respect to the state governments. This centralization of power
in federal authorities, seated in the national capital in Brasilia, is most
apparent in Articles 10 and 11, which allow the federal president to intervene
in the affairs of state government (to the point of removing the state
governor) for a wide variety of reasons. In spite of this rather severe
limitation, state governments did retain important prerogatives of the past,
including significant powers of taxation. Each state has its own constitution,
although none can contradict the terms of the federal Constitution.

     The Constitution is divided into five major sections. The first,
consisting of 144 articles, details the system of government. The second
section spells out the nation's declaration of civil rights in 15 articles.
The subsequent 15 articles outline the nation's economic and social order.
Articles 175 through 180 discuss the family, education, and culture; Articles
181 through 210 are under the heading of general and transitory provisions.

     The Constitution may be amended on a proposal by Congress or by the
federal president. Constitutional Amendment Number 8, dated April 1977, made
it more difficult for Congress to propose an amendment, and easier for the
president. For the former, one-third of the members of each legislative body
must sponsor an amendment. An amendment must be approved by two-thirds (it had
been a simple majority between 1977 and 1981) of the members of each
legislative body. The Constitution cannot be amended during a state of siege.
It should be noted, however, that on two important occasions, in December
1968 and April 1977, the president sidestepped these constitutional provisions
by closing Congress in order to decree important constitutional provisions. On
these occasions when Congress threatened to challenge the executive
authority, Institutional Act Number 5 and Constitutional Amendments Numbers 7
and 8 (the so-called April package of 1977), both of which greatly increased
the powers of the executive, were issued by decree.

The Executive

     Article 73 of the Constitution reads: "The executive power is exercised
by the president of the republic assisted by the ministers of state." A vice
president serves jointly with the president and replaces him in the event of
temporary impairment or the death of the president. Under military rule the
vice presidency has often been held by a civilian. It was a tribute to the
process of abertura that Vice President Antonio Aureliano Chaves de Mendonca
(a civilian) served as interim president for seven weeks following President
Figueiredo's heart attack in September 1981. In 1969, under similar
circumstances, military commanders had prevented the civilian vice president
from assuming the presidency as mandated in the Constitution. Both the
president and the vice president must be Brazilians and at least 35 years old.

     President Figueiredo assumed office on March 15, 1979, for a six-year
term (the presidential term of office was raised from five to six years in
1977). Popular, direct elections of the president ended with the fall of the
Second Republic in 1964. The five subsequent military presidents were
"elected" indirectly by an electoral college, consisting of all members of
Congress plus delegates of the state legislatures. (The number from each state
depended on its population until 1982, when a constitutional amendment changed
the makeup of the electoral college to include six representatives from each
state legislature, irrespective of size.) In fact, however, these indirect
elections were no more than pro forma exercises because Congress and the state
legislatures, between 1964 and 1982, were stacked with regime appointees and
other delegates certain to endorse the candidate chosen by the outgoing
military president. The real presidential politicking during these years
took place among the military hierarchy in a process that was not publicly
visible. Much of the excitement over the 1982 popular elections was that they
held the prospect of electing a Congress and state legislatures that for the
first time since 1964 would be truly independent of the military government.
Thus the indirect election of Figueiredo's successor, scheduled for October
15, 1984, held the potential of being a meaningful democratic event (see
Elections under Military Rule, this ch.).

     The constitutional powers of the president are many and are varied. In
the legislative area, he may issue decree-laws on matters concerning "national
security, public finance, including standards on taxation, and the
establishment of public posts and setting of salaries." He also is given
exclusive power to propose laws in these and other matters, including
administrative and judiciary organization, a variety of concerns with respect
to the civil service, and amnesty for political criminals. In the event of
"war, or serious disturbance of order or threat of the outbreak of such
disturbance," the president is also empowered to decree state of a siege,
under which he may take virtually any measure he deems necessary to restore
order.

     Aside from his power to legislate, the president appoints and removes key
advisers and ministers of state without the need for congressional approval.
State governors were also appointed by the president until the 1982 elections.
He also approves gubernatorial appointments of a large number of key mayors to
head local governments in areas deemed essential to national security.
After 1982 the president retained the power to intervene in state and local
governments, and an uncooperative governor could be removed under the
authority of the Constitution.

     In August 1982 the president's cabinet was enlarged from 20 to 21
members. It included the ministers of aeronautics, agriculture, army,
communications, education and culture, finance, foreign affairs, health,
industry and commerce, interior, justice, labor, mines and energy, navy,
transportation and public works, and welfare and social security. Also within
the cabinet were five officials who were considered to be the president's
closest advisers. These were the minister-chief of the Planning Secretariat
of the Presidency, who in 1982 was Brazil's so-called economic czar, Antonio
Delfim Netto; the chief of the Civilian Household (Casa Civil) of the
presidency, the president's principal political adviser; the chief of the
Military Household (Casa Militar) of the presidency, who acts as a liaison to
the armed forces, the chief of the National Intelligence Service (Servico
Nacional de Informacoes-SNI), the position held by Figueiredo before he became
president; and the chief of the Special Ministry for Land-Related Issues, a
new cabinet position that was initially filled by Brigadier General Danilo
Venturini, who also served as secretary of the National Security Council
(Conselho de Seguranca Nacional-CSN).

     The holders of these five posts have, under military rule, generally been
regarded as the most powerful men in Brazil after the president, because of
their direct, daily access to the president (see fig. 8). The relative power
of each, however, has varied over time. For many years the chief of the
Civilian Household, for example, was retired General Artur Golbery do Couto e
Silva, who was considered the architect of much of the regime's political
evolution from 1964 until his retirement in August 1981. After that time the
position lost much of its previous influence. The importance of the
minister-chief of the Planning Secretariat is commonly attributed to the
economic and political skills of Delfim, who was appointed in August 1979. The
SNI chief has nearly always been powerful. The fact that presidents Figueiredo
and Emilio Garrastazu Medici had both held that position led many observers to
consider General Octavio Aguiar de Medeiros, who in late 1982 had been SNI
chief since early 1978, a prime candidate for the presidential term to begin
in 1985.

     This "inner cabinet" also included Figueiredo's personal secretary,
Heitor Aquino Ferreira, until his fall from grace in late 1981. Before that
time he and the other five officials were referred to as the "palace group"
(grupo palaciano, after the Planalto Palace, the seat of government in
Brasilia). This inner group of presidential advisers was also known as the "9
o'clock group" because they met with the president every day at 9:00 A.M.

     Another important advisory body is the CSN, which consists of the
president, the vice president, the cabinet ministers, the chief of the Armed
Forces General Staff (Estado-Maior das Forcas Armadas-EMFA), and the chiefs of
staff of the three armed services. First created under the 1946 constitution,
the CSN did not become a vital political institution until 1964. It was
particularly important in the years immediately following the 1964 coup; in
1982 it remained powerful, though some of its prerogatives may have been lost
to the "inner cabinet." Among the powers granted the CSN in the 1967
Constitution are "to establish the permanent national objectives and the bases
for national policy" and to give prior consent in executive decisions
considered indispensable to national security, including land concessions,
installation of means of communication, opening of transportation routes, and
establishment and operation of industries affecting national security.

     Within the Brazilian executive there are hundreds of agencies for the
provision of social services, the operation of government-owned industries,
and the administration and regulation of many aspects of national life. Brazil
is somewhat infamous for its bureaucracy. For a time during the 1970s the
government created a Ministry of Debureaucratization (complete with its own
bureaucracy) to try to remedy the many problems created by the growth of so
many government agencies. Basically, there are five kinds of agencies: the
interministerial councils use personnel from various ministries to make up
such organizations as the Economic Development Council, National Monetary
Council, and the Industrial Development Council; federal autarquias, or
semi-autonomous enterprises, such as the Central Bank of Brazil; federal
institutes; government corporations; and mixed-economy corporations, which
may be wholly owned or partially owned by the government. Some prominent
examples of these are Embraer (Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica), a Brazilian
aeronautics enterprise, the Bank of Brazil, and the Brazilian Petroleum
Corporation (Petroleo Brasileiro-Petrobras).

     Since 1964 many of these agencies have been headed by military officers.
The bureaucracy also acts as a power base for the so-called technocrats. For
politically motivated civilians such as Delfim, the government executive
agencies provide ample opportunity to build a following through patronage
(see Conservative Groups, this ch.)

The Legislature

     Brazil has a bicameral legislature, consisting of the Senate and the
Chamber of Deputies, which is in session in Brasilia every year from March 1
to June 30 and again from August 1 to December 5. Senators serve eight-year
terms of office and must be at least 35 years old; deputies serve for four
years and must be at least 21.

     Since the early 1960s the Congress has gone through continual
evolutionary change in terms of its composition and its relationship with the
executive. This evolution sped up in the early 1980s; the executive branch
used its prerogatives to retain control over the legislature at the same time
that it pursued the process of democratization under abertura. (The 1982
congressional elections, in particular, produced a Congress that was widely
viewed as more popularly representative and independent of the executive
branch than any legislature since 1964.)

     Under the administration of Joao Goulart, the Congress played the role of
an effective opposition, blocking many of the reforms proposed by the
executive (see The Presidency of Joao Goulart, ch. 1). After the 1964 coup
d'etat some 100 members of Congress, stripped of their political rights,
were removed from their posts and replaced by alternates who were more
amenable to the wishes of the executive. Nonetheless, a political crisis
ensued in December 1968 when the Chamber of Deputies refused to accede to an
executive request to strip a deputy of his parliamentary immunity. The
executive closed Congress and decreed Institutional Act Number 5, which vastly
increased executive powers. Congress did not reconvene until April 1970.
Congressional elections held later that year, under new rules that lowered the
number of deputies from 409 to 310 and altered the system of proportional
representation, resulted in a Congress more compliant with executive wishes.
The 1974 elections, however, brought significant victories for the opposition,
and between 1974 and 1978 ( a period that saw the initiation of the process of
political "decompression," or distensao, under President Ernesto Geisel) the
legislature again gained a real, though limited, role in government
decisionmaking.

     By April 1977 the prospects of an even larger opposition victory in the
1978 elections led President Geisel to close Congress once again in order to
decree "new rules of the game." The "April package" increased the number of
deputies to 420, again altered the system of proportional representation to'
favor rural areas more prone to support the government, and instituted the
"bionic senators." (One of each states three senators was indirectly elected
by the states legislature in 1978; subsequent legislation barred this
procedure for the 1986 election.) These changes ensured a government victory
in the November 1978 congressional elections, after which the National
Renovating Alliance (Alianca Renovadora Nacional-Arena) assumed 41 seats in
the Senate and 231 seats in the Chamber of Deputies while the opposition
Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democratico Brasileiro-MDB) held 25
Senate seats and 189 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (see Electoral Politics,
this ch.).

     After 1978 the Congress again became a stabilizing influence in providing
political support and legitimacy to President Figueiredo's efforts at
abertura. New political party legislation in 1979 had the effect of gradually
eroding the executive's base of support in Congress, however, as the new
government party, the Democratic Social Party (Partido Democratico Social-PDS)
experienced numerous defections as the 1982 elections approached. By late 1981
opposition parties held majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time
since 1965, thus forcing the executive to negotiate with the opposition over
controversial legislation. Alignments continued to shift, however, and in
September 1982 Brazilian officials reported that the PDS held 36 to 69 Senate
seats and 225 of 420 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. A series of
presidential decree "packages" in 1981 and 1982 again changed the rules of the
game in anticipation of major opposition victories in the 1982 congressional
elections. Included among them was an increase in the size of the Chamber of
Deputies from 420 to 479.

     Every four years at least one-third of the Senate (two-thirds in
alternate elections, e.g., 1986, 1994) and the entire Chamber of Deputies are
elected. After the election each new legislative body elects a president and
a steering committee to determine the chamber's agenda and guide its work.
Legislation, except on subjects that are the exclusive prerogative of the
president of the republic, may be proposed by a simple majority of either
chamber. Legislation proposed by the president becomes law either if both
chambers approve it by a simple majority or if no action is taken in Congress
for 90 days (40 days if the president considers the bill urgent). The
president holds veto powers, and a two-thirds majority in each chamber is
required to override.

     In addition to legislative functions, the Chamber of Deputies has
exclusive power to initiate impeachment proceedings against the president and
his cabinet ministries. The Senate then judges impeachment charges; the Senate
also serves as a court for judges of the Supreme Federal Tribunal or an
attorney general charged with crimes of responsibility. The Senate also
confirms presidential appointments of an attorney general, certain judges, and
chiefs of permanent diplomatic missions. One of the most important functions
of Congress designated by the 1967 Constitution, of course, is its members'
participation in the electoral college that elects the president of the
republic.

The Judiciary

     The judicial branch of government has undergone considerable change
during the years of military rule. The jurisdiction of the federal courts
increased at the expense of the state courts, which lost their power to try
infractions of federal laws in the first instance. The role of the military
courts, not surprisingly, increased dramatically; and a new court, the
National Magistrate Council, was created. While Institutional Act Number 5 was
in force (1968-78), the power of the president to dismiss judges cost the
judiciary its traditional independence from the executive. Nevertheless, there
was little publicly aired conflict between the judiciary and the military
government; the traditionally conservative Supreme Federal Tribunal was
reluctant to use its powers of judicial review to declare legislative or
executive action unconstitutional. During the late 1970s and early 1980s,
however, lower courts often challenged the government is cases involving the
constitutional rights of citizens, e.g., issuing writs of habeas corpus. All
federal judges are appointed by the president for life (they must retire
at age 70); they can be removed from office only as a result of judicial
sentence.

     Supreme Federal Tribunal justices are appointed by the president, with
the approval of the Senate, from among citizens at least 35 years old and "of
notable juridical leaning and of spotless reputation." The size of the Supreme
Federal Tribunal has varied under military rule: in 1965 President Humberto de
Alencar Castello Branco enlarged the court from 11 to 16 (to dilute the
influence of several justices sympathetic to the populist ideals of former
president Getulio Vargas); in 1969 President Artur da Costa e Silva (using
executive powers granted by Institutional Act Number 5) lowered the number
back to 11, removing judges believed to be supporters of Vargas' policies. The
court may meet in panels or in plenary sessions.

     In addition to its power to rule on the constitutionality of laws, the
Supreme Federal Tribunal holds original jurisdiction in a number of matters,
including crimes committed by certain high officials (including the
president), lawsuits between a foreign government and an agency of the
Brazilian government or between a state government and the federal government,
and jurisdictional disputes between various lower courts. Most of its efforts,
however, are spent in hearing appeals from lower courts. The National
Magistrate Council, created by constitutional amendment in April 1977,
consists of seven justices from the Supreme Federal Tribunal. It is convened
to hear criminal complaints levied against federal judges.

     The Federal Court of Appeals, also located in Brasilia, consists of 27
judges. They sit in plenary, in chambers, or in panels according to
specialization. The court has original jurisdiction over appeals of the
decisions of lower federal judges.

     The 1967 Constitution created, for the first time, federal courts in the
capitals of each state, territory, and in the Federal District (Brasilia) to
try cases involving infraction of most federal laws. One judge sits on most of
these courts of first instance.

     Special courts under federal jurisdiction, also mandated as part of the
judiciary in the 1967 Constitution, include military, electoral, and labor
courts. In addition to trying military persons of crimes under military law,
the system of military courts hears cases involving civilian infractions of
the National Security Law of 1979 (see Criminal Law and Procedure, ch.
5). Lower military courts hear the majority of such cases being tried in the
first instance. The Superior Military Tribunal consists of 15 judges appointed
by the president for life. Those convicted by the Superior Military Tribunal
have the right to appeal to the Supreme Federal Tribunal.

     The electoral courts were created by Vargas with the objective of making
elections more meaningful and honest. Both their administrative and judicial
functions were broadened in the 1967 Constitution. The Superior Electoral
Tribunal, seated in Brasilia, consists of five judges (three from the Supreme
Federal Tribunal, two from the Federal Court of Appeals) and two lawyers
chosen by the president of the republic. Regional electoral courts, found in
the capital of each state and in the Federal District, also consist of five
judges and two lay persons. Local arms of the electoral court system consist
of electoral judges and electoral boards. These judges have wide competency in
matters pertaining to elections as well as the registration and financing of
political parties.

     The system of labor courts, instituted to resolve disputes between
management and labor, consists of the Superior Labor Court, regional labor
courts, and local boards of conciliation and judgment. The Superior Labor
Court is composed of 17 judges, all appointed by the president of the
republic. Eleven are magistrates for life, six are temporary; half of the
latter represent management, the other half, labor.

     The Public Ministry, although formally an arm of the executive branch, is
attached to all levels of the judiciary. It acts as the legal representative
of the government in all cases involving the public interest. In addition to
defending the rights and promoting the interests of the federal government,
the Public Ministry sees that laws are obeyed and safeguards the right of
individuals unable to provide for their own legal defense. It is headed by the
attorney general, who is appointed by the president and approved by the
Senate, and is staffed by career attorneys. Each state also has a public
ministry. All state and local governments also preside over their own system
of civil, criminal, and military courts. Article 144 of the Constitution lays
out broad outlines for certain features of these courts, including the
qualifications and remuneration of judges, the kinds of state and local
courts, and their membership.