Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0012/00124.txt

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$Unique_ID{bob00124}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Brazil
Chapter 1G.   President Emilio Garrastazu Medici}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Jan Knippers Black}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{brazil
government
military
political
geisel
medici
percent
president
brazilian
de}
$Date{1982}
$Log{}
Title:       Brazil
Book:        Brazil, A Country Study
Author:      Jan Knippers Black
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1982

Chapter 1G.   President Emilio Garrastazu Medici

     On October 7, 1969, the High Command of the Armed Forces (Alto-Comando
das Forcas Armada-ACFA) announced the selection as presidential candidate
of General Emilio Garrastazu Medici, commander of the Third Army and former
chief of the National Intelligence Service (Servico Nacional de
Informacoes-SNI). Medici, who was to govern for five years, had served 42
years in the army but was little known by the public. The military
triumvirate promulgated provisions that incorporated the numerous
Institutional Acts and other decrees into the 1967 Constitution, which
legitimized increased authoritarian rule. The Congress was reconvened
from its 10-month forced recess to validate the selection of Medici and
was then again recessed.

     Some of President Medici's ambitions for his term in office were
contained in a master plan entitled "Project Brazil: Great Power." In
particular he sought-and in large measure achieved-dramatic increases
in economic growth, expansion in the provision of technical training and
of "moral and civic" education, expansion in governmental capabilities in
the areas of intelligence and communications, and progress toward the physical
integration of the country through the construction of the Transamazon and
peripheral highway systems. Upon assuming office, he had pledged to leave
democracy firmly installed by the end of his term. In early 1970, however,
he explained that the pledge had been an expression of hope rather than a
commitment and that in the meantime the president would retain extraordinary
emergency powers.

     Meanwhile, in late 1969 and in 1970, conflict had escalated between the
Roman Catholic Church and the military over the issue of torture. The use
of torture on political prisoners and the kidnapping of diplomats by guerrilla
groups in order to free political prisoners appeared to reinforce each other.
The arrests of some 4,000 persons in November 1970, the month when
congressional elections were held, were condemned by the National Conference
of Brazilian Bishops. The following month the Swiss ambassador was kidnapped
and ransomed for the release of 70 political prisoners.

     Elections posed no problem for the Medici government. In October 1970
gubernatorial candidates, personally selected by the president, were routinely
ratified by the previously purged state legislatures. The congressional
elections in November returned a heavy majority of Arena members. Congress
became increasingly cooperative. In 1971 it approved 100 percent of the
projects introduced by the executive.

     Media censorship was tightened more each year, and regulations
designed to control the flow of information proliferated. In November 1971
Medici issued a presidential decree authorizing the president to make secret
laws. In August 1972 O Estado de Sao Paulo, the leading newspaper of that
city, in a marked departure from the caution generally displayed by all of
the communications media, questioned why the frequency of arbitrary arrests
should be even greater at that time than at the height of the incidence of
political kidnappings and other such revolutionary acts.

     Elections continued to be held more or less on schedule. In fact,
voting remained compulsory, and those who refused to participate were subject
to severe penalties. Thus in the elections of November 15, 1972, voter turnout
was higher than it had ever been, but blank or nullified ballots outnumbered
valid ones, which by law invalidated the election. This produced some
extraordinary electoral results. For example, in the city of Sao Sebastiao
de Lagoa de Roca, in Paraiba, an Arena candidate ran without opposition and
lost; that is, there were more blank or nullified ballots than votes for the
sole candidate. In various cities a significant number of votes were cast for
"Sujismundo," a government-created cartoon character that represented a
nationwide cleanliness campaign, and for a reputed international Mafia figure
who had been arrested in Brazil. In Salvador, Bahia, a wildcat that had just
escaped from the local zoo polled more than 5,000 votes, more than the
candidates of both government and opposition parties.

     Although censorship had spared the public from many categories of
information, the media had not ceased to be an important vehicle for political
communication. The government made extensive use of radio and television to
identify the military leaders with the Brazilian soccer team's victory in the
1970 World Cup competition, to disseminate patriotic oratory and symbolism in
connection with the celebrations of the sesquicentennial of national
independence that went on throughout 1972, and in general to provide the
public with a sense of vicarious participation in the national prosperity,
modernization, and progress toward great-power status that had come about
since 1964.

     In 1973 Medici expressed his evaluation of the accomplishments of the
military government in the political sphere on the occasion of the ninth
anniversary of the "Brazilian Revolution." "Uniformity in thought and action,"
he said, "is the principal reason for the speed and efficiency with which our
country is being modernized and the bonds of solidarity between Brazilians are
being forged."

     On the issue of the selection of a successor to Medici in the presidency,
such uniformity was encouraged by a strictly enforced ban on any mention of
the topic until June 18, 1973. Medici then announced that General Ernesto
Geisel would be the candidate of the government party. Geisel had been chief
of the Military Household in the government of Castello Branco and more
recently had served as president of Petrobras. He represented a faction of
relatively moderate and nationalistic officers, as opposed to the more rigidly
authoritarian group that was also more favorable to foreign business
interests. On January 15, 1974, the electoral college gave Geisel 400 of the
476 votes cast.

     The MDB charged that the electoral college was a farce, for thousands
of dissenters had been banned from any participation in politics. Twenty-one
of the party's would-be electors refused to vote at all, maintaining that
voting would signify going along with the farce. The remaining 76, however,
agreed to participate in exchange for the right to express themselves more
or less openly in an "anti-campaign." Speaking to the electoral college, MDM
party leader and presidential "anti-candidate" Ulysses Guimaraes urged the
government to do away with "unemployment, arbitrary arrests and persecution,
police terrorism, torture, and violence."

The Economy under the Military Regime

     During the first three years after the military seizure of power,
Brazil's economic performance continued to be dismal by anyone's standards.
Inflation and unemployment were high, growth and new direct investment low,
and in response to the policy known as "constructive bankruptcy," nationally
owned businesses were eliminated or sold off at a rapid pace.

     Inflation was gradually dampened, however, through a cutback in effective
demand. Demand was reduced through the pruning of social services,
particularly those involving income transfer, and through wage freezes. Frozen
wages, along with other indicators that the government had brought labor under
control, eventually began to inspire the confidence of investors, particularly
foreign ones. Other measures, such as credit, tax, and tariff policies,
commonly favored foreign businesses over domestic ones, and limitations on
the
repatriation of profits were lifted. By 1968 the transnational corporate
community had gained confidence in the Brazilian system.

     Spurred by massive foreign investment, Brazil in 1968 entered a phase
that came to be known as the "economic miracle." The miracle was reflected
for some six years in annual growth rates of about 10 percent. The rate of
12 percent growth, attained in 1973, was probably the highest in Brazil's
history.

     Some economists have argued that the normal condition of the Brazilian
economy is to grow and that only the rapid inflation started by Kubitschek,
the confusion of the parliamentary regime, and the international credit freeze
imposed on the Goulart presidency had slowed down the economy's growth.
Nevertheless, the military regime did begin several new policies that assisted
in the growth process. In addition to breaking the power of trade unions and
courting foreign investors, the military government introduced a system of
mini-devaluations of the cruzeiro in place of rigid exchange rates that had
led to speculation and in turn had forced substantial devaluations. Government
policy favored exportation, particularly of new products and manufactured
goods.

     A massive reorientation of Brazil's external trade also took place
so that the country became less dependent on coffee exports. Soybeans have
been cultivated on a large scale as an export crop, rivaling coffee in its
foreign exchange earnings. At the same time, however, beans, which had been
raised for local consumption on land devoted to soybeans, had to be imported,
at greater cost to consumers.

     Brazil's proudest boast has been that it was exporting manufactured
goods-even watches to Switzerland, computer components to the United States,
and shoes to Italy. Volkswagen located a major plant in Brazil, exporting not
only assembled cars to surrounding countries but also components to the
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany).

     Although the middle class and some sectors of the skilled working class
benefited from the boom, income distribution became more regressive. In 1960
the wealthiest 5 percent of the economically active population earned 27
percent of the total national income; by 1970 the top 5 percent received 35
percent of the total income. The income of the poorest 80 percent shrank from
46 percent to 37 percent of the total during the same period. The government
later revealed that Antonio Delfim Netto, the architect of the economic
miracle, had rigged the consumer price index so that wages linked with the
index would not rise to reflect the full amount of inflation, as they were
supposed to do, thereby holding down lower class incomes.

     The miracle came to an abrupt end with the sudden rise in world oil
prices in 1973. Brazil is a heavy importer of oil; exploration for domestic
petroleum deposits was stepped up, and some small deposits were found, but
they covered only a small fraction of the country's requirements (see Energy,
ch. 3). A colossal program of production of alcohol from sugarcane to supply
the country's fuel needs was undertaken, at very great cost, and automobiles
were produced that ran on either hydrous alcohol or a mixture of gasoline and
alcohol. But some participants in the program have questioned the wisdom of
using arable land in the production of fuel rather than food. Finally, Brazil
had to fill the gap between exports and imports caused by the sudden jump in
petroleum prices by resorting to heavy foreign borrowing, which in turn
saddled the country with excessive repayments of principal and interest (see
Balance of Payments, ch. 3).

     The process of abertura (political opening), beginning in the mid-1970s,
meant that a certain amount of labor union activity had to be allowed and that
workers' wages would no longer be made to bear such a disproportionate burden
of the costs of development. The newly active labor movement generated a new
popular leader in the person of Luis Inacio da Silva, "Lula," the leader of
the Sao Paulo metalworkers. Lula and other labor leaders have been arrested
from time to time, but their wildcat strikes have often been successful in
securing wage increases and other concessions.

President Ernesto Geisel

     Immediately after assuming office, Geisel sought to open a dialogue
with the Roman Catholic Church, generating speculation that his
administration might tolerate a degree of political liberalization. The
Rio de Janeiro newspaper Jornal do Brasil, for example, editorialized in
March that "political stagnation, deemed necessary until now, must be
followed by some no less necessary democratic activity." Such speculation
was dampened before the end of Geisel's first month in office by the arrests
in Sao Paulo of about 60 clergymen, professors, students, and labor leaders,
as well as by the closing of Jornal do Brasil and two radio stations.

     Although the 10-year suspension of political rights ran out in April
1974 for about 100 of the more than 1,200 persons affected, Minister of
Justice Armando Falcao made it clear that "challenges and contradiction"
would not be allowed and that the government would" use the legal
instruments, ordinary or extraordinary, available to it to continue
guaranteeing maximum order, peace, and stability...." He added that under
no circumstances would those responsible for "the situation which
threatened to lead the country to chaos" be allowed to return. On another
occasion Falcao commented that "our struggle is hard and difficult against
common crime, subversion, and communism," and he said it was urgent that
Brazil rationalize and modernize the entire police structure, availing
itself of the latest technological advances (see Public Order and Internal
Security, ch. 5).

The Abertura, or Political Opening

     Geisel did begin tentative steps, however, in the direction of what
came to be known as distensao (decompression, relaxation of tension) or
abertura. Congressional debates became livelier as the MDB found that it
could criticize the government. In the 1974 elections for the state and
federal legislatures, the MDB received almost 5.5 million of the 8 million
votes cast and won 16 of the senatorial seats up for election, against
the six won by Arena. Arena still held the majority in both houses of
Congress, but it no longer held the two-thirds majority necessary for
approval of constitutional amendments.

     Geisel's political strategy seemed to be to economize on the use of
force and to reduce the widespread abuses-the assassinations and torture
that had reached a peak during the Medici administration-without losing
control of the liberalizing process. He removed from their posts officers
associated with the worst excesses of the regime. Liberalization stopped
far short of relinquishing military control of the government to civilian
politicians,however. In the campaign for the 1978 election of state
governors, when it appeared that the MDB might be too successful, Geisel
changed the rules of the game by introducing the "April package." This
provided that the Constitution could be amended by a simple majority of
Congress, which Arena still had, and changed the electoral laws to the
disadvantage of the opposition. Moreover, the "package" reaffirmed the
president's powers to remove members of Congress and to suspend the
political rights of individuals, a power used freely by Geisel against MDB
members of Congress.

     The military hard-liners believed that measures such as this were only
temporizing a bad situation and that the attempt at abertura should be
abandoned completely. In the jockeying for the nomination to succeed
Geisel as president, the candidate of the authoritarian right was the
war minister, General Silvio Coelho da Frota. Geisel took advantage of
extreme statements made by Frota to remove him for insubordination.
Frota's ambitions were permanently crushed when his attempt to topple
Geisel in a coup d'etat aborted.

     Geisel was thus able to impose his own choice as the regime's candidate
for the presidential term beginning in 1979. This was General Joao Baptista
de Oliveira Figueiredo, whose branch of service was technically the cavalry
but who had served most recently as head of the SNI. Figueiredo, in a
peculiarly populist style, in 1982 continued along the path of abertura (see
Elections under Military Rule, ch. 4).

                                  * * *

     There are many outstanding books, both in English and in Portuguese,
covering various segments and aspects of Brazilian history. Donald
Worcester's Brazil: From Colony to World Power offers a wealth of fascinating
detail on the colonial period and the transition to independence. The early
national period receives good coverage in Richard Graham's Britain and the
Onset of Modernization in Brazil, 1850-1914 and A Century of Brazilian
History since 1865. Among the best studies of the Vargas era and the Second
Republic are Thomas E. Skidmore's Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An
Experiment in Democracy and E. Bradford Burns' Nationalism in Brazil: A
Historical Survey.

     The best of the many books dealing with the demise of Brazil's last
constitutional government in 1964 are probably O Governo Joao Goulart: as
Lutas Sociais no Brasil, 1961-1964 (1978) by Luis Alberto Moniz Bandeira
and 1964: A Conquista do Estado: Acao Politica, Poder e Golpe de Classe
(1981) by Rene Armand Dreifuss. Moniz and Dreifuss had exclusive access to
some of the most important documents of the period. That time of troubles
is covered in English by Alfred Stepan in The Military in Politics: Changing
Patterns in Brazil (1971) and by Jan Knippers Black in United States
Penetration of Brazil (1977). Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and
Future (1973), edited by Stepan, provides a wide-ranging assessment of the
early years of military rule. (For further information and complete
citations, see Bibliography.)