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9420.txt
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**************************************************************************
Security Bulletin 9420 DISA Defense Communications System
June 6, 1994 Published by: DDN Security Coordination Center
(SCC@NIC.DDN.MIL) 1-(800) 365-3642
DEFENSE DATA NETWORK
SECURITY BULLETIN
The DDN SECURITY BULLETIN is distributed by the DDN SCC (Security
Coordination Center) under DISA contract as a means of communicating
information on network and host security exposures, fixes, and concerns
to security and management personnel at DDN facilities. Back issues may
be obtained via FTP (or Kermit) from NIC.DDN.MIL [192.112.36.5]
using login="anonymous" and password="guest". The bulletin pathname is
scc/ddn-security-yynn (where "yy" is the year the bulletin is issued
and "nn" is a bulletin number, e.g. scc/ddn-security-9302).
**************************************************************************
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
! !
! The following important advisory was issued by the Computer !
! Emergency Response Team (CERT) and is being relayed unedited !
! via the Defense Information Systems Agency's Security !
! Coordination Center distribution system as a means of !
! providing DDN subscribers with useful security information. !
! !
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
Organization: CERT Coordination Center
Address: Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213-3890
Phone: +1 412 268-7090
Fax: +1 412 268-6989
=============================================================================
CA-94:09 CERT Advisory
May 23, 1994
/bin/login Vulnerability
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CERT Coordination Center has learned of a vulnerability in
/bin/login. This vulnerability potentially affects all IBM AIX 3
systems and Linux systems. At this time, we believe that only
IBM AIX 3 and Linux systems are at risk.
Included with this advisory is an appendix containing the
CA-94:09.README, which lists the vendors who have responded to our
inquiries, and the status of their investigation into this
vulnerability report. As we receive additional information relating
to this advisory, we will place it, along with any clarifications, in
the README file, available via anonymous FTP from info.cert.org. We
encourage you to check the README files regularly for updates on
advisories that relate to your site.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Description of IBM AIX vulnerability
A vulnerability exists in /bin/login on all IBM AIX 3 systems.
II. Impact of IBM AIX vulnerability
Remote users can obtain unauthorized root access on the affected
hosts.
III. Solution for IBM AIX vulnerability
IBM is working on an official fix, which is still under
development. The reference number for this fix is APAR IX44254.
Until you obtain the official fix from IBM, we encourage you to
apply the workaround or install the emergency fix below.
A. Workaround
The recommended workaround is to disable the rlogin daemon:
1. As root, edit /etc/inetd.conf
Comment out the line 'login ... rlogin'
2. Run 'inetimp'
3. Run 'refresh -s inetd'
B. Emergency fix
The emergency fix for the different levels of AIX 3
affected by this vulnerability is available via anonymous
FTP from software.watson.ibm.com:/pub/rlogin/rlogin.tar.Z.
Installation instructions are included in the README file
(which is included in rlogin.tar.Z).
Checksum information for rlogin.tar.Z:
BSD: 25285 317
SystemV: 13021 633 rlogin.tar.Z
MD5: MD5 (rlogin.tar.Z) = 803ee38c2e3b8c8c575e2ff5e921034c
C. Official fix
The official fix for this problem can be ordered as
APAR IX44254.
To order an APAR from IBM in the U.S., call 1-800-237-5511
and ask IBM to ship it as soon as it is available.
According to IBM, this fix will be available in
approximately two weeks. APARs may be obtained outside the
U.S. by contacting your local IBM representative.
IV. Description of Linux vulnerability
A vulnerability exists in /bin/login for Linux systems.
V. Impact of Linux vulnerability
Any user, remote or local, can obtain unauthorized root access on
the affected hosts.
VI. Solution for Linux vulnerability
A patch that addresses the remote access problem has been made
available via anonymous FTP from sunsite.unc.edu:
/pub/Linux/system/Network/sunacm/URGENT/README.security
/pub/Linux/system/Network/sunacm/URGENT/security.tgz
The "security.tgz" file includes other security fixes in addition
to the /bin/login patch.
Checksum information for README.security:
BSD: 09575 1
SystemV: 20945 1 README.security
MD5: MD5 (README.security) = 41d14d7b8725c7a1015adeb49601619b
Checksum information for security.tgz:
BSD: 32878 257
SystemV: 40797 513 security.tgz
MD5: MD5 (security.tgz) = dd4585cf4da1b52d25d619bf45f55b75
To address the local access problem, we encourage you to install
a version of /bin/login that does not allow the -f option in the
form "-f<user>", but only allows this option in the form
"-f <user>", as two arguments. At this time, we do not know
which versions of login.c are vulnerable. As we receive
additional information, we will update the CA-94:09.README file.
Again, we encourage you to check this README file regularly for
updates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CERT Coordination Center wishes to thank Axel Clauberg of
University of Cologne for reporting the IBM AIX problem, and
IBM for their assistance in responding to this problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT
Coordination Center or your representative in Forum of Incident
Response and Security Teams (FIRST).
If you wish to send sensitive incident or vulnerability information to
CERT via electronic mail, CERT strongly advises that the e-mail be
encrypted. CERT can support a shared DES key, PGP (public key
available via anonymous FTP on info.cert.org), or PEM (contact CERT
for details).
Internet E-mail: cert@cert.org
Telephone: 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4),
and are on call for emergencies during other hours.
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
USA
Past advisories and their associated README files, information about
FIRST representatives, and other information related to computer
security are available for anonymous FTP from info.cert.org.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix
CA-94:09.README
This file is a supplement to the CERT Advisory
CA-94:09.bin.login.vulnerability of May 23, 1994, and will be updated
as additional information becomes available.
We have received feedback from these vendors, who indicated that their
products are not vulnerable:
Amdahl
Apple
BSD
BSDI
Harris
HP
Motorola
NeXT
Pyramid
SCO
SGI
Solbourne
Sony
Sun
CERT has verified that the following vendor products are not vulnerable:
Free BSD
We have received feedback from these vendors, who have made patches
available to address the /bin/login vulnerability:
IBM
workaround: see Section III. Solution for IBM AIX
vulnerability A. Workaround of CERT advisory
CA-94:xx
emergency patch: software.watson.ibm.com:/pub/rlogin/rlogin.tar.Z
Official patch: APAR IX44254
Linux
patch: sunsite.unc.edu:/pub/Linux/system/Network/sunacm/URGENT/*
****************************************************************************
* *
* The point of contact for MILNET security-related incidents is the *
* Security Coordination Center (SCC). *
* *
* E-mail address: SCC@NIC.DDN.MIL *
* *
* Telephone: 1-(800)-365-3642 *
* *
* NIC Help Desk personnel are available from 7:00 a.m.-7:00 p.m. EST, *
* Monday through Friday except on federal holidays. *
* *
****************************************************************************
PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOD computing communities receive
DDN Security bulletins. If you are not part of DOD community, please
contact your agency's incident response team to report incidents. Your
agency's team will coordinate with DOD. The Forum of Incident Response and
Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member
organizations and their constituencies can be obtained by sending email to
docserver@first.org with an empty subject line and a message body containing
the line: send first-contacts.
This document was prepared as an service to the DOD community. Neither the
United States Government nor any of their employees, makes any warranty,
expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for
the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, product, or
process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process,
or service by trade name, trademark manufacturer, or otherwise, does not
necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring
by the United States Government. The opinions of the authors expressed herein
do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government,
and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.