Atari FTP/ATARI_FTP_0693.zip/ATARI_FTP_0693/Mint/mntlib32.zoo/Bugs

Text File | 1993-06-17 | 12KB | 241 lines

This text files describes some bugs in the MiNT library, as well as some
ways in which the library's behaviour differes from most UNIX systems.  If
the document looks like I'm talking to myself in places, it's because it was
originally compiled by [e-mail] (Hildo Biersma), and
I've marked it up to use as a sort of checklist of things to fix.  Since
some of these problems will be resolved in later releases of the library,
try not to depend too heavily on the behavior described here.

[e-mail] (Nick Castellano)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

*.c: ++boender
  Currently, the code for the mintlibs does various checks
  according to the various versions of MiNT. Now, this is all very
  well, but in some cases, this causes *three* versions of the
  code to exist: TOS, old MiNT and new MiNT. Should this be cleaned
  up at some time, i.e. do we stop supporting MiNT before 0.8 or 0.9?
  Some obvious candidates are killpg.c and unx2dos.c.

*.h:  ++boender
  I have a problem using gcc and GNU programs. If a Makefile from a
  GNU program sets a gcc parameter of -I../lib, and a C file does
  #include "wait.h", "../lib/wait.h" will be included. Now this file
  includes <sys/wait.h>, which does an #include <wait.h>. This, in turn,
  includes the GNU lib/wait.h! (Wow, recursive, recursive, .....)

  This could be solved in various ways. I make a symbolic link to
  <sys/wait.h> from <wait.h>. <sys/wait.h> could do a #include "../wait.h".
  The parameter -I/usr/include could be added in the GNU Makefile.
  For you to decide upon the correct action!

  [I'm not sure I understand this.  It sounds like it could happen if you
  put the Mint library header files in a directory such as /usr/lib, and then
  compile some GNU program in a dir such as /usr/gnu.  Solution:  name your
  include directory something else (e.g. /usr/include) -entropy]

abort.c: ++entropy
  Should fclose() all streams in the same way of exit().  Also, if my
  understanding is correct, it should unmask SIGABRT, and also set SIGABRT's
  signal handler to SIG_DFL if it was SIG_IGN, before raising the signal.

access.c: ++entropy
  I think my "superuser can access anything" assumption is wrong, especially
  if checking execute permissions.

alarm.c: ++entropy
  alarm() will silently "round down" any requested time greater than
  LONG_MAX / 1000 (approximately 2 million seconds).  Most UNIXes allow much
  larger maximum values (usually LONG_MAX).  MiNT needs this extremely small
  maximum value because wakeup scheduling is calculated in milliseconds by
  the kernel.  This cannot be fixed without changing MiNT.  alarm() does not
  work at all under TOS.

clock.c: ++boender, ++entropy
  clock() is currently implemented as an alias for _clock(), which makes it
  hopelessly different from the UNIX version, since it returns time elapsed
  since the program started, and not the CPU time used by the process and
  its children that have terminated so far.  Also, the time units used are
  different (200 Hz ticks instead of microseconds).  When clock() is fixed,
  CLOCKS_PER_SEC in time.h will need to be changed, as ANSI specifies that
  clock()/CLOCKS_PER_SEC gives the CPU time used, in seconds, since the
  beginning of execution.  It may be a good idea to change CLK_TCK to agree,
  or maybe CLK_TCK should be used for the actual 200 Hz hardware tick, and
  change only CLOCKS_PER_SEC.  CLK_TCK is used in times.c.  CLOCKS_PER_SEC
  is used in sleep.c.

fcntl.c: ++entropy
  Need emulation for POSIX-required F_SETLKW.  Should be trivial.

getopt.c, unistd.h: ++boender
  The three externally usable variables defined in getopt.c should be
  included in <unistd.h>, where getopt() is declared too.  These
  are: 'extern char *optarg', 'extern int opterr' and 'extern int optind'.
  [Not really a bug.  Leave it this way because UNIX doesn't have these
  vars in any headers either. -entropy]

ioctl.c: ++nox
  TIOCSETP is #defined to be == TIOCSETN, but they are not really...
  also still looks like it disables RTSCTS every time, unless i
  specifically set that bit (0x2000), and thats not #defined in ioctl.h.
  (and more things like TIOCFLUSH... but Eric knows them already. :-)

kill.c: ++boender, ++entropy
  On UNIX (SysV), system processes (PID 0 and 1) are treated specially.
  This is somewhat different under MiNT, where init(1), if run at all, need
  not have PID 1.  PID 0 is already treated in the correct manner by
  Pkill().  PID 1 really deserves special treatment under MiNT in any case,
  because shooting signals at MiNT's child process (be it init(1), or some
  shell, or whatever) isn't likely to have the expected results.  I'm not
  sure if this can reasonably be resolved in the library alone.

  Ultrix defines a system process as any process with a parent PID of 0.
  This definition may be helpful for implementing kill() correctly in the
  library.

  The man page for the MiNT call Pkill() forgets to mention that
  either the effective user ID of the caller must be zero (super-user) or
  else the real user IDs must match.  Note that, on UNIX, the caller must
  be super-user or else the real or effective user IDs of both processes
  must match.  This might be a bug in MiNT or the MiNT documentation.
  Ask Eric?

limits.h: [e-mail]
  CLK_TCK should be defined here and not just in time.h, since SVR4 does.
  [I disagree, limits.h should be strictly ANSI and is already polluted
  as it is -entropy]

main.c: ++boender
  In exit(), stdin, stdout and stderr are flushed, all other file
  descriptors are closed. I don't know what POSIX says, but System V
  wants stdin, stdout and stderr to be closed too.

mktemp.c: ++entropy
  Produces different sorts of filenames than UNIX does.

open.c, dup.c: ++entropy
  Should clear the close-on-exec flag to be more UNIX-like.
  [and maybe use O_EXCL to mean O_DENYRW also when used without O_CREAT?
  (and always pass O_DENYRW thru, currently it gets lost when open calls
  Fcreate().) [e-mail]]
  open() returns -4 instead of -1 on errors when __MSHORT__ is defined.

pgrp.c: ++entropy
  The setsid() function never really disassociates the controlling tty from
  the current process, since MiNT doesn't seem to have any such concept.  It
  gets around this with a bunch of kludges in setsid(), ioctl(), and open().

popen.c: ++boender
  This function reads the environment variable SHELL to find your shell,
  and takes /bin/sh as an alternative. I think the opposite should be
  done: only take SHELL of /bin/sh does not exist.
  [See my comments on system.c -entropy]

read.c, write.c: ++entropy
  When a backgrounded process is reading from or writing to its controlling
  tty, and its process group has no controlling tty, it should get a return
  value of -1 from the read() or write() with errno set to EIO.  I'm
  not really sure what the controlling tty of a process _group_ is, so
  I'm clueless as to how to try to implement this.

scanf.c: ++jrb
  Evidently loses big time.  Run Gcctests and find out what's what.

sigaction.c: [e-mail], ++entropy
  sigblock() could be declared int at least #ifndef __MSHORT__.  The
  functions sigpending(), sigprocmask(), and sigsuspend() have not been
  tested.  The other new POSIX sig*() functions have been tested but not
  exhaustively.

sleep.c: ++boender, ++entropy
  sleep() will never sleep for more than LONG_MAX / 1000 (approximately 2
  million) seconds because Talarm() is used in its implementation (see
  alarm.c).  usleep() is of type void.  This may not be correct:  it is of
  type unsigned on UN*X, and should be of type unsigned long in the mintlibs.

stat.c: +nox
  In lstat(), maybe make filenames with trailing slash follow symlinks?
  sometimes it would be nice if i could do `ls -l /usr/' and get whats
  in there, not just the link...
  [This sounds like a bad idea to me.  Sounds like a kludge in ls is
  what's needed here, if anything. -entropy]

statfs.c: ++entropy
  Hildo's kludge for /PROC, /PIPE, /SHM will have really unexpected results
  for any signal handler that deals with the current directory, if it is
  called in the small period of time while the current directory is
  changed.  Shouldn't cause major problems.

system.c: ++boender
  Currently, this function emulates the UN*X function, including
  simple input/output redirection. It might be wise to check
  if "/bin/sh" exists; if it exists, to call "/bin/sh -c <cmdline>".
  If it does not exist, keep the current behaviour (emulation).
  [I feel better about the way this is currently handled as there are
  too many broken shells out there, and too many problems with figuring
  out what a user means by "/bin" on a tos file system, and so on.  The
  current scheme is more likely to work for more users more of the time...
  -entropy]
  [well you could argue over that now that there are `real' shells
  available at least for MiNT...  but more important, if it `emulates' it
  could do better, like in system ("uux foobox!foo '>bar'") pass the
  quoted '>bar' to uux at least as long as the `emulation' doesn't know
  how to uucp back output of remote commands... :-) [e-mail]]
  [OK, if someone wants to write a fix for system() that execs a shell,
  I'll accept it so long as there is a way (via an environment variable)
  for the user to select the emulation as it is currently working.  Fixes
  to make the emulation more robust would also be welcome. -entropy]

types.h: ++entropy
  Need ssize_t for POSIX compliance.

unistd.h: ++entropy
  The following should be #ifndef _POSIX_SOURCE:  abort(), chmod(), creat(),
  getwd(), kill(), mkdir(), mktemp(), open(), psignal(), _read(),
  setlinebuf(), setegid(), seteuid(), setregid(), setreuid(), stime(),
  tell(), umask(), _write(), system(), getpass().  Some of them should be in
  a different header when _POSIX_SOURCE is defined (or always?).

unlink.c: [e-mail]
  When a file is still open on a GEMDOS filesystem MiNT already sets some
  flag and unlinks after the close, but until then open() still finds the
  file!  (which can be annoying on things like lock files...)
  [I don't think this can be fixed in the library.  MiNT acts this
  way on purpose.  -entropy]

utime.c: ++boender
  stime(): My System V.3 manual state that `The stime() call will
  fail if the effective user ID of the calling process is not
  super-user.'. Now, I know the underlying system calls Tsetdate()
  and Tsettime() are not privileged, and possibly the clock itself
  can also be set on hardware level. What do we do here? Perhaps
  MiNT should be fixed to check the effective user ID in Tsetdate()
  and Tsettime() (a trivial fix in MiNT source file dos.c), or
  perhaps we should do a check in stime(). I personally would prefer
  MiNT to be fixed. Could you raise this subject with Eric Smith?
  [I did, and I believe someone mentioned that it is now a privileged
  call in MiNT 1.05, but I'm still running 1.04 so I cannot verify this.
  As to the hardware clock, I'd hope that would be in protected memory
  on newer machines, but I don't know.  Anyone want to give me a TT
  so I can try it? <grin> -entropy]

utmp.c: ++boender
  The utmp structure as defined differs from the System V structure.
  Now, I don't know what BSD does, but I'll look it up. Do you
  know what POSIX says about the utmp structure?
  Also, the System V getutent, getutid, etc. calls are missing from
  the mintlibs, but they are so dependent on fields in the utmp
  structure that are missing in the mintlibs that they cannot be
  written without changing the utmp structure.
  I think complying with POSIX on this would be a Good Thing; if
  someone could send me the relevant parts, I'll write the routines.
  Note that all kind of stuff is dependent on this and has to be
  emulated in the mintlibs, like getlogin(), or left out altogether,
  like ttyslot().
  Oh, and this: changing the utmp structure is a pretty large
  operation, since init(1) will have to be overhauled completely.
  As I don't think MiNT will ever write /etc/utmp and /etc/wtmp
  structures on booting, perhaps we should leave this be.