To be successful, any scheme for multilateral disarmament should proceed by small steps, should convince both sides that each has bettered the other, and, most importantly, should not become embroiled in the difficulties of weapon comparison. I propose a mechanism which has these three characteristics. Indeed, it can turn to advantage the inevitable differences of opinion about weapons of the two sides. It is based on the 'I cut - you choose' rule by which children can divide a cake.
It would be extraordinary if the values of usefulness chosen by one side were in exact agreement with the magnitude of threat felt by the other. Indeed, we may expect that the weapons with accurate terminal guidance and short launch times, which are suitable for pre-emptive first strikes, will induce a feeling of threat in their victims which is much greater than the feeling of comfort they offer to their owners. On the other hand, second-strike weapons are valuable deterrents and provide a large feeling of security, but do not pose a threat in proportion. This difference of opinion provides the incentive for the disarmament process and ensures that both sides can believe that they have secured an advantage.
The first reduction should be very small. Let us suppose that it is a step of about one per cent. Each side picks from the list of its opponent the most threatening items with total military value percentage not exceeding this 'table limit'. The selections may be announced simultaneously and small differences carried forward as credits for a second round.
If Side B happened to decide that the 'Class X' missile was the most serious threat, they would request as a first move that the number of missiles be reduced by 23. Meanwhile Side A would pick the most threatening one per cent of weapons from Side B's list. Side B would be quite indifferent about Side A's choice because the numbers would have been chosen to make any one per cent selection equal, in their view, to any other.
Either side may wish to distort the percentage values it declares. But because the sum total is always equal to one hundred, a reduction is quite legitimate, but the ploy may backfire and lead to the loss of good weapons at less than their face value.
It is also possible to design rules which allow for the updating of weapons. For example, if Side A insists on the introduction of some new missiles, it may do so provided that it also declares a military value percentage for them. Side B may then, without loss to its armoury, remove items to that same value from any part of Side A's inventory including the new ones. Side A will not want the new ones to be instantly lost and so will have to put a higher than true value on them. It will therefore have to give up rather more of its obsolete inventory. This rule would encourage the evolution of new weapons which provide high perceived security for low perceived threat - a most desirable feature.
Stephen Salter, Department of Mechanical Engineering, School of Engineering, The King's Buildings, University of Edinburgh, Mayfield Road, Edinburgh, EH9 3JL, Scotland (tel 031 667 1081 ext 3276). This scheme won a Social Inventions Award. 'Some Ideas to Stop World War III' by Salter is available from the Institute for L1-55.