Interactive Entertainment 12/EPISODE_12_APR_1995.iso/patch/f15303.zip/iraq93.txt

Text File | 1993-03-18 | 12KB | 228 lines

               F-15 Strike Eagle III 1993 Scenario
               -----------------------------------

    On the two year anniversary of the Gulf War, we once again
find ourselves poised to begin military operations against Iraq. Since
the Gulf War ended, the failure to remove Sadam Hussein from
power has come to be viewed as a mistake. At the time, the
reluctance of the United States and its Coalition partners to become
embroiled in Iraq ended the ground campaign in just 100 hours. Our
greatest fear was not that we might lose the war, but that we might
win it and get mired in a Vietnam-like occupation.

    In our rush to conclude the Gulf War, public opinion seems to
have undergone a sea-change in direction. The new consensus is that
we left before finishing the job. Iraq's brutal dictatorship had been
compared to Nazi Germany and Hussein had been vilified as being
the next Adolf Hitler. So it came as a shock that the war ended with
Hussein still in power. It appeared to some as if the Coalition had
pushed to the Rhine and then declared the war over.

    The goal of the Coalition in 1991 was limited under a United
Nations mandate to ejecting the Iraqi army from Kuwait. No
provision was made to allow for toppling the Iraqi dictator. Clearly
though, no one outside of Iraq (and perhaps Jordan) would have shed
a tear had Hussein been "taken out" by a lucky hit. But because this
didn't happen, because the Israelis have so far shown restraint, and
because he wasn't removed by his own people, Hussein and his Ba'
athist party continue to rule.

    Besides the withdrawal of the Iraqi army, another one of the
cease-fire conditions was the dismantling of Iraqi's nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons (NBC) programs. This was to be
systematically accomplished under the watchful eyes of various UN
inspection teams. From the very beginning, UN teams were deceived,
harassed, intimidated and prevented from completing their mission.

    The Iraqis engaged in an elaborate shell game, shuffling
material between various locations to confuse the inspectors. Several
of these attempts were captured on tape but little could be done to
otherwise prevent them. Numerous stand-offs also occurred early on.
UN team members were often kept from removing incriminating
documents from government facilities, documents which would have
outlined Iraq's extensive NBC program.

    One incident in particular, the barricading of inspectors within
the Agricultural Ministry in Baghdad, lasted several days. It ended
only after the Iraqi government allowed the inspectors to leave the
building with documents they had uncovered.

    Since the commencement of cease-fire talks on 3 March 1991,
Sadam Hussein has consistently violated the agreement which
effectively ended the Gulf War. By denying UN access to weapon
facilities and announcing that it no longer recognizes the "No-Fly"
zones, Iraq's leadership has once again placed it on a collision course
with the United States.

    By terms of the ceasefire agreement Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft
had been forbidden to fly anywhere within the country. General H.
Norman Schwarzkopf agreed to allow Iraqi helicopters to operate on
humanitarian grounds since the nation's transportation
infrastructure had been destroyed. It soon became apparent that
helicopters were being used against helpless civilians. Schwarzkopf
believed that the Iraqis had fully intended to use helicopters for this
purpose all along. He had, in his words, "been suckered."

    "No- Fly" zones were established to prevent Hussein from using
airpower to suppress rebellious Shi' ites in the south and Kurdish
separatists to the north. Embarrassed by its failure to protect these
anti-Hussein populations, the UN sectioned off Iraqi airspace south of
the 32nd parallel and north of the 36th parallel.

    Several Iraqi warplanes have been shot down since the "No-
Fly" zones went into effect. Throughout this period, Iraqi aircraft
would race up to the zones then turn away at the last moment. Those
pilots that misjudged their location and crossed the line have been
shot down.

    On the 17th of December 1992, a MiG-25 was shot down after
penetrating the southern "No-Fly" zone. Exactly one month later a
MiG-23 was downed by an F-16 firing two AMRAAMs north of the
36th parallel. The next day (18 January) a F-15C used an AMRAAM
to take out another MiG-25 in the southern "No-Fly" zone.

    Not only are Iraqi aircraft prevented from flying in these zones
but surface-to-air missile sites are also not allowed within these
areas to insure the safety of Coalition aircraft. Likewise, Iraqi SAM
radars have been repeatedly warned not to "lock-up" Coalition
aircraft overflying the country.

    Because of the personal enmity between Hussein and George
Bush, Hussein apparently decided to undertake measures designed to
embarrass the out-going administration. Despite public comments
from President Clinton to the contrary, Hussein may also believe he
can entice the new administration into negotiations. This perhaps
explains why, after two years, a flurry of violations has suddenly
occurred.

    On 7 January 1993, U.N. inspection teams that were returning
to Iraq after the holidays were denied flight clearances. At the same,
U.S. intelligence spotted a number of operational SA-2 and SA-3 sites
within the zones. In addition, mobile SA-6 missile batteries had
evidently crossed south of the 32nd parallel. This effort to
reconstitute its air defense system within the "No-Fly" zones put Iraq
in direct violation of its cease-fire agreements.

    On January 10th, Iraqi military forces dressed as civilians
crossed into Kuwait and began dismantling a former Iraqi naval
facility at Umm Qasr. Reports surfaced that a number of Silkworm
anti-ship missiles were taken back across the border and for the next
four days this illegal activity would continue. Iraqi triple-A and
SAMs began moving along the edges of both "No-fly" Zones. The next
day, the U.S. threatened immediate action if the SAMs were not
removed from the "No-fly Zones."

      The cumulative effect of Iraq's provocation was a resumption
of active military confrontation. Beginning on Wednesday, 13
January 1993, the United States, Britain, and France resumed
airstrikes on Iraqi military and strategic targets. Responding to the
refusal to allow UN inspection teams back into the country, three
separate strikes took place within five days. This last ditch effort to
tweak the nose of the Bush administration had brought a strong
response. Iraq could not help but get the message.

    The first strike involved some 112 aircraft including six
Tornadoes from Britain and six Mirage fighters from France. Only 80
of the sorties could be considered "shooters" with the rest being
support aircraft.

    Launched from Saudi Arabia and the carrier U.S.S Kitty Hawk,
the raid was flown against eight separate locations in the southern
"No-fly" zone. The primary targets were four air defense command
and control centers and four fixed SA-2/ SA-3 sites. Mobile SA-6
launchers were also identified and targeted if necessary. The raid
consisted of a total of 32 separate aiming points divided amongst the
eight locations.

    The results of this raid were generally disappointing. After
debriefing the pilots and analyzing photo-intelligence, the BDA
showed that the strike was only partially successful. Bombing was
conducted from 10,000 ft to avoid residual ground fire and poor
weather in the target area caused severe problems. Only 16 of the 32
aiming points were hit and many of the aircraft were forced to
return with their ordnance. Less than 50% of the intended targets
were damaged and only the radars sites at Tallil and Amara were
destroyed.

    According to published reports none of the F-16 or F/A-18s
managed to score hits. The F/A-18s missed all of their three assigned
targets near Samawah. The six F-16s dropped Mk.84s from over
10,000 ft. Not surprizingly, without specialized targetting equipment,
all failed to hit. Only two of the six vaunted F-117As managed to
deliver ordnance on target. Without the F-15E's TFR, the
"Nighthawks" were left to deal with cloud cover, seriously
degrading their ability to laser designate targets. One pilot made a
navigational error and bombed a farm house over a mile away from
his intended target.

    The F-15Es performed well and were among the few aircraft to
hit their targets. With their all-weather bombing systems and
Terrain Following Radar, F-15s were able score 8 hits on 10
scheduled targets. The 80% success rate made the F-15 the star of
the operation. To be fair though, this raid placed aircraft in roles for
which they were not equipped. Expecting F-16s to hit targets with
unguided munitions from 10,000 ft in poor weather was asking too
much.

    A second raid involving only Tomahawk missiles, was launched
on the 17th at a nuclear processing facility at Zaafaraniyah 13 miles
south-east of Baghdad. Forty-five TLAM cruise missiles were
launched from ships in the Persian Gulf (U.S.S. Cowpens, Hewitt and
Stump) and Red Sea (U.S.S. Caron). The target was subsequently
reduced to powdered rubble after taking at least 35 direct hits. At
$1.2 million per missile, it might have been cheaper just to buy the
facility rather than to bomb it.

    According to western journalists taken to the site, only specific
buildings involved with manufacturing were struck. Adjacent
buildings in the complex were left untouched. One of the Tomahawks
fired by the U.S.S. Caron , however, was apparently hit by triple-A
causing it to veer off-course. It slammed into the courtyard of the
now famous Al-Rashid hotel in Baghdad which happened to be
holding an Arab League conference at the time. Two women were
killed in the explosion.

    A third raid, characterized as a re-strike, was launched
following Iraq's continued refusal to quarantee the safety of UN
inspection teams. This attack took place in daylight and involved
some 60 aircraft. F-15Es, which had performed so well on the 13th,
struck selected SAM sites, radar installations, and command facilities
in the southern "No-fly" zone. One F-15C managed to shoot down a
MiG-29.

    F-15s and F-16s were able to destroy the fixed sites but when
intelligence noted that the mobile SAMs were missing or on the
move, the F/A-18 sorties were cancelled. Rather than risk having to
return to the carrier loaded with ordnance, the Navy scrubbed its
portion of the attack.

                        --------------

    As noted in the F-15 Strike Eagle III instruction manual,
military analysts here at MicroProse anticipated a resumption of the
conflict. To accommodate this eventuality, the design team included
F-15 missions against a wide range of targets, including the ones
struck recently in the "No-fly Zones".

        These recent missions can be recreated without difficulty. The main
difference between these missions and those conducted as part of the
1991 Gulf War is that it is imperative to minimize losses. This time
there is no massive ground army ready to invade and the contest is
more political than military. The U.S. cannot afford to have its pilots
shot down and possibly captured by Iraqis on the ground.

    Therefore, when flying these missions it is absolutely crucial
that you return with your aircraft. Hitting your target is a secondary
consideration to returning safely. If you have to eject, make sure that
you are over friendly territory or at least "Fence Out" so that you can
be rescued. The U.S. cannot be put in a position of having to bargain
with Hussein for your release. Accordingly, having one of its pilots
put on trial in Baghdad would be politically embarrassing. If you do
manage to get captured, plan on staying awhile.

        To recreate these missions, select the Desert Storm theater
from the Home screen.  Then, select "Iraq '93".  The program will now
generate missions to the actual target areas flown in this latest
action.  See if you can match the real F15E's successes
!