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HANDBOOK FOR VOLUNTEERS OF THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY
Notes On Guerrilla Warfare
CONTENTS
Chapter Subject Page
1 Our Tradition ......................... 1
2 What Is Guerrilla Warfare? ............ 5
3 Guerrilla Strategy .................... 8
4 Tactics Of Guerrillas ................. 10
5 Organization and Arms ................. 13
6 With The People ....................... 17
7 Guerrilla Bases ....................... 20
8 Guerrilla Attack ...................... 22
9 Enemy Tactics ......................... 24
10 Guerrilla Defence ..................... 27
11 General Techniques .................... 30
12 Battle Notes .......................... 35
A Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army,
issued by General Headquarters, 1956.
re-issued Electronically by Vipurr of Anarchist's in Action,
Nov. 1993.
CHAPTER 1 -- OUR TRADITION
No nation has a greater tradition of guerrilla warfare than
Ireland. Our history is full of examples of its successful use. We
have produced some fine guerrilla leaders whose true qualities have
never been fully assessed.
Their strength lay in the support they received from the Irish
people. In the final analysis it was the people who bore the
enemy's reprisals.
Whoever betrayed the cause, or gave up the fight, or suffered
loss of spirit, it was seldom the people.
KERNE OF OLD
The kerne of old were lightly armed foot soldiers. Their
tactics were of the skirmishing kind. They harassed the Normans.
In open or positional warfare they had no hope of breaching the
defenses of the strongly-armed, iron-clad Normans.
Art Og MacMorrough Kavanagh was a typical guerrilla leader of
his period. Richard II came twice with large armies to subdue him
(1394 & 1399) and never succeeded. Another was Fiach MacHugh
O'Byrne and yet a third Leinster leader was Rory O'More. The
O'Byrne's great victory at Glenmalure followed the strict
application of guerrilla tactics.
Ulster produced its quota of which Shane (the Proud) O'Neill
was only one. The English leader Sydney paid him a fine tribute
when he said "He armeth and weaponeth all the peasants of his
country, the first that ever did so of an Irishman."
But it was left to the finest military leader Irish history
has produced, Hugh (the Great) O'Niel, to understand fully the
potentialities of guerrilla warfare. He proved it too for 9 years.
YELLOW FORD
O'Neil forsake his guerrilla tactics only once: at Kinsale.
He did so under pressure from the Spaniards who had landed at the
wrong place and time and who were insistent that he attack the
encircling English army of Mountjoy. This was the first and last
battle in which he adopted open positional warfare. The result we
all know.
How he defeated Essex, who landed here with huge armies in an
attempt to subdue him, and how these armies were dissipated in vain
attempts to reach him, is worthy of study by the serious student of
guerrilla tactics. He knew when to strike and when to withdraw and
he never fought a battle except on his own terms The battle of
Yellow Ford is the greatest example of this.
At the Yellow Ford he lured Marshal Bagenal with 5,000 men out
of Armagh He had full intelligence as to Bagenal's strength and
battle order. He hit him with snipers all the way to the Backwater
and at a spot called the Yellow Ford-in a prepared position-he gave
battle, split Bagenal's superior forces, and destroyed them
division by division. Bagenal was killed, his army's retreat
became a rout, three-fourths of the English forces were
annihilated. It was, in effect, a large scale ambush executed in
the classical Cannae manner: by drawing the enemy into the centre
and closing him in a pincer.
OWEN ROE
Another O'Neill, Owen Roe (a regular officer of the Spanish
army), was also a master guerrilla tactician. His defeat of
General Munroe (June 1646) at Benburb is an example of how a small,
well trained guerrilla force can destroy a far superior army.
First, Owen Roe's cavalry cut off Munroe's reinforcements.
Then his cavalry returned and attacked the enemy's big guns. The
victory was complete: 5,000 poorly-armed men against a standing
army of 6,000. A memorable victory in any country's story.
1798's GUERRILLAS
Michael Dwyer is a much neglected figure in Irish history. It
is too easily forgotten that he held out in the Wicklow mountains
for seven years against England's forces. His guerrilla force grew
from 10 men who came with him after his disastrous Battle of Tara
to more than 150 men. He used every tactic in the guerrilla
handbook and was never really defeated.
But Michael Dwyer's example is important in other ways. He
could not hope to win as long as only his small force was in
action. Had other groups risen similarly throughout the country,
the outcome would have been far different. But the true
application of guerrilla tactics to a revolutionary situation was
not properly understood at the time.
FINTAN LALOR
James Fintan Lalor (1848 leader) never got the opportunity to
carry his guerrilla theories into the battlefield. But that he
understood these tactics is evident from his writings. Take this
quotation:
"The force of England in entrenched and fortified. You must
draw it out of position; break its mass; break its trained line of
march and manoeuvre, its equal step and serried array ... nullify
its tactic and strategy, as well as its discipline; decompose the
science and system of war, and resolve them into their first
elements."
FENIANS
Lalor, after his 1849 abortive rebellion, fathered the Fenian
movement through such figures as John O'Mahony and James Stephens.
But one Fenin figure above all practiced guerrilla warfare
extensively and again like Michael Dwyer failed because his tactics
were little understood and he was left isolated.
This man was Captain Mackey Lomasey, affectionately known in
the Cork area where he operated as "The Little Captain," an
Irish-American who harried English garrisons for arms for a long
time before being taken. Lomasey learned his guerrilla tactics
while an officer with the Union forces in the American Civil War.
BLACK AND TANS
By guerrilla warfare after 1916, with the united resistance of
the Irish people to Britain rule almost a fact, and spearheaded by
the I.R.A., it became quite obvious that England could no longer
govern Ireland. The time of the Treaty it has been calculated
England could not have reconquered Ireland with less than 100,000
troops aided by all the accoutrements of modern warfare.
It is now almost an accepted historical fact that had Lloyd
George's bluff been called during the Treaty negotiations-and that
he was bluffing is no longer in doubt-the outcome would have been
a free Ireland. The bluff was, of course, that he would declare
"immediate and terrible war."
But guerrilla operations which made this great success
possible had to have a united people behind them. British
Government in Ireland no longer existed in fact. British terror in
Ireland could not hope to revive it. And terror had come as a last
resort but one. The final one was to split the people.
The hammer blows of the guerrillas destroyed the British
administration.
The guerrillas acted in small numbers in the right localities
and compelled the British to disperse to find them. Then as they
searched they hit them at will by means of the ambush.
Communications were systematically destroyed and even the British
army's transport system in the country was disorganized.
The enemy's intelligence service was completely dislocated.
The R.I.C.-the eyes and ears of British rule-was demoralized.
British justice courts could not operate-for the people ignored
them.
The British gradually were forced to evacuate the smaller more
isolated garrisons. They concentrated in the larger towns. The
areas evacuated came under sole control of the Republic. The next
step was to isolate the larger centres and keep cutting
communications and constantly hitting the enemy. In time these
would have been evacuated too. Thus ended the last great phase of
guerrilla operations against British rule in Ireland.
CHAPTER 2 -- WHAT IS GUERRILLA WARFARE?
A small nation fighting for freedom can only hope to defeat an
oppressor or occupying power by means of guerrilla warfare. The
enemy's superiority in manpower, resources, materials, and
everything else that goes into the waging of successful war can
only be overcome by the correct application of guerrilla methods.
Guerrilla warfare might be defined as the resistance of all
the people to enemy people. In the struggle the guerrillas act as
the spearhead of the resistance.
Up to the second world war the military textbooks ignored this
phase of warfare. After that they couldn't afford to ignore it.
Now the General Staffs are working out methods of dealing with
guerrillas. Britain has built an independent Brigade to deal with
them. In the age of the H-Bomb, strangely enough, the tactics of
guerrillas are being widely copied.
For example, the former British Chief of the General Staff and
Commander of the 14th Army, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, has
this to say on the matter:
"Dispersed fighting, whether the dispersal is caused by the
terrain, the lack of supplies or by the weapons of the enemy, will
have two main requirements-skilled and determined junior leaders
and self-reliant, physically-hard, well disciplined troops.
"Success in future land operations will depend on the
immediate availability of such leaders and such soldiers, ready to
operate in small independent formations. They will have to be
prepared to do without regular lines of communications, to guide
themselves and to subsist largely on what the country offers.
"Unseen, unheard and unsuspected, they will converge on the
enemy, and, when they do reveal themselves in strength, they will
be so close to him that he will be unable to atomize them without
destroying himself."
That then is the blueprint of warfare in the atomic age-the
tactics and strategy of guerrillas.
REGULAR WARFARE
In regular warfare the tactical objective is to destroy the
enemy in battle by concentrating superior numbers at a decisive
time and place. The guerrilla strikes not one large blow but many
little ones; he hits suddenly, gnaws at the enemy's strength,
achieves surprise, disengages himself, withdraws, disperses and
hits again.
A regular army unit depends on all kinds of tactical support:
air, ground, communication, supplies, armour, artillery, reserves,
units to the left, right, and rear. And so on. There are all
kinds of weapons available.
Plans are worked out by General Staffs, transmitted through a chain
of command down the line. Attackers will go in under artillery,
air and even sea barrages. Armour will create the breakthrough.
More often than not the line soldiers are unaware of what is
happening or is supposed to happen. They rely on N.C.O.s and
officers in all eventualities. They are trained to fight as cogs
in an intricate and vast machine embracing perhaps millions like
themselves.
THE GUERRILLA
The situation on the guerrilla is quite different.
Outside of the support he gets from the people among whom he
operates-and this support must never be underestimated for it is
vital to his eventual success-he fights alone. He is part of an
independent formation that is in effect an army by itself. He must
be SELF-CONTAINED.
If necessary he must act alone and fight alone with the
weapons at his disposal-and these very often will not be the best.
He must find his own supplies. His endurance has to be great: and
for this he needs a fir body and an alert mind. Above all he must
know what he is fighting for-and why.
The guerrilla must move fast and hit hard. He must be
adaptable. He must change his methods constantly.
His training must be such that during withdrawal his formation
can break up and reform later. It is not his job to hold a line or
take a city or maintain a strategically vital area.
But what he must do is this:
HE MUST EXHAUST THE ENEMY BY CONSTANT HARASSMENT.
HE MUST ATTACK CONSTANTLY FROM ALL DIRECTIONS.
HE MUST STAGE SUCCESSFUL RETREATS, RETURN TO ATTACK,
AVOID ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY THAT ARE NOT OF HIS
OWN MAKING.
Tactics have to be changed constantly. Formations have to be
independent of terrain and lines of communications. This is what it
means by being self-contained.
The guerrilla never affords the enemy a target. He is bold in
the attack and his great advantage is MOBILITY.
The plan of action must be simple, understood by all, an-if
possible-well rehearsed. The guerrilla's great weapon is SURPRISE.
To achieve this surprise, intelligence must be first class. The
guerrilla must know everything about the enemy and his battle
order, his strength and his weakness-even his plans for anti
guerrilla activities.
Good intelligence breeds good morale. And for the guerrilla
morale is everything. It is this moral that gives the guerrilla
his determination and his daring.
Once the fight is joined, it must be carried out relentlessly
and to the bitter end. The road may be long, the sacrifices great,
but if the guerrilla has this endurance and the will to win, he
cannot be defeated.
To strive constantly towards these goals day by day, mounting
small success on bigger victories, building up the morale of the
people, these are the aims of the volunteer guerrilla. They ensure
final victory.
CHAPTER 3 -- GUERRILLA STRATEGY
The strategy of guerrilla warfare is to build up resistance
centres throughout the occupied area and confine the enemy to the
larger towns by restricting his movements and communications. In
time the resistance centres are knitted together into one liberated
area.
After that the job is to drive him out of his supposedly safe
base: and thus out of the country.
The essence of all strategy is to bring, by use of surprise
and mobility-or a combination of both-the greatest possible
strength to bear at a chosen time and place. It must be ensured
that the enemy does not-or is not able to-assemble HIS strength at
that point.
This holds true also of guerrilla warfare. But it involves
clever manoeuvre and here the skill of the commander, the
organization of his force and his mobility, play an important role.
The guerrilla attempts to do three things:
(1) Drain the enemy's manpower and resources.
(2) Lead the resistance of the people to enemy
occupation.
(3) Break down the enemy's administration.
He achieves the FIRST by remembering the very fact of his
existence and his constant harassment of the enemy. He remembers
that his own task is not to hold ground but to ensure that in time
the enemy will not hold any either.
He achieves the SECOND by remembering that the people will
bear the brunt of the enemy's reprisal tactics and by inspiring
them with aims of the movement. In this way they will be made
tenacious and strong for in the long run it is the people who can
stop the enemy: by their backing of the national movement.
And he achieves the THREE when the enemy imposes martial law
and thus recognizes he can no longer rule that area the old way.
In effect he is recognizing that the people no longer want him.
As the enemy recognizes the ne phase he has entered he makes
even greater attempts to destroy the guerrillas. And the
guerrillas' number one task is to ensure that he fails.
The main principles of war can be boiled down to these five:
CONCENTRATION-or economy of force.
PROTECTION-to guard against being taken unawares by the
enemy.
SURPRISE-to catch the enemy in such a situation that he is
unable to switch his forces to meet the attack.
Surprise
can be of time or place as well as armament and forces.
AGGRESSIVENESS-determination to knock out the enemy in the
attack.
OBJECTIVE-to pursue the objectives to the end despite the
enemy's counter-measures and never to be sidetracked.
These principles hold good for guerrilla warfare also.
CHAPTER 4 -- TACTICS OF GUERRILLAS
The guerrilla is always on the offensive. To be successful he
needs surprise, mobility, exact knowledge of the enemy,
determination, fire action and shock action. All these, as in
warfare generally, will be determined by
his armament, his training, his morale, his planning, and
co-ordination between higher command and the initiative of
guerrilla action.
He destroys enemy communications, raids enemy bases, ambushes
the enemy when the latter tries to find him. But his tactics must
always be in process of change because in time the enemy will have
an answer to the old ones.
In guerrilla warfare the attacks must be fluid and carried out
by detachments or columns, sections and even battle teams. The
local commander will have the initiative in his hands.
The battle teams may move by bounds to keep the objective and
if attacked will be capable of dissolving immediately-only to come
together again later. To reach the objective the battle teams may
have to infiltrate hostile strong points. This would be done under
cover of darkness. The infiltration would take place through lanes
previously reconnoitred.
INITIATIVE
Since the guerrilla's main task is to drain the enemy it
follows that he hits the enemy in his most vulnerable area and
fights for initiative-never ground.
The guerilla will not fight the enemy in a long battle where
reserves would overwhelm him: he strikes only when he can win. And
avoids superior forces. When the enemy advances, he withdraws.
When the enemy rests, he hits him. He attacks when the enemy is
exhausted. And when the enemy counter-attacks, the guerrilla
flees.
THE GUERRILLA NEVER AFFORDS A TARGET.
The guerrilla relies on SURPRISE above all principles of war.
He makes as little contact as possible with the enemy and uses "the
smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place"
(Lawrence).
His attacks are planned and rehearsed. He strikes when the
enemy is moving, resting or is lightly guarded. By using flank
attacks on the line of march a much weaker force can achieve
success.
THE DECISION
The guerrilla must be the master of lightning blows to achieve
fast decisions. When conditions are unfavorable he disperses and
shifts base immediately. He will do that when:
(1) He hasn't the forces to hold off the enemy.
(2) He is encircled and has to break out.
(3) The terrain is unfavorable.
(4) His supplies are insufficient.
Guerrilla units will only concentrate their forces when the
enemy is advancing and can be damaged severely. Otherwise they
remain intact in small detachments. This reduces errors and makes
action easier.
Also the small detachment working independently can make
better use of ground and is able to break-out of an enemy cordon
more easily.
The guerrilla must pick his targets wisely. His choice must
lie with the ones that play up his natural advantages and which aid
his general strategy.
DECEPTION
The guerrilla must muster the tactics of deceiving the enemy.
He moves secretly and quickly. He travels light, is highly mobile,
knows the terrain intimately and uses it to its best advantage. He
uses ground, darkness and fog to aid his attacks. He may move by
night and sleep by day.
He sticks to back routes, avoids main roads and towns, seldom
uses motor transport, gets to his objective by forced marches,
changes direction constantly. Closely guarded terrain he crosses
by battle teams (two men).
His movements will be by bounds and well guarded in front,
rear and flanks. The detachment will then reassemble at a
predetermined point near area of attack. The guerrilla must be a
master of manoeuvre.
In deceiving the enemy as to his methods and intentions the
guerrilla will use many ruses. He can always cover his tracks by
leaving fast-moving snipers and smaller formations scattered over
wide areas while the main forces pull out.
CONDITIONS
But a guerrilla movement can only operate if two conditions
exist.
The are:
(1) That There Are Guerrilla Formations Everywhere
(Centres Of Resistance) And That They Are Everywhere
In Action. Thus When The Enemy Concentrates On One
Point Another Blazes Up. Without
This Could Snuff Out The Guerrillas In No Time.
(2) That The Guerrilla Detachments Are SELF-CONTAINED In
Everything Needed For Their Operation Including Arms,
Supplies, Intelligence And Propaganda Among The
People.
Co-operation of the people is also vital to the guerrillas.
Because it has to be stressed that support for the aims of the
guerrillas must come from the population. Cut loose from the
people, a guerrilla formation can neither develop nor survive.
And every guerrilla formation is an educator of the people.
It exposes the lies of the enemy, shows the reasons for his
occupation.
LARGE-SCALE
Guerrilla operations generally begin on a small level and
constantly grow. By the time centres of resistance have been built
and tied together large guerrilla formations may carry out
combined operations.
Here the use of radio communications is invaluable. Certain
formations, with a high degree of mobility, will be uses to
intervene at decisive points. In such cases the guerrilla
formations will have beforehand the general plan of action. They
will be able to act with a high degree of independence, depending
on the situation, as a result.
But the guerrilla even at this point must be careful about
moving on to positional warfare. He has to remember that his main
task is to keep the enemy off the balance. He will win if he does
this.
CHAPTER 5 -- ORGANIZATION AND ARMS
The organization of a guerrilla force in the field must in no
way duplicate that of a regular army. Its objective, tasks, need
and outlook are completely different. Its structure must be
elastic so that it can fit in with terrain conditions and
operational necessity.
Three points must be made clear at the outset:
(1) The membership of a guerrilla force operating is a
particular area should in the main consist of locals.
Since small blunder may lead to major setbacks the
guerrillas should know the terrain like a book. For
this knowledge locals are invaluable.
(2) The guerrillas are volunteers and are inspired by an
ideal. Therefore their loyalty, understanding of what
is at stake and discipline will be-and must be-on a
much higher level than that obtaining in a regular
army.
(3) Leadership will not come so much by appointment as by
the trust the guerrillas place in their commander. He
must be worthy of that trust if he is to succeed.
From these points follow a number of principles:
(a) Organization will vary according to the conditions.
Above all it must not be rigid.
(b) Instead of discipline of the regular army type there
will be a more stern battle discipline: agreement on
the job to be done, and the need to do it, and
obedience to the guerrilla code, these take the
place of the unthinking army type discipline.
(c) Breaches of the guerrilla code-desertion, betrayal,
breach of confidence in any way-must be severely
dealt with on the spot.
(d) Guerrillas' work is decentralized or dispersed
units. The independent detachment (15 to 25 men) is
the key to the organizational structure. The
detachment will decide its own local targets and
carry out its job within an area without further
orders. It can expect little help if it fails in
its mission. It takes its punishment ALONE.
Accordingly organizational co-ordination is not
important. But there may be, as the occasion
demands, operational co-ordination of several
guerrilla detachments.
(e) Since guerrillas are self-contained they dispense
with the supply and reserve methods of regular
formations-where one fighting man may be backed by
as many as 10 non-combatants.
THE COLUMN
From this it follows that organizationally the basic guerrilla
unit is the independent detachment-or as we in Ireland named it,
Flying Column. Its strength will follow development and local
needs. Operationally, it is under higher command but at the same
time knows its own field of operations and carries out its tasks
without further checking.
It may be called on by higher command to carry out certain
tasks or support other columns in the field. But most of its time
will be taken up with local operations.
The column should be able to live and fight on its own for a
long period of time ... without help from any quarter. And it does
the following:
(1) Picks its own targets except when acting under direct
orders from higher command.
(2) Co-ordinates its activities with other columns through
higher command.
(3) Gets its reserves and replacements from the local
population.
(4) Is responsible for its own security, intelligence, arms,
equipment, supplies, and propaganda among the people.
(5) To operate outside its allotted territory it must get the
sanction of higher command. Also it passes along all
intelligence data collected to higher command.
SECTIONS
The flying column should be as small as operationally
possible. It should seldom exceed 30 men. When it grows stronger
new columns may be created. Its size aids its fast
manoeuvrability.
The basis of all tactics is fire and movement. The column
will concentrate more firepower for less men and thus achieve
striking superiority over enemy forces when in the attack.
It would break down in this fashion:
(1) THE BATTLE TEAM-consisting of two men for fire and
movement. The team could be a tactical entity when required:
one would give fire support while the other manoeuvred.
(2) THE SECTION-consists of two battle teams and the section
commander-five men. Three sections make up the basic column.
The commanders and column commander are the column H.Q. and
every volunteer is a fighting man.
The battle teams and sections will be trained to operate on
their own.
ARMS
Almost any small arms weapon can be a guerrilla weapon. For
assault: sub-machine-guns, light machine-guns, shotguns,
explosives, grenades, pistols, automatic rifles, flame throwers are
needed. For support, light machine-guns, rifles, 2" mortars (for
high angled fire) and rocket launchers.
But it will be the fortunate column that can have all or most
of these weapons. For the most part guerrillas have to make an
improvise.
For many guerrilla operations explosives can be used to make
up for arms deficiencies. Entrances can be made to buildings by
the use of surprisingly small charges. (Always on the building's
blind side.)
Breaking down enemy resistance is also easier once explosives
are employed. Charges of one pound H.E. can be used to mop up the
enemy. And pole charges (10 pounds or more of H.E.) from the end
of a long pole fired by a time fuse are invaluable for pillboxes
and higher windows and such like.
Charges can also be used in ambushes. Buried along the
approach route (9 inches to a foot in depth) in a quantity of four
pounds to a foot they can be fired electrically from cover. The
enemy trucks, once stopped, can be attacked from nearby, also using
explosives.
Four-pound charges can also be spaced for guerrilla protection
in much the same matter as anti-tank mines. As well, explosives
can be strapped to ten-foot planks for use against enemy trucks and
other points.
The employment of explosives, once their tactical use is
understood, can have many variations. They are only dangerous in
the hands of inexperienced men-once the usual precautions have been
taken. Fire is also a potent guerrilla weapon.
The guerrilla armament must be light and carry concentrated
firepower for shock engagements. Heavier weapons may be used in
the fire base while lighter and closer ranged ones are employed in
the final assault.
Every man in the column should be able to handle all weapons
of the column, maintain them and repair them.
TASK OF THE COLUMN: To get as near as possible unobserved to
the target and then use surprise and shock tactics to win.
CHAPTER 6 -- WITH THE PEOPLE
Successful guerrilla operations involve the people. It is the
quality of their resistance to the enemy and support for the
guerrillas which in the end will be the decisive factor. The
guerrillas are the spearhead of the people's resistance.
In fact, a guerrilla force will be unable to operate in an
area where the people are hostile to its aims. And it must be
remembered always that it is the people who will bear the brunt of
the enemy's retaliatory measures.
Accordingly there should be constant contact and co-ordination
between the guerrillas and the local population. This is aided by:
(1) Recruiting volunteers for columns from population of
territory in which column is operating.
(2) Use of civil political committees among the people
whose function it would be to agitate against the
oppressor, get new members for guerrillas, lead the
people in a campaign of active and passive resistance to
enemy occupation.
(3) Have guerrilla agents working among civilian
population collecting information for army.
(4) Use of part time guerrillas who would continue in
civilian occupations yet be available for active service
when called on. Thus local companies would be built up
and used as reserves when the occasion warranted.
(5) Build up liaison between guerrillas and people until
such time as it was perfect. When the people suffer
under enemy oppression for aiding the guerrillas that
latter would help and protect the people.
INFORMATION
To build up the resistance of the people to the required pitch
needs more than guerrillas activity. The aims of the movement must
be popularized, the objectives clearly stated, and the world must
be informed of what is happening-and why.
This type of information is actually good education too. Part
of the education process is countering the enemy's propaganda.
This basic idea is that the guerrilla education campaign must be
continuous, must beat the enemy at his propaganda game and must
expose his lies to the people and indeed the whole world.
This end of the guerrilla operation is no less important than
the destruction of enemy resources and bases.
Information must be factual to build up confidence among the
people in the national movement. What it must do is this:
(1) Give the people tenacity to stand up to the enemy by
showing them the struggle is worthwhile and necessary.
They must be made aware that the national struggle will
be victorious in the end-but the end depends on them.
(2) Get world public opinion behind the just fight of the
people.
(3) Undermine the enemy's morale and his propaganda by
exposing his methods and by constant emphasis on the
unjustness of his cause.
(4) Be the spiritual mainspring of those actively engaged
in the national movement so that they understand the need
to destroy the enemy and his power forever.
METHODS
The main channels of information available to the guerrillas
are newspapers, leaflets, radio, word of mouth. Other methods may
be worked out and new ones invented. For example: Painting of
slogans, proclamations and manifestoes and so on.
All the means of winning the confidence of the people must be
utilized. The ideas of the movement must be so popularized that no
one is in doubt-least of all the enemy-that it will win eventually.
This information service must function continuously to get
maximum results. Among the things to do are:
(1) Show weakness of the enemy position and propaganda
used to bolster that position.
(2) Show what is wrong with political and social order.
(3) Suggest remedies and how they can be brought about.
(4) Be in touch at all times with the thinking of the
people.
ACCURACY
The guerrillas' information service will be judged on its
accuracy. It must tell the people exactly what is required of
them. It must show that the guerrilla movement is all knowing,
all-powerful, part of the people's life-the people are a part of
it.
Its broadcasting must be so interesting that friend and foe
alike tune in. This rule applies to all information media.
The information service of the guerrilla command should work
in close liaison with intelligence so that information is up to the
minute and accurate and yet does not give away any information to
the enemy.
It would also independently collect and evaluate and
distribute its own information. The world has to be informed of
what is happening for it will be basic policy to shut off all
contact between the movement and the rest of the world.
The world must know and understand what is being done, what
the enemy is trying to destroy and why, and the way these things
can be ended and peace restored and freedom won.
The use of regular bulletins for foreign newspapers and news
agencies becomes a necessity. The bulletin should be of the
documentary type: no room for emotional pleas or the like. Just
the facts.
CHAPTER 7 -- GUERRILLA BASES
The guerrilla column will have a base to serve as a rallying
point, as an assembly area after an attack or withdrawal, for use
as a training camp, a place for the wounded, and for general
regrouping.
From these bases the enemy will be raided, his communications
cut, his strong points subjected to heavy and consistent attacks.
Outlying enemy areas, adjacent to the bases, must be destroyed
beforehand.
The bases can be large or small, elaborate or quite simple.
If the guerrilla movement is sufficiently strong and well developed
the bases will reflect this and may indeed be quite large.
Otherwise they should be scattered, inconspicuous and well hidden.
At best the bases can only be semi-permanent. They will be
changed as the situation warrants. Large ones suffer the
disadvantage of attracting enemy attention: they offer him a
target. And of course, the whole aim of his strategy is to be able
to do just that.
Guerrilla bases must have a good line of withdrawal in case of
attack. Indeed they should have several routes of escape. If
possible there should be only one entrance and the base should be
located in an inaccessible area-mountains, marshes, uninhabited
places.
They should be changed frequently.
DEFENCE
The defence of a guerrilla base must be so organized that:
(1) A few snipers (acting as look-outs) can cover approaches
for long distances. There should be a clear-cut system of
alarms and a well-worked drill for evacuation of volunteers
and supplies.
(2) There should be an emergency exit so that the attackers
can be hit from the rear.
(3) The lay-out of the column dug-outs should be such that all
sections of the column are in a position to manoeuvre or
completely dissolve as the occasion warrants. Best is the
triangular form. Each dug-out would give supporting fire to
the other.
(4) Dug-outs should be camouflaged for defence from air and
ground attack, have an all-round traverse and be well
camouflaged.
(5) There should be catches for arms and supplies which would
be insulated against water and drainage.
(6) Approaches may be mined and bases near roads should have
exits facing away from the road.
(7) After the capture of guerrillas belonging to the column
the bases must immediately be changed. A force might,
however, be left behind to surprise the enemy if he attacks.
POINTS OF NOTE
In guarding bases sentries should work in pairs and have
frequent relief. They should have definite instructions on the
line to take in case of attack or if a civilian blunders on the
base.
In the case of innocent blundering on the hide-out, the
sentries should be able to grab the individual and leave subsequent
matters to the commander. In the case of attack, the drill for the
occasion should go into operation without delay. The base must
never be surprised.
Camouflage is vital to the digging of any dug-out. The line
should face into the background. If caves are used the opening
might be covered by dirtied sacking curtained off by leaves and
twigs. But foliage must be changed often-(in case of withering)
and tracks must be carefully covered for they show from the air.
Finally, bases are for the storing of arms and for training
while resting. They are not places for lying low and the guerrilla
must avoid the temptation to use them as such.
CHAPTER 8 -- GUERRILLA ATTACK
The regular soldier is no match for the trained guerrilla in
attack. Because the guerrilla holds the initiative, strikes when
he is ready, uses shock action and surprise to attain his ends,
then breaks contact and withdrawals.
Guerrilla attacks are fluid. There is a large measure of
decentalisation, and manoeuvres are carried out by battle teams who
know their job and do it.
The battle teams move by bounds to the objective and may have
to infiltrate hostile strong points. They cloak themselves in
darkness. They infiltrate through previously reconnoitred lanes.
When they hit the strongpoint they use their first waves to cut
enemy communications, support and supplies. Then the final
subjection is accomplished by the use of close fire-power-small
arms, LMGs, mortars, high explosives, thermite and flamethrowers.
Or whatever weapons the guerrilla commander has at his disposal.
The guerrilla turns night into day (night vision goggles are
easily obtained). He knows at night accurate fire is impossible.
That control is very difficult even for seasoned troops. That a
force can hit and then dissolve. He exploits these advantages and
becomes adept at night operations.
SIMPLICITY
Certain rules govern all attack situations. Thorough
reconnaissance is necessary before the assault. The enemy's
strength and defences are ascertained. The guerrillas move by
night and rest by day. They get as near as possible without being
seen.
The guerrilla takes it for granted that his movements may come
to the enemy's attention so he guards against surprise. He avoids
the local population. His movements must give no indication of his
eventual target.
He will, of course, be self-contained. His equipment will be
as light as possible. He will be well camouflaged, wear light
clothes (meaning light weight, not color), tape grenades and other
equipment that might rattle. He darkens his hands and face-burnt
cork is good for this.
With accurate information on the enemy's defences the
guerrilla commander may stage a rehearsal. Every man will know his
job. Every man is fully briefed on his role and the plan itself.
The plan must be simple. Complicated manoeuvres always break
down. The attack must be timed with precision and it should move
at top speed. There must be total surprise, a thorough carrying
out of the job to be done, and then a planned withdrawal.
WITHDRAWAL
The guerrilla must live to fight another day and for that
reason the withdrawal is as important as the attack itself. There
should be no slip-up. Assembly areas must be clearly understood
and an alternative rendezvous should be named in case of
interference with the original plan.
There must also be a plan for evacuation of the wounded.
And the withdrawal routes must be well chosen so that there is
no confusion.
After the attack a full conference should be held by the
gorillas. Every aspect of the job will be examined. Mistakes will
be pointed out. Weaknesses and strength of the enemy will be
gauged.
More than any other soldier the fighting morale of the
guerrilla must be on a very high plane. Every volunteer is imbued
with aggressive confidence in his fighting skill and the importance
of that skill to his comrades and to his people. This pride will
lead him to do the apparently IMPOSSIBLE-and the "impossible" will
seem easy as a consequence. His enthusiasm will be infectious and
generate such power that no force on earth can stop it.
For the fight he is engaged in is worthy of nothing less.
CHAPTER 9 -- ENEMY TACTICS
The enemy will use every device he can command to destroy the
guerrilla movement. These will include: martial law, curfews,
blocking of roads leading to towns, cities and villages and his own
garrisons, round-ups, night patrols, use of hostages, reprisals,
propaganda to alienate local population from the guerrillas,
torture of prisoners ...
Tactically he will attempt any or all of the following to
destroy the guerrilla columns:
(1) ENCIRCLEMENT-He throws a cordon around the guerrilla
area and then closes the ring.
(2) SURPRISE ATTACK-By use of special troops and
helicopters he will try sudden strikes which ensure that
the guerrilla is kept moving if nothing else.
(3) TRAINED BANDS-He employs small but effective
auxiliary police or army units who can move fast, know
the country and the people and whose job it will be to
destroy the columns, cut their communications and
strangle their supply lines.
TECHNIQUES
The enemy will utilize surprise and will attack in bad
weather, at night or when the roads appear impassable.
The enemy hopes to achieve this surprise by guarding his
intentions and by constant change of direction. They also search
constantly for guerrilla bases and comb the countryside as well as
using patrols and reconnaissance units and local guides when on
this job.
In the following his basic anti-guerrilla techniques the enemy
does the following:
(1) ENCIRCLEMENT-He cuts off all escape routes and then sets
out systematically to destroy the guerrillas. Assembly points will
be long distances from the guerrilla areas. The encircling lines
will be fixed in accordance with the terrain. The aim is to close
the ring around the columns and hold them
Here the enemy's weakest point is his approach to the
encircling areas from his assembly point. He will use vehicles and
heavy weapons and strong reconnaissance units. When he has his
ring completed he may use several methods to finish the job.
Some of these are:
(a) All encircling lines advance simultaneously towards the
centre. This can only be done in relatively small areas. Otherwise
great gaps occur in the circle.
(b) As one force digs-in the other lines close in. The idea
is to drive the guerrillas against a wall of fire and kill them.
The attackers keep pressing the guerrillas all the time.
(c) The wedge system-As the ring is completed other enemy
forces drive strong wedges towards the guerrillas.
As the wedge splits up the guerrillas, several smaller rings
are created. Each ring is then sealed off and the guerrillas
caught within it are systematically destroyed.
Or if the enemy's intelligence tells him the guerrillas are
operating from a special base, he will encircle the area and use
shock troops to destroy the guerrillas.
(2) SURPRISE ATTACK-The enemy avoids the trouble of
encirclement and tries for a knock-out blow by a surprise raid.
He picks a time when the guerrillas are resting or least
expect an attack. He reconnoitres beforehand to get the exact
location of their base and its strength. And then he assembles
secretly and as the guerrillas withdraw he moves up along the
flanks.
(3) SPECIAL BANDS-When the guerrillas are weak the special
bands go into operation. They track-down the guerrilla column,
keep it on the move. They try to overtake, hold and then destroy
the columns. Above all they go for the guerrilla H.Q.
For this purpose special police are used. They are constantly
deployed to keep the guerrillas on the move and thus prevent
harassing actions. They clear areas of guerrillas and try to wear
them out. Mostly they are recruited locally and know the country
well. Their forte is the surprise attack.
They watch supply areas and are specially armed for the job at
hand. They are in constant radio touch with real units for
immediate reinforcements.
THE ANSWER
The enemy's counter-guerrillas tactics sound formidable but
they will be of little use against skilled columns who understand
the motives behind them and stick to their original objective.
The guerrilla must know and understand that:
(1) No encirclement is complete enough that it can't be
broken. There are always weak links and these must be found,
probed and exploited. Note where units link-up.
(2) Proper intelligence can counter the special surprise blow.
The guerrilla must always be on his guard.
(3) When the enemy attacks with his trained bands of hunting
packs the guerrilla must fall on them and ruthlessly destroy them.
Provide diversions. Hit the enemy's base. Cut him off. When one
area is under enemy attack, increase activity in other areas.
The guerrilla must retain the initiative at all times. And he
must stop the flow of information to the enemy. The guerrillas
must be so trained that on capture despite the enemy's pressure
they reveal nothing. For the enemy hopes to build up his knowledge
of the guerrilla in this fashion: gets his strength, its aims, its
objectives, its leaders, its supplies, its bases and so on.
CHAPTER 10 -- GUERRILLA DEFENCE
Properly speaking the guerrilla never goes into a defence
situation if he can avoid it. There are occasions, however, when
the guerrilla will be unable to avoid a defensive battle.
Here is how he deals with such eventualities:
(1) ENCIRCLEMENT-The enemy attempts to destroy escape routes
then eliminate piecemeal the guerrilla columns.
(a) By reconnaissance the guerrilla probes the enemy
circle.
He discovers the enemy's strong defensive lines then
his weak points.
Having discovered the weak spot-either in men or
terrain-he stages a mass break-out.
(b) The enemy attempts to hide his movements from
guerrilla observation. He proceeds from the assembly
area so as to reach cordon areas at a defined time.
His critical period is the approach from the
assembly area into the cordon area. The guerrilla
attempts a break-through at this time
(c) Break into smaller formations and either infiltrate
the enemy lines (there are always unguarded spots
between defense positions) or get out by use of still
smaller formations. Assemble later.
(2) CLOSING CORDON-All enemy encircling forces advance at the
same time toward the centre. Terrain here helps the guerrilla
for the enemy can only use this technique in small areas. The
encircling lines cannot advance equally fast and big gaps
occur. The guerrilla breaks out at these points.
(3) DRIVING AGAINST WALL OF FIRE-This consists of a stationary
defence line with other forces driving the guerrillas back
against it. The guerrilla probes the defence line and the
terrain. If the area is not easily defensible he stages a
break-through. If the line is too solid he escapes via the
attackers who will inevitably be strung out and disorganized.
(4) DRIVING IN STRONG WEDGES-The ring is held solid and strong
wedges probe forward cutting the guerrillas into smaller bands
and depriving them of freedom of action. They cannot find the
weak links in the enemy.
After a time this situation leads to enemy confusion no
matter how well he is organized. The guerrilla utilizes the
confusion and by the judicious use of scouts and snipers adds
to it by striking various of the wedge forces. The guerrilla
commander holds his main force for a break-out. By use of
mobility and avoiding the wedges the guerrilla finds the
enemy's weak spots
(5) SHOCK UNITS-The enemy encircles the area and uses a strong
shock force to destroy the guerrillas.
The guerrilla avoids the shock-force and breaks through.
(6) SURPRISE ATTACK AND HUNT BY SPECIAL GROUPS-The answer of
the guerrillas is always to guide against surprise, avoid
hunting packs and manoeuvre rapidly.
ALL-ROUND DEFENCE
When taking up position however temporary even the smallest
unit prepares for all-round defence.
In the case of strong semi-permanent base preparation gets
under way from the start for a sure-fire defence method.
The column takes up a triangular defence so that each section
can support the other. Within the section the two-man teams and
the section leader are similarly deployed.
Pickets and sentries are posted to cover all approaches.
Grenade throwers and light infantry weapons cover ground which
cannot be supported by the sections. Mines and anti-tank traps
dominate all roads and paths. Mobile forces if possible should be
prepared for enemy strikes.
If there is an encirclement of many columns, higher command
organizes the break-out. Diversionary attacks on the enemy's bases
are organized from the outside ring. The enemy will be surprised
in turn by flanking attacks designed to roll up his circle. Mass
break-outs then occur.
If none of this is possible the columns break out on their
own. If this is not possible the columns break up into sections
and perhaps the sections into two-man teams and then get out.
The rule is: NEVER GIVE BATTLE ON THE ENEMY'S TERMS.
DIVERT HIM BY QUICK ATTACKS IN OTHER AREAS.
HIT HIM AT HIS WEAKEST POINT AND DRIVE A
WEDGE THROUGH HIM.
CHAPTER 11 -- GENERAL TECHNIQUES
The guerrilla must always remember that his main job is the
destruction and break-down of enemy communications, administration
and supplies, and not the capture of specific objectives.
Therefore, the more the enemy is harried the better the result.
The guerrilla can ALWAYS harry the enemy by even small scale
methods.
Trees felled across roads can cause long delays. Railway
signal boxes can be effectively sabotaged. Telegraph and telephone
lines can easily be put out of order.
Four men can fell 200-300 trees of one foot diameter in a day.
These can be set up as barriers or barricades.
A stone tied to the end of a long piece of cord can be thrown
over a wire and the wire lowered to the roadway and then cut it.
When using explosives it should be remembered that a pocket
knife, adhesive tape and matches (if possible, phosphorous matches)
are indispensable.
HOW TO DO IT
Fit fuse in the detonator at opening and crimp the det. to the
fuse to stop it from slipping out. Always cut the other end at an
angle to effect rapid lighting. Wind waterproof sticky tape around
the connection point where the fuse fits the det. to prevent
moisture.
Always see that explosives are in close contact with the
object to be blown up-especially if it is metal. If contact is not
possible increase the amount of explosive. Make sure each parcel
of explosive is touching the next.
Ensure also that they are well tamped down as the success of
any explosion depends on confining the charge in a restricted
space. If using ammonal it is advised that the primer, fuse and
det. be laid beneath the surface of the ground for safety.
Explosives actually sever only where they are in contact with
the objective, except in a minor degree where this is due to blast
effect.
FOR METAL-Use a half pound of explosive for every half inch of
thickness for a width of a foot.
FOR STONE OR BRICK-Use a half pound of explosive for a
thickness of 10 inches by a width of one foot.
FOR WOODWORK-Use a half pound of explosive for five-inch
thickness by a width of a foot.
It will be seen from these that the standard ratio of the
above is 1-20-10. Further note, that should the object to be
exploded be of circular form, calculate as though it were a square
and use approximately 4/5ths of this amount.
For these three types of objects the following explosives can
be used but make certain that primer is also used with TNT,
gun-cotton, gelignite, and plastic.
One useful method of calculating quantities is to devide the
thickness of the object in inches by 10 in the case of wooden
targets, 20 in the case of stone, and 1 in the case of metal. Then
obtain the square of the figure and allow twice the amount for
every foot of width. This will give the minimum effective quantity
of explosives in pounds that is required. Always be on the
generous side.
EXAMPLES
Here are some examples:
(a) To demolish a metal structure for inches thick by three
feet wide.
4 x 4 = 16.
Therefore 32 pounds of explosive are required for each
foot. For three feet 96 pounds will be needed.
(b) To demolish stonework 10 feet in diameter:
10 feet = 120 inches.
This, divided by ratio of 20 is equal to six.
6 x 6 = 36.
Therefore 72 pounds will be needed for every foot of width.
As this is a circular object, allow the same width as
thickness which gives a width of ten feet.
Thus explosive required for a square objective 10ft. by
10ft. is 72 x 10 or 720 pounds. As this is a circular
section all that is required is 4/5ths of this amount or 576
pounds.
ROADWAYS-Sixty pounds of explosive buried six inches beneath
the level will cause a crater of 12-14 feet across.
When using explosives for mining or cratering, always tamp
them tight. For this purpose it is preferable to use ammonal or
gelignite without the aid of a primer
BUILDINGS-Sixty pounds for every 100 square feet of space on
a ground floor level is sufficient to demolish a two-storey house.
It is necessary to close all doors and windows to get the maximum
effect.
The best results are obtained when the charges are placed in
the middle of each room.
BANGALORE TORPEDO-This is one of the most effective methods of
clearing barbed wire entanglements, and is prepared by use of metal
pipe filled with explosives. Any pipe of an inch and a half or
more of diameter will do.
Make certain that the length of the pipe is never less that
the depth or width of the entanglement, as it is the effect of the
disintegration of the metal of the pipe which bursts asunder under
the wire barricade, not the explosive, that counts. Always ensure
the pipe is kept at least 18 inches above ground, to keep maximum
tearing effect.
TO MAKE
To make Bangalore: Fill pipe with explosive and tamp well
down. Lay primer and det. with fuse fitted at one end. Plug both
ends with wooden stoppers, one of which should have a hole to allow
the fuse to enter.
Should the torpedo be more than eight feet in length always
fit a fuse of F.I.D. through the middle of the explosive from end
to end. This enables a perfect detonation to take place.
The torpedo is al effective against road or tank blocks, as it
has great disintegrating effect, and if arranged on small road
blocks, are useful in dealing with enemy tanks.
SAFETY WITH EXPLOSIVES-ALWAYS allow sufficient length of fuse
so as to get to safety before explosives goes up.
CLEAR the area of friendly personnel. NEVER attempt to
examine enemy explosive charges. Leave it to the specialist.
Never use naked lights or allow smoking near explosives. Do not
use steel or iron instruments in handling, laying or tamping.
MAIN EXPLOSIVES
GELIGNITE is brown, used for cutting. Initiate with primer.
Can be initiated with bullet. Keep in cool place.
808 looks like shaving soap. Yellow colour. Cutting or
cratering. Do not inhale fumes.
TNT is yellow thready cake. Use for cutting and is liable to
dry up and crumble. Store in box until needed.
AMMONAL has greyish dusty appearance. For cratering or
excavating. Keep away from damp.
WET GUN COTTON looks like white candle wax cake. Used for
cutting. Liable to dry and crumble. Store in box.
PLASTIC looks like putty. Used for cutting or excavating.
822 is a liquid for general purpose use. Must be initiated by
det. Fuse and primer is required.
FUSES are either burning or det. type. Check rate of burning
for speed. All burning fuses have a blackish powdery core.
DET. TYPES
CORDTEX-white and silver core. Damaged by damp. Allow more.
Burns at 6,000 yards pers second. FID-yellow core with leaded
cover. 5,000 yards per second. Operates under water. Make sure
no bends or kinks. Throw away first foot when cutting off a
portion. PRIMACORD-has yellow cord and coarse yellow cover. 6,000
yards per second. Allow extra two feet.
SABOTAGE
Put sugar into petrol tanks. To immobilize enemy aircraft
best place is the elevator. This is made of fragile material and
can be easily damaged. If the elevator is out of action plane
can't rise into air.
When attacking enemy railway communications try to blow up a
bridge since this is the most difficult to repair. Blow up a train
so as to block the track. This will distort the rails and prevent
enemy traffic for quite some time.
Unbolt railway lines at an embankment or curve. This tilts
the train off the lines for a considerable time.
If there is not time for this a half a hundredweight of fat,
lard or grease, spread on an upward gradient will prevent the
engine gripping the rails.
ANTI-AIRCRAFT
Guerrillas on the move must always be on the watch for enemy
aircraft. Also when resting.
One of the best protections is a standard warning system. The
columns should always be dispersed when moving in daylight in case
of aircraft. Air guards should see and watch for aircraft when in
camp. The drill is-scatter, hit the ground, take cover.
Slit trenches and dispersal will be sufficient protection
against enemy bombing of a camp.
HELICOPTERS
Enemy increasingly uses helicopters against guerrillas. The
Westland Whirlwing is for troop assembly and dispersal. The
Two-Seater Saunders Roe Skeeter is for staff officers and
reconnaissance.
CHAPTER 12 -- BATTLE NOTES
The first essential is to kill the enemy without being killed
yourself. The second is take advantage of all cover. Equipment
must be camouflaged. This goes for face and hands too
At night silence in movement is vital.
When sniping in open country never operate from same spot
twice.
Continually being on the move is important for guerrillas.
The enemy is thrown off by this and overestimates numbers and
power. This makes him sometimes alter his plans.
RAIDS
The plan should be simple and the attack timed. Rehearse if
possible. Special training may be required depending on the job at
hand. Intelligence must be excellent for this planning depends.
AMBUSH
Preparations must be well camouflaged and groups should move
to assembly point in small formations. No contact should be made
with local population. All fighters must be accurately briefed on
plan, withdrawal and later assembly point.
Can be turned into battle drill in this fashion.
1. The fire base-main concentration of fire and opens up on
enemy first.
2. The assault party-moves in for the kill if the situation
requires and if not covers withdrawal of fire base.
3. Cut off-seals enemy retreat and covers assault. Groups
will not be of equal size. The fire base will have heavier
concentration of fire.
SITE-very important. Must have covered and sheltered line of
withdrawal. Fire base must be able to cover battle area and allow
no cover to enemy who will try to encircle attackers.
Road may be mined to hit first enemy truck, and last truck may
also be trapped by similar mine to rear-blown not by contact but by
electrical connection. Charges can be buried at a depth of nine
inches or a foot. Four pounds per foot in length. These are
enough to smash a lorry.
Signals must be clear and understood and ambushers must be in
contact. Get-away must be swift. Look-outs are needed before
enemy approaches. Aiming marks are valuable in killing area and
can be prepared beforehand.
STRONGPOINT
Any enemy post is a strongpoint. Use fire base and assault
section. Isolate post, use surprise to get to objective, lay charge
to gain entry. First section moves in and clears ground floor.
Section clears, top, blow up, withdraw to prepare assembly point.
Rehearse if possible and each man should know his job.
FORCED MARCH
Move at night, change direction frequently, avoid inhabited
localities and towns, go over heavily guarded territory in twos and
threes, stay clear of roads. Check an assembly point and stopping
points along the way. Guard front and flanks.
PATROLS
Mission must be precise. Men must know what their job is. A
get-away man should be provided.
Select routes forward, stopping places, assembly, point,
withdrawal. Sturdy terrain, weather conditions, enemy
dispositions. Use scouts.
MOVEMENTS
Use of formations-for open country use diamond. Use Indian
file for close country. Be in position for all-round observation,
each member has special area to observe.
SEARCH BUILDINGS
Cover front and rear. The two men advance cautiously and
enter by blind side. Have signals.
CROSSING ROADS--At bend. All together or in groups.
CONDUCT OF ATTACK
1. Select Forming Up Point (FUP).
2. Issue orders and if need be make last minute
reconnaissance.
3. Stay under cover near objective until preparation is
complete.
This should be as brief as possible-matter of minutes or
column will lose element of surprise.
4. Basis of attack is by fire and movement. First base
covers movement of assaulting groups. Hold fire until
last minute or until prearranged signal.
5. The assault is put in with aggressiveness and efficiency,
each man knowing his job and doing it. Mission is then
completed.
6. Withdrawal is also by fire and movement.
7. Break contact with enemy and reassemble at assembly point
which is prearranged. Alternative assembly point is also
necessary.
8. Get back to base.
ORDERS-Should be brief and cover the following points.
1. INFORMATION on the enemy.
2. MISSION-what we have to do.
3. METHODS-how we will carry out mission.
This covers:
(a) The plan
(b) The route forward
(c) Formations
(d) What each section will do at objective.
What each man will do. (This latter in sections
leader's orders.)
(e) Withdrawal
(f) Assembly point
(g) Alternative assembly point
(h) How to get back to bases.
4. ADMINISTRATION-includes (a) weapons distribution; (b)
equipment; (c) where extra ammo is; (d) first aid and
wounded.
5. COMMUNICATION-signals used for attack, withdrawal, and
others.
Watches should be synchronized and check back on orders and
ask for questions.
In attacking enemy strongpoints maximum use should be made of
explosives and the attack should be made silently at night. When
covering fire opens up it should be intensive and be directed at
enemy loop-holes and if possible be on (for LMGs) prepared fixed
lines (use of two sticks to left and right).
The assaulting groups should be at as wide an angle as
possible from fire group (90 degrees is ideal but may not always be
possible). When entrance has been made the assault force should
move in rapidly according to prepared drill, cover one another's
inside movements, clear ground floor rooms by grenades and sub MG
fire.
Second assault group should come, if possible, from top down.
Have signals prepared. First group could then get back out and
cover enemy driven downward.
Demolition group then destroys enemy base.
ESTIMATE OF SITUATION
For the guerrilla commander it is all important that he should
have a correct estimate of the situation in all operations. In
this way he discovers weaknesses in his plan, what extra
information he requires, what special type of equipment he may have
to use in a particular attack.
The estimate is an analysis of a set of circumstances to
determine the best course of action to pursue. Its form is:
1. THE MISSION-what is the task before him.
2. SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION-(a) Enemy dispositions,
activities, strength, reinforcements, time and weather, his
equipment, supply and transportation. Local politics of
population. (b) Enemy capabilities-What the enemy is capable of
doing to stop the job being carried out. What he is likely to
do-or the courses of action open to him. (c) Our own courses of
action-the various methods by which the mission may be carried out.
3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION-Determine the
effect of each enemy capability on our own courses of action.
4. COMPARE OUR VARIOUS COURSES OF ACTION-Weigh the advantages
and disadvantages. Decide which course of action promises to be
the most successful in accomplishing the mission.
5. DECISION-Translate the course of action selected into a
concise statement of what you will do-also when, where, how, you
will do it.
INTELLIGENCE
Top intelligence work is necessary for guerrilla operations.
Intelligence is the collection, analysis, distribution of enemy
information. It may be collected many ways. It must be evaluated
and analyzed-check one against the other. Then it must be passed
along to higher and lower command.
Information gathering is a continuous operation. It will be
done by reconnaissance, by patrols, by establishing observation
posts and listening posts which note the enemy's movements and
routine, from the local population, by agents and so on.
The intelligence officer or commander should have and
intelligence plan. This consists of (1) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
INFORMATION-or what particular information is required about the
enemy. (2) THE ANALYSIS OF EEI-the IO visualizes what the enemy
would do if he intended exercising any of the capabilities raised
in EEI. For example, in his security measures of a barracks has he
installed an alarm system, has he reinforced the defences, has he
put more barbed wire on the walls, etc.? The IO looks for signs
which will answer the specific questions raised in the EEI. There
are indications that the enemy intends to do this or that. (3) IO
lists reconnaissance and other intelligence methods to develop
indications in column two. Is the enemy preparing for an attack on
guerrillas? What are the indications that he is? Check these by
specific missions. (4) Agencies to be employed in seeking
information-patrols, OPs, listening posts, local inhabitants,
agents and so on. (5) Hour and destination at which information is
to be reported.
INTELLIGENCE PLAN
The Io works according to an intelligence plan. This is for
his own guidance. But if specific information is required on an
enemy target then he will make an INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY on that
target. That is he gives a full intelligence estimate (see
estimate of the situation) on enemy-strength, disposition,
defences, reinforcements, weather, terrain, local politics and
so on. Here he will list everything pertaining to that enemy
target.
The IO must know everything about the enemy. If he doesn't he
must take steps to get this information. Then he must pass is
along without delay.
There is only one sure way of getting information on the
enemy:Go out and look for it.
A complete intelligence network should be built up in the
enemy occupied area. Agents should be located in important
localities and specialists should be sent after key information.
As many forces as possible should be used in intelligence work
and the collection should be so organized that the agents are not
put in jeopardy. Couriers would collect and agents would be walled
off from contact with any other guerrillas.
Such a chain of information, difficult to build up, would keep
the guerrillas informed of everything happening in enemy controlled
territory.
Counter-intelligence is also an important activity of
guerrilla IOs. It means guarding our own security, denying
information to the enemy and tracking down enemy agents.
-----Finished Thursday, November 11th, 1:27pm PST, 1993-----
