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- CERT Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-95:08
- November 2, 1995
-
- Topic: X Authentication Vulnerability
- Source: X Consortium
-
- To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, the
- CERT Coordination Center is forwarding the following information from
- the X Consortium. The X Consortium urges you to act on this
- information as soon as possible. X Consortium contact information is
- included in the forwarded text below; please contact them if you have
- any questions or need further information.
-
-
- ========================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================
-
- Two widely used X Window System authorization schemes have weaknesses
- in the sample implementation. These weaknesses could allow
- unauthorized remote users to connect to X displays and are present in
- X11 Release 6 and earlier releases of the X11 sample implementation.
-
- There are reports that systems have been broken into using at
- least one of these weaknesses and that there are now exploit
- programs available in the intruder community.
-
-
- MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 Description:
-
- On systems on which xdm is built without the HasXdmAuth config option,
- the MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 key generated by xdm may be guessable.
-
- If you use MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 to authenticate X connections, and
- your keys are generated by xdm, and xdm does not also support
- XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 authentication (that is, your X tree was not
- built with the HasXdmAuth config option), you may be at risk.
-
- On systems with poor pseudo-random number generators, the key may be
- guessable by remote users. On other systems, users with access to the
- file system where xdm stores its keys for use by local servers may be
- able to use information in the file system to guess the key.
-
- If your xdm program was built with HasXdmAuth set to YES (the compiler
- command line includes the -DHASXDMAUTH flag), MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 keys
- generated by xdm are not vulnerable; the DES code is used to generate
- cryptographically secure keys.
-
- Impact
-
- Remote users anywhere on the Internet may be able to connect to your
- X display server. It is NOT necessary that they be able to snoop your
- key first.
-
-
- XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 Description:
-
- The X server does not correctly check the XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 data and
- can be fooled into accepting invalid data.
-
- A user who can snoop the encrypted authorization data of a valid
- connection can create fake auth data that the X server will accept.
-
- If you do not use XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1, you are not vulnerable.
-
- Determining whether your server is vulnerable: this problem is fixed
- in X servers from the X Consortium with a vendor release number of
- 6001 or higher.
-
- Impact
-
- Remote users may be able to connect to your X display server.
-
-
-
- SOLUTIONS
-
- A. Install a vendor supplied patch if available.
-
- B. If your site is using X11 built from X Consortium X11R6 sources,
- install public patch #13. This patch is available via anonymous
- FTP from ftp.x.org as the file /pub/R6/fixes/fix-13. It is also
- available from the many sites that mirror ftp.x.org. Apply all patches
- not already applied, up to and including fix-13. The file xc/bug-report
- shows what public patches have been already applied to your source
- tree.
-
- The MD5 checksum of fix-13 is as follows:
-
- MD5 (fix-13) = 0d81d843acf803a8bedf90d3a18b9ed6
-
- C. If your site is using an earlier version of the X Consortium's X11,
- upgrade to X11R6. Install all patches up to and including fix-13.
-
- D. Work arounds.
-
- 1. Building with HasXdmAuth will eliminate the first vulnerability.
- The necessary DES code is available for FTP from both inside the
- US (for US sites only) and outside (for non-US sites). Read
- <ftp://ftp.x.org/pub/R6/xdm-auth/README> for details on obtaining
- this code.
-
- 2. If you cannot use DES, you can determine your exposure to
- remote attackers by testing the strength of your rand() function
- using the program rand-test; the source is available as
- <ftp://ftp.x.org/pub/DOCS/rand-test/rand-test.c>.
-
- 3. Limiting use of X connections using XDM-AUTHORIZATION-1 to trusted
- networks will prevent unauthorized parties from snooping X protocol
- traffic, thus preventing exploitation of the second vulnerability.
-
-
- Acknowledgements: The X Consortium would like to thank Chris Hall of
- the University of Colorado for analyzing these problems and bringing
- them to our attention.
-
-
- -----------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Vendor Status
-
- The following information was supplied by vendors for this bulletin.
- The X Consortium and CERT have not verified this information.
-
-
- Cray Research
-
- UNICOS 8.0 and 9.0 are not vulnerable. These systems have robust
- pseudo-random number generators, making them not vulnerable to the
- first problem, and do not support an X server, making them not
- vulnerable to the second problem.
-
-
- GSSC (formerly Solbourne)
-
- Has concluded they are not vulnerable.
-
-
- Hewlett-Packard
-
- All versions of X on HP-UX 9.x and 10.x (based on X11R5) do not
- have the first vulnerability.
-
-
- X Consortium
-
- (Sample implementation of X.) You can patch X11R6 by applying all
- public patches up to and including fix-13. Patches are available
- via FTP from ftp.x.org in /pub/R6/fixes/ and from mirroring sites.
-
- You can check that the X server has fix-13 installed by verifying
- that the server has a vendor release number of 6001 or higher.
-
- General questions about the X Window System can be asked on the
- xpert mailing list hosted at x.org. Send a "subscribe" message to
- xpert-request@x.org to subscribe. This list is gatewayed with
- the comp.windows.x newsgroup. The FAQ for this newsgroup is
- available from <ftp://ftp.x.org/contrib/faqs/FAQ.Z> and other
- locations. <http://www.x.org/consortium/news_and_mail.html>
- describes other newsgroups and mailing lists for the discussion
- of issues related to the X Window System.
-
- Bugs encounted in X Consortium code can be reported to
- xbugs@x.org using the format in xc/bug-report. Please see the
- X11R6 Release Notes for additional details.
-
-
- XFree86 Project
-
- The XFree86 Project, Inc has patched binaries for XFree86 version 3.1.2
- running on FreeBSD 1.1.5, FreeBSD 2.0.5, ISC, NetBSD and SVR4. They
- are available from ftp://ftp.xfree86.org/pub/XFree86/3.1.2/binaries/.
- The files are:
-
- FreeBSD-1.1.5/X312Sxdm.tgz
- FreeBSD-2.0.5/X312Sxdm.tgz
- ISC/X312Sxdm.tgz
- NetBSD/X312Sxdm.tgz
- SVR4/X312Sxdm.tgz
-
- The MD5 checksums are:
-
- MD5 (FreeBSD-1.1.5/X312Sxdm.tgz) = 43166109c88fcd623d27de1fa90e8f5b
- MD5 (FreeBSD-2.0.5/X312Sxdm.tgz) = 3314a623b2c31a9130445e9237ff65f9
- MD5 (ISC/X312Sxdm.tgz) = e4e16fc5f4d06ad455e572a2e1eb0eb5
- MD5 (NetBSD/X312Sxdm.tgz) = 0bc74cbee0214366ac15658bf5436853
- MD5 (SVR4/X312Sxdm.tgz) = bf5dfea2a86cdf92621421e3f68af203
-
- Installation instructions (assuming X312xdm.tgz is in /tmp):
-
- Kill any xdm processes that are running, then:
-
- For FreeBSD 1.1.5 and FreeBSD 2.0.5:
-
- cd /usr
- mv X11R6/bin/xdm X11R6/bin/xdm-3.1.2
- chmod 0500 X11R6/bin/xdm-3.1.2
- gzip -d < /tmp/X312xdm.tgz | tar vxf -
-
- For NetBSD:
-
- mv /usr/X11R6/bin/xdm /usr/X11R6/bin/xdm-3.1.2
- chmod 0500 /usr/X11R6/bin/xdm-3.1.2
- pkg_add /tmp/X312Sxdm.tgz
-
- For ISC and SVR4:
-
- cd /usr/X11R6
- mv bin/xdm bin/xdm-3.1.2
- chmod 0500 bin/xdm-3.1.2
- gzip -d < /tmp/X312xdm.tgz | tar vxf -
-
-
- =========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE=============================
-
-
- CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and
- other information related to computer security are available for anonymous
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-
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-
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- (public key available via anonymous FTP on info.cert.org), or PEM (contact
- CERT staff for details).
-
- Internet email: cert@cert.org
- Telephone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
- CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4),
- and are on call for emergencies during other hours.
- Fax: +1 412-268-6989
-
- CERT Coordination Center
- Software Engineering Institute
- Carnegie Mellon University
- Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
- USA
-
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-
- CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.
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