Hacker 2/HACKER2.mdf/cud/cud462c.txt

Text File | 1995-01-03 | 7KB | 149 lines

Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 12:57:02 EDT
>From: David Sobel <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 3--NASA Statement on Ames Raid

                     NASA Statement on Ames Raid

THE CPSR Washington Office has been monitoring developments concerning
the unannounced "security review" conducted at the Ames Research
Center this past summer.  During the course of the review, desks were
searched, computers were opened, employees were locked out of their
offices, and nine employees (5 civil servants and 4 contractors) were
placed on administrative leave without
explanations.  CPSR has submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to
seeking information on the purpose and results of the review.

NASA announced on November 17 that certain matters growing out of the Ames
raid have been referred to the FBI for further investigation.  The agency's
statement is reprinted below.

David Sobel
Legal Counsel
CPSR Washington Office

********************************************************

RELEASE:  92-207

NASA RELEASES FINDINGS OF REVIEW TEAM ON SECURITY CONCERNS

        In July 1992, a Management Review Team (MRT) was established,
after a classified briefing was presented to NASA Headquarters
management by Ames Research Center (ARC) management located at
Mountain View, Calif.  The briefing identified potential national
security problems.

        NASA Administrator Daniel S. Goldin determined that the
situation at ARC warranted a special one-time review to determine
whether the issues and problems existed and, if so, what type of
corrective action should be taken.  The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Department of Justice and the Department of
Defense were consulted on the national security and foreign
counterintelligence aspects of the problems identified.

        "Upon learning about the potential security problems, I
immediately ordered a review of the situation," Goldin said.  "Based
on the review, information has been forwarded to proper authorities.
The recommendations of the review are being taken very seriously and I
intend to promptly implement them."

        Based upon the review and discussions with senior management,
the MRT does not believe that the problems encountered at ARC are
occuring at other NASA centers.

Findings of Review

        ARC is considered "high risk" for hostile intelligence
operations.  ARC exacerbated a marginally effective security posture
by not focusing appropriate management attention on the handling of
sensitive technology.

        Structural and functional weaknesses existed in the way the
ARC security office worked in relation to other center operations.  In
addition to security concerns, processes and practices in the areas of
personnel, legal, procurement, and data and technology protection are
contributing to the potential risk rather than serving as controls
over the risk.

        The ARC culture and environment were found to be the
underlying cause of NASA's vulnerability;  the culture is strongly
biased toward maintaining an academic reputation, rather than meeting
U.S.industry and national needs.

        Generally accepted management controls, as well as security,
legal, personnel, and procurement policies, are often viewed as
impediments and are sometimes sidetracked or avoided.  Lax procedures
and attitudes were identified that set the stage for widespread
dissemination of commercially valuable applied technology being
developed by ARC personnel.

        ARC's credibility with the U.S. aerospace industry has been
damaged as a result of these problems.  Some of NASA's customers and
partners are reluctant to share important data with NASA for fear it
will be disseminated with little or no regard for its sensitivity.  In
order to regain credibility, specific processes for the identification
and handling of sensitive and commercially valuable technologies at
ARC must be developed and fully implemented by ARC employees.

        To resolve the conflict between NASA's desire to share
technology internationally and the need to place U.S. interests first,
an environment and culture must be developed at ARC and elsewhere at
NASA, which focuses NASA's attention on the needs and expectations of
U.S. industry and the taxpayer.

        Basic science efforts actively involve and will continue to
involve the international community but applied technology, developed
at U.S. taxpayer expense, must be protected for U.S. industry use in
accordance with applicable laws and regulations.  NASA must work
internally, and externally with appropriate members of the
Administration and Congress to address the problems and develop
long-term solutions.

Information Referred to OIG and FBI

        The MRT found a number of specific discrepancies in the areas
of procurement, misuse of government equipment and apparent violations
of the law and/or NASA policy.

        The MRT referred this information, as appropriate, to the NASA
Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the FBI, which has jurisdiction
over foreign counter intelligence issues resulting from the review.
Cases were opened up by both the OIG and the FBI.

        It is anticipated that the OIG effort will be completed in
December 1992.

Review of the MRT Team

        Because the review was unexpected by the ARC workforce and
employees of Asian-Pacific ancestry appeared to be disproportionately
affected, there was a significant adverse reaction to the review among
some of the ARC workforce.  The NASA Administrator took immediate
action to address employees' concerns.  He met with representatives of
the ARC Asian Pacific Island Advisory Group to discuss their concerns.

        The Administrator also appointed an Assessment Panel on Aug.
26, 1992, to assess the approach and process used by the MRT.  The
assessment panel was charged with examining the concerns that could
have unnecessarily increased the levels of employee discomfort or
organizational disruption flowing from the review.

        It was also tasked to make recommendations that would
alleviate employee concern about the process, and minimize
difficulties, should a similar review be required in the future.

        The Assessment Panel concluded that "the scope and objective
of the management review were legal and that individuals were not
selected for interview and search of their workplaces based upon their
race or national origin."

        The Panel further concluded that there was a confluence of
factors prior to, during and after the management review, some of
which were avoidable and some not, which caused negative reactions
within the workforce.

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