HaCKeRz KrOnIcKLeZ 3/HaCKeRz_KrOnIcKLeZ.iso/anarchy/essays/schoolsucks/plo.txt

Text File | 1996-04-27 | 13KB | 205 lines

History
Palestinian Liberation Organization

1.      Can the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) justifiably claim
to be 'the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.'?

        The PLO was set up in 1964 by an Arab League decision in response
to growing signs of Palestinian unrest. The Palestinians desired to reclaim
the lands occupied by Israel, which they felt belonged to them, as said in
the Bible.  In 1964 the Arab states created the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO).  While it was supposed to represent the Palestinians,
in reality it represented the views of President Nasser of Egypt, who
guided  the formation of the PLO. Its first leader made wild and
irresponsible threats to drive Israelis into the sea, and  had little
support among Palestinians for he was seen as a puppet of the Egyptians. In
the 1960s Palestinian students began to form their own organizations
independent of control by Arab governments (although the Syrians, Libyans,
and Iraqis continued to fund and control particular groups). Yasser Arafat
founded an independent Palestinian-run party called Fatah. He is said to
have the backing, for most of the recent past, of about 80% of the
Palestinian people. The position of the Arab governments was that a PLO
under Arab League supervision would be the best way of satisfying the
demands made by an emerging Palestinian national consciousness.  Also, it
was felt that through such an organization Arab governments could control
Palestinian political activities.
        Ten years after its founding, the PLO was raised to the status of
government.  And in 1988, the PLO's status was to be raised again, this
time to a state in exile.  After several negotiations, Arafat became a
Terrorist leader and administrator of self-rule in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip.
        In the 1967 Six Day War, the Arab armies did very badly against
Israel, losing 67,000 square kilometres of land. Palestinians came to
believe that if they were ever to have their land, they would have to do it
themselves.  After the 1967 war, the situation changed drastically.  The
resistance activities of various guerrilla organizations, in particular the
Al-Fatah and the PFLP, gained the increasing support of the Palestinians.
With Arafat at the helm from 1969 and a resistance-oriented leadership, the
PLO was more effective and played a central role in mobilizing the
Palestinians and in expanding its basis of support both at the local and
international level.  The PLO became an umbrella organization for the
various guerrilla groups.
        This increase in support was made possible because of the
Al-Fatah's ability to access to the growing numbers of volunteers from
refugee camps which were freshly swollen due to the 1967 war. Most of these
refugees suffered the frustration of having been displaced twice in a
lifetime.  This generated, especially among the young, a mood of defiance,
as they were ready to question the credibility of the idea of relying on
Arab governments to liberate Palestine.  Furthermore, as a consequence of
the war a large proportion of the Palestinian community became
territorially united.  This brought the possibility of direct interaction
between the various sections of the Palestinian community that had
previously remained isolated from each other. On the other hand, the
inability of the PLO's conservative leadership to promote any effective
resistance operations culminated in the eventual transfer of power to the
armed-struggle orientated guerrilla organizations.   Thus initially, the
PLO had a broad base of support and represented the desires of the majority
of the Palestinian people.
        The origins of the Al-Fatah can be traced back to the mid-1950s to
a group of Palestinians that had neither relinquished their national
identity nor their belief in the necessity of liberating Palestine via
Palestinian means, rather than relying on other Arab states.  Yet,
throughout the 1950s the attitude of the Palestinians remained largely
skeptical if not uncommitted to Al-Faith's ideology.  It was in the 1960s
that the situation began to change, enabling Al-Fatah to expand its
organizational structure and base.  Under the leadership of Arafat,
Al-Fatah pursued an ideology which simply stresses the nationalist struggle
to liberate Palestine without dwelling too deeply on any theoretical
speculations about the nature and form of the future Palestinian society.
This tactic was essential in gaining support against other movements, and
aided the rise of Al-Fatah to become the dominating faction within the PLO.
        Militarily, the PLO has a broad base of human resources for
recruitment, almost half a million.  The PLO has established
across-the-board conscription for all the Palestinian men between the ages
of 18 and 30.  As a result, the PLO is able to maintain three military
forces.  It could be said then that physically, it did indeed represent a
cross-section of the population.  However, even if they were significant in
number, these lower-level members were not politically potent, and did not
have their voices heard.  Arafat continued on his policies, tending to
brush aside differing opinions, leaving many disenchanted with his
autocratic rule.
        Even before the PLO was declared a state in 1988, it functioned
much like one.  This was reflected in much of the powers it possessed.  The
PLO has been able to exert what amounts to sovereign powers over the
Palestinian people in war situations.  The PLO represented the Palestinians
in wars with Jordan and Lebanon, and during various incursions into Israel.
        The PLO also exercises extradition powers, as on many occasions
Arab governments have turned over to the PLO Palestinians charged with
criminal activities.  They were tried and sentenced by the PLO judicial
system. In these ways, it was supposed to represent the people.
        But various problems within the PLO undermined its legitimacy as
the sole representative of the Palestinian people.  Arafat's ascendancy to
power on the Palestinian issue had naturally provoked rivals to try the
same tack in their own interest.  As a result,  maintenance of his
supremacy within the PLO became Arafat's full time preoccupation.   Far
from laying the basis for secular or democratic institutions that one day
might serve as a nation, Arafat recruited Sumni Muslims like himself into a
body known as Fatah, loyal to him on confessional lines.
        Unity itself was a mere appearance, a show for the sake of
recovering honour.  Far from uniting behind the Palestinian cause as words
might indicate, every Arab state in practice discriminated against
Palestinians living in its midst and had differing slants upon the PLO.
This was due to its nature as an umbrella organization, the PLO comprises a
number of resistance organizations.  These organizations entered the PLO as
groups retaining their ideological and organizational identity.
Consequently, PLO institutions are structured to reflect proportional
representation of each organization in addition to the few independent
members.  This has turned PLO politics into coalition politics.
        The flux of events between 1967 and 1982 offered Palestinians
several chances to demonstrate en masse in favour of the PLO, if they had
been so inclined.  But they refrained, not due to fatalism or cowardice,
but because they may be willing to pay lip service to Arafat, not much more
than that.
        Whether Palestinians outside the Occupied Territories would in fact
accept the legitimacy of the PLO as their representative was put to test in
Jordan in 1970.  Jordanian frontiers were the result of British map-making,
which left half of the country's inhabitants Palestinian by origin.  The
rapid financing  and arming by Arab power holders of Arafat's mercenaries
offered these Palestinians in Jordan a chance to repudiate King Hussein and
declare themselves nationalists for the new cause.  Unexpectantly, Arafat's
power challenge threatened to replace King Hussein with a PLO state in
Jordan.  After 18 months, while tensions were running high, the PFLP
hijacked international airliners, three of which were brought at gunpoint
to Jordan.  Taking advantage of this anarchic jockeying between rival
Palestinian groups,  King Hussein ordered his army to subjugate the whole
movement. Palestinians in Jordan and on the  West Bank gave evidence of
their real feelings by denouncing the PLO and PFLP activists to the
authorities and occasionally even helping to round them up.
        David Pryce-Jones observed that "wherever they live, they observe
for themselves that the PLO is a means to enrichment and aggrandizement for
the unscrupulous few, but death and destruction for everyone else".
Everywhere Palestinians have little alternative but to cling to this
identity, as they continue to seek what freedom they can from power holders
of different identity.  In Syria, any Palestinian who attempted to form
some independent grouping would be seen as a dangerous conspirator and
summarily disposed of.   This left many with no choice but to remain
silent.
        Fatah itself was split by power struggles initiated by a growing
number of young Fatah activists who were trying to gain positions of power
in local society, in the process challenging the older generation of Fatah
leaders.  They felt entitled to positions in the structures Arafat was
trying to create. The newest generation of people not only refuse to be
cajoled or coerced, but also have acquired political organizing and
networking skills in neighbourhoods, refugee camps, Israeli jails, and
above all, in the political bodies created during the Intifada (uprising).
        The problem of factionalism has plagued the PLO from its formation.
However, instead of adopting a policy of inclusion to accommodate the
general goals of the people, he excluded not only the opposition but also
the local Palestinians who had acted as his proxies before his return.  He
had promised he would be the leader of all Palestinians, but acted only
like the President of his trusted lieutenants.  Instead of speaking of
tolerance and political pluralism, he spoke of respect for his authority.
        On top of this, Arafat's leadership was questioned.  Arafat was
criticized for filling his posts with loyalists whose professional
qualifications are below average and whose reputations are tarnished.
Other appointments brought more and more Palestinians to the conclusion
that Arafat was mired in the past, and that he would continue to follow the
policy plans he had formed long ago.
        The Chairman's primacy within the PLO had been seriously
compromised as a result of the secret negotiations that had led to the
September 13, 1993 agreement with the Rabin government.  The relationship
with the masses that the charismatic Arafat had enjoyed was diminished by
the concessions he made to Israel.
        In modern day politics, he still remains a symbol of Palestinian
nationalism, as does the PLO.  But he faces much opposition.  On the left
various socialist groups think Arafat is too close to business and banking
interests and too willing to negotiate with Israel or cooperate with
America. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is one of these.
It is led by George Habash, a Christian doctor. It opposes any
negotiations. On the right some Islamic groups feel the PLO is too willing
to  cooperate with socialists and is too willing to negotiate with Israel.
They feel there should be a united Palestine where Jews could live but
which would not be governed by Jews. The largest of these groups is called
HAMAS, the Islamic Resistance Movement.  Several Palestinian radicals have
their own military organizations. Abu Nidal is one of these. He is bitterly
and violently opposed to the PLO  for what he sees as its moderate
positions. He has carried out airplane bombings and attacks on civilians
and has tried to assassinate Arafat.  He opposes any negotiation with
Israel. He is probably funded by Iraq.
        In the latest turn of events, Yasser Arafat has decided to scrap
the anti-Israeli section of the PLO charter calling for its destruction.
Some have said that this is due to Israeli pressure in the peace process,
which demanded the change before new talks and settlements.  Shimon Peres
has called it the "most important ideological change of the century", but
it is sure to upset the Islamic fundamentalists, and those in the PLO who
desire a completely pro-PLO solution.  While there is so much contention
and opposition to PLO decisions, the PLO cannot be called the sole
representative of the Palestinian people, although it has a large
following.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. David  Pryce-Jones: The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs
Harper Perennial, New York, 1991

2. Peter Calrocovessi: World Politics since 1945 (5th Ed)
Longman Group, New York, 1987

3. Kamal Kirisai: The PLO and World Politics
Frances Pinter, London, 1986

4. Muhammad Muslih : Arafat's Dilemma
Mr Kwok's notes