Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0423/04237.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 36KB | 556 lines

$Unique_ID{COW04237}
$Pretitle{371}
$Title{Zimbabwe
Chapter 5A.   National Security}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Frederick Ehrenreich}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{government
security
guerrillas
south
mugabe
national
african
army
political
white}
$Date{1982}
$Log{Guerrilla Operations*0423701.scf
Figure 19.*0423702.scf
}
Country:     Zimbabwe
Book:        Zimbabwe, A Country Study
Author:      Frederick Ehrenreich
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1982

Chapter 5A.   National Security

[See Guerrilla Operations: The shadowy world of guerrilla operations]

     In the early 1980s the new Zimbabwean government of Prime Minister
Robert Mugabe contended with a variety of security problems that, directly or
indirectly, had resulted from the seven-year civil war that preceded
independence. The war, which had claimed 30,000 lives, also left 150,000
combatants who had served in one of the armed political factions or armies and
a like number of unaccounted firearms. With the coming of independence,
political and ethnic differences and the struggle for primacy between Mugabe's
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front and his rival Joshua Nkomo's
Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union were reemerging after having
been overshadowed by the exigencies of war. Tensions between black and white
Zimbabweans persisted to some degree at independence: many Europeans resented
the loss of their political power, and many Africans resented the fact that
the economy, the civil service, and the military remained largely under the
control of the white minority. Neighboring South Africa, the ideologically
hostile last stronghold of white minority rule on the continent, possessed
considerable economic and military power that posed a potential threat to the
Mugabe government.

     In the two and one-half years after independence Mugabe moved to control
his country's national security affairs. To reduce internal dissent, he
initially pursued a policy of reconciliation with his rivals and former
enemies along with strong legislative and police action to maintain law and
order. Combined with a program to integrate former guerrillas into the
security forces, the prime minister's policies helped quell a spate of violent
crime and interparty clashes that gripped the country in its first year of
independence. Serious conflicts remained, however, with some elements of the
white community and, perhaps more seriously, with Nkomo's supporters in
western Zimbabwe. In mid-1982 the arrest of several of Nkomo's top deputies on
suspicion of treason (after the discovery of arms on land owned by his party)
led to a wave of violence in Matabeleland, where Nkomo's party was politically
dominant.

     Mugabe pursued a realistic policy of economic cooperation and verbal
confrontation with South Africa while refusing to allow anti-Pretoria
guerrillas to operate from his own country. Despite the discovery of several
agents working for South Africa and suspicion that Pretoria was behind several
acts of sabotage, relations between the two countries remained generally
correct.

     Mugabe used the security forces both as a means to enforce his security
policy and as an object of social reform. The regular national army expanded
fivefold to 60,000 in less than two years to absorb guerillas from Mugabe's
and Nkomo's liberation armies. The air force, the Zimbabwe Republic Police,
and the Central Intelligence Organization were also changing to reflect the
African nationalists' political victory. The large military establishment
proved costly, however, and in 1982 army personnel strength was in the process
of being slowly reduced by one-third. Individual units within the security
forces were thought to be extremely effective, but most integrated units
continued to be troubled by political and ethnic factionalism. In the event of
major political or civil strife such divisions would likely strain the
effectiveness of the army and could conceivably cause its collapse.

Public Order and Internal Security

     In the wake of 1972-79 civil war, criminal and dissident activity
continued at high levels although not on a scale comparable to the wartime
violence. Crime and threats to public order during the first year of
independence resulted mainly from the large numbers of undisciplined young
former guerrillas who lacked jobs or land but possessed weapons. The
government was able to exert control by integrating them into the security
forces and by acting strongly against criminals and deserters. Later threats
to internal security, which appeared more politically oriented, were
attributed to a few whites who resented their reduced position in the country
and to the political and ethnic conflict between elements of the Patriotic
Front: Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU, known officially as
ZANU-PF since the 1980 election campaign) and Nkomo's Zimbabwe African
People's Union (ZAPU, known as PF-ZAPU since the election campaign).

Postwar Violence and Government Security Policy

     In the year following independence, some 500 deaths were attributed to
former guerrillas who had fought in ZANU's military wing-the Zimbabwe African
National Liberation Army (ZANLA)-or in ZAPU's Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary
Army (ZIPRA). The postwar violence began during the 1980 election campaign
when numerous confirmed instances of intimidation were ascribed to former
guerrillas "campaigning" for their parties. The guerillas were supposed to
report to assembly camps as part of the cease-fire arrangement that ended the
war, but both ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU held back their best troops and cadres. As
the guerrillas determined that it was safe to report to the assembly camps,
their numbers in the country increased from 22,000 at the time of the
elections to 28,700 at independence, to over 35,000 three months later, and
to over 50,000 by mid-1981.

     Acts of violence continued and even escalated after independence as young
former guerrillas, armed and living in overcrowded isolated camps with nothing
to do, turned to armed robbery and acts of retribution. There were numerous
reports of kangaroo courts that dispensed "revolutionary justice" on political
rivals or those accused of collaboration during the war. Political violence
included an assassination attempt, attributed to ZANLA guerrillas, in June
against the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, ZANU's leader before Mugabe took over
in the mid-1970s. Even Mugabe's minister of manpower and secretary general of
ZANU-PF, Edgar Takere, was arrested in August 1980 for the murder of a white
farmer. Mugabe, from the time of his election called upon the former
guerrillas and the rest of Zimbabwean society to unite in "reconciliation,
reconstruction, and nation building," but words alone did not solve the
problem of violent crime.

     To restore public order and assert its authority over the country, the
new government initially relied on the laws, institutions, and many of the
personnel of the Rhodesian era. Mugabe followed this course partly because as
head of government he had more control and power over government forces than
over guerrillas in the assembly camps.

     Control over the guerrillas was limited in part because about one-third
of them were ex-ZIPRA fighters loyal primarily to Nkomo. Moreover the prime
minister's restricted power over his own ZANLA soldiers was attributable to
the earlier civil war experience in which militarily successful guerrilla
tactics placed little emphasis on troop discipline and gave considerable
autonomy and freedom of action to soldiers and commanders in the field (see
Civil War and the Three Armies, this ch.). The result was that during the war
the ZANLA soldiers-who often combined revolutionary fervor with their
guerrilla tactics-and not the ZANU politicians came to constitute the real
power within the ZANU organization. Mugabe had become ZANU's chairman, and the
more moderate Sithole was ousted largely because Magabe was more successful at
bui