Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0417/04176.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 26KB | 424 lines

$Unique_ID{COW04176}
$Pretitle{267}
$Title{Zaire
Chapter 5A.   National Security}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Eugene K. Keefe}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{military
forces
army
faz
mobutu
armed
shaba
president
country
general}
$Date{1978}
$Log{Double-Bladed Ceremonial Sword*0417601.scf
}
Country:     Zaire
Book:        Zaire, A Country Study
Author:      Eugene K. Keefe
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1978

Chapter 5A.   National Security

[See Double-Bladed Ceremonial Sword: Double-Bladed Ceremonial Sword]

     The security of Zaire in the late 1970s was the responsibility of its
armed forces (Forces Armee Zairoises-FAZ), which consisted of an army, navy,
air force, and gendarmerie. The army was by far the most important of the
country's armed forces; the navy and the air force were quite small; and the
gendarmerie was a paramilitary police force. At the beginning of 1978 the army
had a strength of about 30,000, the navy about 400, and the air force
approximately 3,000. The strength of the gendarmerie was estimated at 20,000.
Although the gendarmerie was under the Department of National Defense and its
chief of staff reported to the captain general of the FAZ along with the other
chiefs of staff, since 1972 the gendarmerie has had all the functions and
responsibilities of the police. The National Police, which the gendarmerie
absorbed, had been under the Department of the Interior.

     In November 1965 Lieutenant General Joseph-Desire Mobutu led a military
coup d'etat that took over the government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (Leopoldville) and made himself president. The name of the capital was
changed from Leopoldville to Kinshasa, and in 1971 the official name of the
country became the Republic of Zaire. In 1978, after two elections, Mobutu
(now Mobutu Sese Seko) was still president and still retained the army rank of
lieutenant general.

     The first five years of independence for Congo (Leopoldville) were
chaotic as army mutinies, ethnic uprisings, secessionist movements, and
insurrections were added to the economic, political, and social problems
attendant upon the emergence of any country out of a long period of
colonialism. By the end of the 1960s Mobutu had brought relative calm to the
country (compared with the early years of the decade), but true stability had
been elusive. Every year brought disturbances, ranging from attempted coups or
assassinations to popular demonstrations.

     Although brought to power by a military coup, Mobutu did not establish a
military regime. Even though the army has been his power base, he has used
civilians to run the government and to staff the bureaucracy. The one
exception to the rule was the membership of the armed forces chiefs of staff
in the Political Bureau, the ruling body of Zaire's only political party, the
Popular Movement of the Revolution (Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution-MPR).
Nevertheless, if the armed forces did not participate in the running of the
government, they did remain prominent, particularly around Kinshasa. The
president maintained a powerful, apparently well-trained palace guard, the
members of which were recruited from Mobutu's home area and gained their
sought-after positions by virtue of their loyalty to him. In addition, the
Kamanyola division (sometimes called the Kamanyola brigade), also noted for
its loyalty to the president and, at that time, said to be by far the best
unit in the army, had been stationed in Kinshasa until 1977 when it was
permanently assigned to Shaba.

     Through the years of his presidency Mobutu drew more and more power into
his own hands (see Political Dynamics, ch. 2). As far as the military was
concerned, he was not only the nominal commander in chief but, when a Katangan
guerrilla force from Angola invaded the region of Shaba (formerly Katanga) in
1977, he made himself actual commander of the forces, a post he continued to
hold in 1978. For many years Mobutu had also held the defense portfolio in his
own cabinet making him, in effect, the civilian head of the armed forces as
well as the military chief. Because the gendarmerie was subordinate to the
defense department and because the country's secret police operated directly
out of the office of the president, Mobutu had direct control of all of the
country's military and paramilitary police forces.

     The darkest cloud on the national security horizon was the lack of combat
effectiveness shown by the FAZ during the invasions of Shaba by Katangan
guerrillas in 1977 and 1978. In 1977 the FAZ had been caught unprepared and
was forced to give up a large part of the region. The advantage gained by the
Katangans was lost not because of opposition from the FAZ but because their
lines of supply were overextended and because they had expected a popular
uprising that did not occur. Even though the forward impetus of the invaders
stalled, however, no counteroffensive was begun until outside help arrived.
(King Hassan II of Morocco had responded to Mobutu's plea for assistance by
sending 1,500 battletested troops to bolster the Zairian effort.) For many
observers the issue was why the then 40,000-man FAZ did not function against
the small invasion force until reinforced by the Moroccans.

     After that crisis had ended, Mobutu referred to the Shaba debacle as a
"moral defeat" and instituted sweeping reforms aimed at preventing a
recurrence. Several of the former regional army commanders were fired, the
territorial defense organization was restructured, and units were redeployed,
e.g. the Kamanyola division was assigned to Shaba on a permanent basis. If the
reforms were designed to prevent a recurrence of the Shaba crisis, they failed
as evidenced by the initial success of the Katangans in their second incursion
into Shaba in May 1978. Once again the FAZ was unable to contain the invaders,
and once again Mobutu called for outside help. The Katangans captured Kolwezi
and established partial control in the region until driven out by French and
Belgian paratroops.

     Zaire's neighbors as national entities did not appear to present any
threats to security in early 1978, but some did harbor guerrilla groups within
their borders. The Katangan exiles returned to eastern Angola or went into
hiding in the bush country of Shaba in May 1977 and were a constant threat
until they initiated guerrilla warfare again in May 1978. There were also
several, generally small, exile groups living in various European cities that
were openly dedicated to the overthrow of Mobutu's government. How much
support these groups could command within the country and how much cooperation
they could exercise among themselves were the key questions for security
officials. In the past the secret police have seemingly been very efficient in
gathering information about dissidents and subversive groups both within the
country and abroad.

The Military Services

Legal Basis

     Pursuant to the Constitution, laws have been promulgated that describe
the role of the president in relation to the armed forces and the composition
and functioning of the high command of the forces. The law states, "The
founder and chairman of the Popular Movement of the Revolution, the President
of the Republic, is the supreme commander of the Armed Forces." According to
law, the president directs the formulation of defense policy and is
responsible for the execution of defense policy decisions. To assist the
president in his military responsibilities, the law provides the Department of
National Defense under the direction of a cabinet officer known as the state
commissioner for national defense. The law lists several specific
responsibilities of the commissioner and, to assist him in the implementation
of his many functions, provides for an armed forces chief of staff (known as
the captain general) and chiefs of staff for each of the services.

     In practice President Mobutu has been his own state commissioner for
national defense for several years.