Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0413/04133.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 39KB | 618 lines

$Unique_ID{COW04133}
$Pretitle{299}
$Title{Yugoslavia
Chapter 2E.   Religion}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Patricia A. Kluck}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{religious
church
orthodox
health
education
catholic
yugoslavia
1970s
serbian
roman}
$Date{1982}
$Log{}
Country:     Yugoslavia
Book:        Yugoslavia, A Country Study
Author:      Patricia A. Kluck
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1982

Chapter 2E.   Religion

     There were in Yugoslavia in the early 1980s some forty recognized
religious communities. Most believers were Roman Catholics (Slovenes and
Croats), Orthodox (Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians), or Muslims
(Bosnians, Albanians). A very rough estimate of the membership of each creed
in the early 1970s would be: 30 percent Roman Catholics, 35 percent Serbian
and Macedonian Orthodox, and 12 percent Muslim (see fig. 10). There were as
well small pockets of Protestants in Vojvodina and Slavonia, scattered groups
of Greek or Uniate Catholics, a few members of the Old Catholic Church, and a
remnant of Yugoslavia's pre-World War II Jewish community. Finally, there
were numerous small groups that did not conform to the common ethnic-religious
pattern, e.g., Catholic Serbs on the Montenegrin coast and Catholic Albanians
in Kosovo.

     Religion has been a critical component in cultural and ethnic identity
since the ninth-century conversion of many Slavs to Christianity. It was,
however, a matter of family-based religious practice wherein doctrinal
orthodoxy of any sort played a minor role. The Balkans-even before the Turkish
onslaught-were at the fringe of the Christian world. From the perspective of
Rome or Constantinople alike the region was the frontier, rife with heresies,
its clergy largely uneducated and often poorly linked with general church
organization, and a faithful too often in the throes of superstition.
Travelers' accounts through the nineteenth century attest to an ignorance of
even the most rudimentary dogma and doctrine. There were reports of clergy in
rural Bosnia who were unaware of the schism between the eastern and western
Christian churches, ignorant of the Ten Commandments, and unable to recite the
simplest prayers.

     Religion was traditionally a family affair; religious observances meshed
with and reinforced the familial orientation of Balkan social life. Religion
among the largely peasant rural populace focused on family well-being and
survival. Bosnian families would have their male children both baptized and
circumcised. Albanian zadruga would have a portion of the family profess
Christianity, the rest Islam, and the religion of the zadruga head
corresponded to whomever held power. Ottoman rule, by limiting the building of
churches, reinforced the family orientation of Slav religious practice.

     From the Counter-Reformation onward, however, both Orthodoxy and Roman
Catholicism played central roles in rising Slav nationalism. Both religions
had, beyond substantial doctrinal similarity, a number of points in common. In
both churches the lower ranking clergy resisted the denationalizing efforts of
their hierarchies (the Italian Vatican in the case of the Catholics and, until
the late nineteenth century, the Greek Phanariots in that of the Serbian
Orthodox). In the case of the Bosnian Muslims, religion was the defining
element in ethnic identity. Their national consciousness developed in response
to nineteenth-century Ottoman efforts to modernize, which the Bosnians
opposed.

     Religion's long-standing association with nationalism colored
church-state relations into the early 1980s. A 1936 article by Tito suggested
that Communists would do well to ignore the philosophical and theological
differences separating themselves from religious adherents and concentrate on
bettering "the hell on this earth, whose flames engulf believers and
non-believers alike." The article long served as a justification for a
pragmatic, tolerant approach to religion. Communist officials were at pains to
point out that Marxist atheism was not antireligious. In their view religion
would wither away, even as the bourgeois nationalist state would, with the
progress of socialism. In the meantime a policy of "peaceful coexistence" was
in order.

     At the same time, the Communists came to power in circumstances that
allowed little scope for tolerance of opposition forces and made blunting
ethnic animosities paramount. Communists sought to break the power of the
churches; this was less a Marxist commitment to "scientific atheism" than the
belief that religion had fed the nationalistic hatreds that devastated
Yugoslavia. Their determination was not simply to eliminate the political
leverage of churches but to undermine their influence as well. The immediate
post-World War II era was a difficult one for religious organizations. There
were trials of major religious leaders, religious schools were closed, and
clergy were harassed.

     The situation eased considerably in the mid-1950s, and by 1959 the
government could positively praise the Serbian Orthodox and the Muslim
communities for their attitude toward socialist Yugoslavia. Officials were
less effusive toward the Roman Catholics, but noted that they too recognized
"the usefulness of maintaining normal relations with the government." In the
late 1970s church-state relations were, if not a marriage made in heaven, at
least relatively even. The top Yugoslav leadership made efforts to include
believers within the framework for consensual decisionmaking in the post-Tito
era. There was a general emphasis on unity and consensus.

     Points of contention remained. Local-level communist officials were often
less benign towards believers and clergy. Hardliners objected to the (in their
view) relaxed official attitude toward the "opiate of the masses." Usually
government judgments about religious activity reflected the general domestic
situation; the churches' lot was easier as long as affairs in multinational
Yugoslavia ran smoothly. Thus, for example, there was a period of unease
associated with the general crackdown in Serbia and Croatia in the early
1970s. The issues affecting church-state relations varied from one religion to
another, but the most persistent general concerns were children's right to
religious instruction, discrimination against believers in public life, and
the interdict against "political activity" on the part of clergy.

     By 1980 all republics had enacted laws governing religious communities in
keeping with the provisions of the 1974 Constitution (which reconfirmed the
provisions of the 1963 constitution affecting religion). The particulars of
the republics' laws varied, but in essence they guaranteed freedom of
religion, recognized the separation of church and state, and acknowledged that
the state might provide financial assistance to religious institutions (though
this was not mandated). Anything akin to stirring up nationalistic hatreds in
religious guise was, of course, strictly prohibited, as was the clergy's
involvement in political activity; the definition of "political activity"
remained a subject of interpretation.

     Legislation permitted all religious communities to establish a press;
most had done so by the 1960s; the Serbian Orthodox, Islamic, and Roman
Catholic communities all published a variety of periodicals. Religious groups
had campaigned for access to television, but this was denied. The legislation
prohibited social activity on the part of clergy, a catchall category that
included soccer clubs, dancing groups, and almost any youth activity not
strictly religious. A provision in the Croatian draft legislation would have
prohibited economic activity as well, but the popular outcry there, where the
Roman Catholic Church is active in social services, led to the measure's
removal from the final law.

     Religious instruction for the faithful remained limited, although a
Macedonian proposal limiting religious education to those over eighteen years
of age was re