Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0403/04037.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 34KB | 530 lines

$Unique_ID{COW04037}
$Pretitle{232}
$Title{Vietnam
Chapter 3B.   Agriculture}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Tuyet L. Cosslett and William R. Shaw}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{production
percent
trade
plan
foreign
agricultural
state
tons
government
vietnam}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Country:     Vietnam
Book:        Vietnam, A Country Study
Author:      Tuyet L. Cosslett and William R. Shaw
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1987

Chapter 3B.   Agriculture

     Agricultural production, the backbone of Vietnam's development strategy,
varied considerably from year to year following national reunification in
1975. A particularly strong performance in agriculture was recorded in
1976--up more than 10 percent from 1975--but production dropped back to
approximately 95 percent of the 1976 level in 1977 and 1978 and recovered to a
level higher than that of 1976 only in 1979 (see table 7, Appendix A).

     Vietnamese crop and livestock production offset agricultural performance
during this period. For example, an 8-percent increase in the value of
livestock production in 1977 balanced an 8-percent decrease in the value of
crop production (mainly the result of a 1-million-ton decline in the rice
harvest). In 1978 the reverse occurred: a steep decline in livestock output
countered a significant increase in grain production. The value of crop
production, however, averaged four times the value of livestock output at this
time.

     Foremost among Vietnam's agricultural troubles was exceptionally adverse
weather, including a drought in 1977 and major typhoons and widespread
flooding in 1978. The drought overtaxed Vietnam's modest irrigation systems,
and the floods damaged them. In addition, the floods reportedly reduced cattle
herds by 20 percent. The size of this loss was indirectly confirmed in
Vietnamese statistics that showed a leveling off of growth in livestock
inventories (particularly of cattle) between 1978 and 1980. Throughout the
Second Five-Year Plan, and especially in the late 1970s, chemical fertilizers,
pesticides, and spare parts for mechanical equipment were in short supply.

     Despite their having occurred, for the most part, fairly early in the
plan period, the severe reversals in the agricultural sector greatly
diminished hopes of achieving self-sufficiency in food production by 1980. The
1980 grain target eventually was lowered from 21 million tons to 15 million
tons, but even that amount proved unattainable.

     The agricultural policies promulgated from 1976 through 1980 had mixed
results. Pragmatic measures that encouraged the planting of more subsidiary
food crops (such as sweet potatoes, manioc, beans, and corn) led to an
increase of these crops from a level of less than 10 percent that of grain
production in 1975 to a level that was more than 20 percent of grain output by
the late 1970s. Improved incentives for farmers in 1978 and 1979 included
efforts to boost availability of consumer goods in the countryside and to
raise state procurement prices. They were reinforced by adoption of a contract
system that sought to guarantee producers access to agricultural inputs in
exchange for farm products. Even so, bureaucratic inefficiencies and shortages
of agricultural supplies prevented complete success.

     The program undertaken in mid-1977 to expedite unification of North and
South by collectivizing Southern agriculture met with strong resistance. The
reportedly voluntary program was designed to be implemented by local leaders,
but Southern peasants were mainly freeholders--not tenants--and, aside from
forming production teams for mutual assistance (an idea that won immediate
acceptance), they resisted participation in any collective program that
attenuated property rights.

     Failure to collectivize agriculture by voluntary means led briefly to the
adoption of coercive measures to increase peasant participation. It soon
became apparent, however, that such harsh methods were counterproductive.
Increased food shortages and heightened security concerns in late 1978 and
1979 caused the leadership once again to relax its grip on Southern
agriculture.

     In the North, formation of cooperatives had begun in 1959 and 1960, and
by 1965 about 90 percent of peasant households were organized into
collectives. By 1975 more than 96 percent of peasant households belonging to
cooperatives were classified as members of "high-level cooperatives," which
meant that farmers had contributed land, tools, animals, and labor in exchange
for income.

     Between 1976 and 1980, agricultural policy in the North was implemented
by newly established government district offices in an effort to improve
central control over planting decisions and farm work. The lax enforcement of
state agricultural policies adopted during the war years gave way to a greater
rigidity that diminished cooperative members' flexibility to undertake
different tasks. Labor productivity fell as a result. A study by an overseas
Vietnamese who surveyed ten rice-growing cooperatives found that, despite an
increase in labor and area cultivated in 1975, 1976, and 1977, production
decreased while costs increased when compared with production and costs for
1972 through 1974. Although the study failed to take weather and other
variables into account, the findings were consistent with conclusions reached
by investigators who have studied the effects of collectivization in other
countries. Moreover, the study drew attention to the North's poor agricultural
performance as a reason for Vietnam's persistent food problem.

     State investment in agriculture under the Third Five-Year Plan remained
low, and the sector was severely troubled throughout the plan period and into
1986 and 1987 as well. Only modest food-grain increases of 5 percent were
generated annually. Although this was enough to outpace the 2.3 percent annual
rate of population growth during the 1980s, it remained insufficient to raise
average annual per capita food consumption much above the official subsistence
level of 300 kilograms. One official Vietnamese source estimated in 1986 that
farm families devoted up to 80 percent of their income to their own food
needs.

     At the conclusion of the Third Five-Year Plan, agricultural yields
remained less than required to permit diverting resources to the support of
industrial development. In 1986 agriculture still accounted for about 44
percent of national income (the figure for developed nations is closer to 10
percent). The agricultural sector also occupied some 66 percent of the work
force--a higher percentage than in 1976 and 1980. Worse still, the output per
agricultural worker had slipped during the plan period, falling even farther
behind the increasing output per worker in industry. In 1980 more than three
agricultural workers were needed to produce as much national income as a
single industrial or construction worker. By 1985 an industrial worker
produced more than six times as much as an agricultural worker.

     In December 1986, Vo Van Kiet, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers
and member of the Political Bureau, highlighted most of the major problems of
Vietnamese agriculture in his speech to the Twelfth Session of the Seventh
National Assembly. While mentioning gains in fisheries and forestry, he noted
that nearly all farming subsectors--constituting 80 percent of the
agricultural sector--had failed to achieve plan targets for 1986. Kiet blamed
state agencies, such as the Council of Ministers, the State Planning
Commission, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, for their failure to ensure
appropriate "material conditions" (chiefly sufficient quantities of chemical
fertilizers and pesticides) for the growth of agricultural production. Kiet
also blamed the state price system for underproduction of key "industrial
crops" that Vietnam exported, including jute, sugar, groundnut, coffee, tea,
and rubber. Production levels of subsidiary food crops, such as sweet
potatoes, corn, and manioc, had