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$Unique_ID{COW03725}
$Pretitle{289}
$Title{Tunisia
Chapter 1E. Destourian Socialism: Tunisia in the 1960s}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Robert Rinehart}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{government
ben
bourguiba
party
economic
political
salah
tunisia
state
minister}
$Date{1986}
$Log{}
Country: Tunisia
Book: Tunisia, A Country Study
Author: Robert Rinehart
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date: 1986
Chapter 1E. Destourian Socialism: Tunisia in the 1960s
A motion was introduced at the 1955 party congress supporting the
principle of economic planning, without identifying the form it was to take.
The next year, however, Ben Salah, speaking as head of the UGTT, formally
advocated centralized state economic planning as the basic approach for
Tunisia's development effort. Bourguiba promptly rejected the idea, perhaps on
the grounds that he would have to delegate too much authority to the planning
agency that it envisioned, and Ben Salah was forced from the union leadership.
Despite Bourguiba's opposition to centralized planning, the issue remained the
subject of debate within party circles.
The economic sluggishness of the late 1950s convinced many in the party
and the government of the need for long-term planning on pragmatic grounds. By
1960 the UGTT had revived its campaign for centralized state economic
planning. Proponents of the scheme eventually succeeded in persuading
Bourguiba that state planning offered a solution to the country's outstanding
problems, and on the basis of the president's decision an entirely new course
was set for its economic development. In January 1961 Ben Salah was appointed
to the government as minister of state in charge of the newly created planning
department. Later in the year Bourguiba formally introduced "Destourian
socialism," announcing that the state would assume an interventionist role in
economic affairs. Ben Salah's concept of socialism, however, proved to be much
more comprehensive and far-reaching than that outlined by the president.
In the months that followed his appointment, Ben Salah increased the
areas of economic activity subject to centralized planning, and as the
influence of his ministry expanded, his political power became second only to
that of Bourguiba.
Ben Salah's rise to prominence coincided with the apparent decline of the
Neo-Destour Party's influence as a mass movement. Popular support for the
regime was grounded on Bourguiba's immense personal prestige rather than on
the guidance of the party. Meanwhile, within the party itself the president's
handling of the Bizerte crisis had caused some important figures to question
his judgment and leadership. Consequently, Bourguiba came to lean on Ben Salah
for support and reassurance, and Ben Salah in turn infused the party with what
passed for a dynamic ideology. Bourguiba's reliance on him increased after a
plot to assassinate the president was uncovered in 1962. Youssefists and
Communists were implicated in the plot, leading to the proscription of the
Tunisian Communist Party (Parti Communiste Tunisien-PCT) and the discrediting
of the political opposition on Ben Salah's left. By the mid-1960s Ben Salah
was widely spoken of as the ailing Bourguiba's obvious successor.
Ben Salah's planning goals anticipated augmented state control of the
economy and the elimination of all foreign participation. The process of
economic "decolonization" included isolating the country not only from foreign
investments but also from imports. Under the planning scheme, agriculture was
regarded as the priority sector and was expected to satisfy the bulk of
domestic food demand. Raw material exports, led by phosphates, would be relied
on to earn foreign exchange for reinvestment in development. Although
discouraging foreign investment, Tunisia sought and received grants and loans
from multilateral sources for development projects from the United States and
other countries as well as unilateral aid that financed programs in
education, health care, energy, irrigation, and transportation.
From its inception, Ben Salah's brand of centralized planning, which
carried with it the implicit threat of state control of the economy, was
inimical to landowning and business interests that still carried some weight
in the party. Attempts by Bourguiba to foster open discussion of proposed
reform measures within the party broke down in the backlash of the Bizerte
crisis. With a deft sense of timing, however, Bourguiba announced a major
reorganization of the party in 1963 that was designed to improve the dialogue
between the national leadership and local and regional branches in
preparation for the next party congress, the first to be held in more than
five years. Convened in October 1964, the Congress of Destiny, as it was
advertised, endorsed centralized state planning and approved Destourian
socialism as the party's official ideology, attempting to reconcile
Bourguiba's political ethics with Ben Salah's collectivism. In keeping with
its new image, the congress voted to rename the party the Destourian Socialist
Party (Parti Socialiste Destourien-PSD). In November, running unopposed under
its banner, Bourguiba was elected to a second term as president.
While Ben Salah tightened his control over economic policy and
consolidated his position in the PSD, Bourguiba turned his attention to
foreign affairs and attempted to use his prestige on the international
scene as a moderate Arab leader to promote a negotiated settlement of the
Palestinian question. In April 1965 he proposed an Arab reconciliation
with Israel, in return for which Israel would allow the return of refugees
and would cede territory for the creation of a Palestinian Arab state
on the basis of the 1947 UN plan. Although Israel welcomed the opportunity
for direct negotiations with concerned Arab states, it rejected the 18-year
-old plan for a settlement on the grounds that it was not relevant to
contemporary conditions in the region. Meanwhile, Egypt and Syria denounced
Bourguiba for breaking ranks with Arab solidarity by recommending a course
of action that would have implied recognition of Israel. Tunisia kept a low
profile officially during the Arab-Israeli June 1967 War, although rioting
in Tunis was directed against Jewish residents, and the United States and
British embassies were attacked by mobs. The following year, Tunisia broke
relations with Syria after Damascus had condemned Bourguiba for his
conciliatory attitude toward Israel. The Tunisian government also cited
contacts between Syrian agents and radical groups in Tunisia as evidence
of attempted subversion.
The Tunisian government had initiated agricultural cooperatives,
using former habus land, as early as 1956. These cooperatives coexisted
alongside a private sector that included peasant smallholders as well
as large-scale farm proprietors. Under Ban Salah's direction, the program
was enlarged by adding communal property sequestered by the government
and again in 1964 to include foreign-owned land that was nationalized
that year. Individual farmers, mostly smallholders, had also been allowed
to buy expropriated land put up for sale by the government, but as more
and more property was brought into the public sector, it became clear that
the cooperative system would be developed at the expense of private ownership.
By 1968 agricultural production had fallen drastically in the public
sector, in large measure as a result of unrealistic planning, incompetent
management, and a reluctance among farmers to join the cooperatives.
The structural failure of the cooperative system was compounded by drought
conditions and a series of extremely poor harvests. Negative reports from the
World Bank (see Glossary), highly critical of the planning program and
cooperative system, further embarrassed the regime. Resentment in liberal
circles within the party over Ben Salah's continued accumulation of power
came to a head when Ahmed Mestiri resi