Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0321/03219.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 26KB | 394 lines

$Unique_ID{COW03219}
$Pretitle{293}
$Title{South Africa
Chapter 5B.   South African Concepts of National Security}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Robert Rinehart}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{south
africa
african
defense
black
security
military
africa's
white
country}
$Date{1980}
$Log{}
Country:     South Africa
Book:        South Africa, A Country Study
Author:      Robert Rinehart
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1980

Chapter 5B.   South African Concepts of National Security

     South Africa did not play a role of primary significance in the overall
defense scheme of the British Empire before World War II. No foreign power had
designs on it nor did any have the capability to invade it. During World War
II the Union's armed forces made valuable contributions to the Allied effort
in fighting that took place in North Africa, East Africa, and Europe. White
South Africans were confident of their ability to ensure the internal security
of the country out of their own resources. In 1950, however, Prime Minister
D.F. Malan expressed fears that India and China might seek to colonize Africa
as an outlet for their excess population, and during the 1950s and 1960s the
Nationalist government was intent on keeping the "winds of change" that were
sweeping across a rapidly decolonized Africa from blowing into South Africa.
The specter of a Soviet-abetted communist threat to Africa was used to
mobilize public opinion to support government racial policies. Communism was
broadly defined in security legislation as "any doctrine or scheme which aims
to bring about any political, social, or economic change" by promoting
disorder, particularly through racial unrest. "Russian imperialism" was more
commonly cited as a destabilizing force in Africa than was Black nationalism,
which was believed to depend on Soviet support. A scenario was advanced in
which the Soviet Union launched the decisive phase of its campaign for world
dominance in Africa, seizing coveted resources and gaining control of South
Africa's vital stretegic position to choke the West into submission. Until the
mid-1970s, however, South Africa felt relatively secure behind a buffer of
Portuguese colonies and White-controlled Southern Rhodesia that shielded it
from direct confrontation with independent African states.

     South African strategists proposed that in the event of another global
confrontation, the enemy must be engaged as far as possible from South Africa
in order to minimize the effects of a popular Black uprising within the
country itself. South Africa also tried to impress upon Western opinion a
consciousness of its strategic and economic importance. Thus, while the South
African government proposed new avenues for joint participation with the
Western powers in the defense of Africa, it also sought to become involved
formally in existing Western defense alliances. South Africa contributed a
fighter squadron to UN forces in Korea, and in 1951 joined the
British-sponsored Middle East Defence Organization, acquiring a number of
heavy tanks as evidence of its willingness to make an effective commitment
in that region. Disappointed when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) failed to extend its cover to the South Atlantic area, Pretoria pushed
for formation of an African Defence Organization-to include NATO members
Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal, together with South Africa-as a
southward extension of the NATO shield. Discussions took place at the
ministerial level, but the plan died for lack of interest on the part of the
European powers, which at the time saw Africa as being far from the main arena
of the struggle to contain Soviet expansion. Association with South Africa had
already become an ideological liability for NATO countries, and the Simonstown
Agreement in 1955, which transferred the naval base to South Africa in return
for continued technical cooperation, fell short of the bilaterial alliance the
country had sought with Britain.

     The thoroughgoing review of defense policy that coincided with the
beginning of hostilities in Portuguese Africa in the early 1960s was a
watershed in South African security planning. Lacking allies, Pretoria
determined to improve the SADF's state of readiness with a view to its being
required to fight on different levels of intensity on several fronts;
contributing to a war involving East-West confrontation on a global scale,
dealing with intensified domestic Black militancy, upgrading the defense of
borders against infiltration, and countering (within its capacity) aggressive
action undertaken against South African territory by hostile foreign forces.
The Permanent Force was increased from 9,000 men in 1960 to 15,000 in 1964,
while the number of reservists in training and on active duty at any given
time with the Citizen Force was increased tenfold from 2,000 to 20,000. The
boost in manpower was intended to serve as a deterrent to potential enemies
and to enhance South Africa's credibility as a potential ally. The buildup
also allowed the SADF to maintain a standing force for rapid deployment in
counterinsurgency operations, a contingency with which South Africa believed
it could cope without allies. In 1968 the SADF's first large-scale joint
military exercise was aimed against hypothetical terrorists infiltrating from
Portuguese Mozambique. Exercises of this nature were conducted regularly
thereafter to provide training in counterinsurgency tactics for all service
units.

     South African security planning continued, however, to be posited on the
arrival of Western aid if its resources or the Cape sea route were threatened
by Soviet-backed forces. By the late 1960s, according to then Defence Minister
P.W. Botha, Moscow had adopted new methods in its drive for strategic
domination of Africa, arming and training insurgents for wars of liberation in
southern Africa as a prelude to the "final conventional confrontation" with
South Africa. The West, Botha concluded, would be compelled to intervene in
such an event in its own self-interest-either through direct military
involvement or by use of its nuclear deterrent.

     The Portuguese withdrawal from Angola and Mozambique in 1975 and the
establishment of self-avowed Marxist regimes in both countries drastically
altered the strategic balance in southern Africa, according to Pretoria. The
victory of Robert Mugabe's Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe in 1980 seemed to some
White South Africans to complete the "Marxist encirclement" of their country.
These events, coupled with the UN-imposed embargo on the sale of military
equipment and the escalation of guerrilla activity in Namibia, called for
further rethinking of security concepts.

     South African military planners perceived three types of security threats
in the 1980s: violent civil disorders, cross-border infiltration by well-armed
guerrilla units, and a Soviet-assisted conventional attack from one or more
neighboring countries. In the first case, the greatest potential for disorder
was understood to lie in large urban areas, where except for Cape Town and
Pretoria the Black population significantly outnumbered the White. Sustained
armed insurrection in those areas was considered unlikely, but security forces
anticipated sporadic violence of increased intensity on the pattern of Soweto
in 1976 and random acts of terrorism in protest against specific acts of
repression on the part of the government. In the second instance the SADF
expected intensified infiltration by well-armed and trained guerrilla units
connected with the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist
Congress (PAC) assigned to commit calculated acts of terrorism, such as
shootings, attacks on government installations, and sabotage. Finally, the
analysts pointed to the presence of an estimated 20,000 Cuban and up to 4,000
East German troops in Angola and Mozambique where they trained Black troops
in the use of modern armor and artillery provided by the Soviet Union. A 1979
biennial wh