Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0321/03218.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 34KB | 527 lines

$Unique_ID{COW03218}
$Pretitle{293}
$Title{South Africa
Chapter 5A.   National Security}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Robert Rinehart}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{south
british
africa
african
war
forces
military
sadf
defense
national}
$Date{1980}
$Log{Defence Force Emblem*0321801.scf
Figure 20.*0321802.scf
}
Country:     South Africa
Book:        South Africa, A Country Study
Author:      Robert Rinehart
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1980

Chapter 5A.   National Security

[See Defence Force Emblem: Official emblem of South African Defence Force]

     South Africa's preoccupation with national security in the aftermath of
the Portuguese withdrawal from Africa and the subsequent fall of the White
regime in Rhodesia-coupled with a growing sense of political isolation and
abandonment by the West-has reinforced the siege mentality that had been a
facet of life in the White-and particularly in the Afrikaner-community. This
attitude has been symbolized by the laager-the circled wagons behind which the
nineteenth century Boer trekkers defended themselves on the open veld against
their Black enemies and from which the pioneers could lash out with
counterattacks. Although the country's Whites are regarded by many observers
as being obsessed by what in Afrikaans is called swartgevaar (an inordinate
fear of being overwhelmed by Blacks), South African authorities have not
tended to equate all opposition to their regime with indigenous Black unrest
but rather with communism. The Nationalist regime has loosely defined
communism as any doctrine or scheme that seeks to change the political,
social, or economic structure of South Africa or to promote disorder and
violence. Some South African analysts see the Soviet Union preparing to make
the African continent a theater of operations in a future East-West
confrontation. According to South African spokesmen, their country has an
intrinsic strategic value for the West derived from its geographic location
and vast natural resources.

     In 1980 the country had committed a significant part of its military
manpower to containing the insurgency in northern Namibia (South West
Africa). Its conventional defense capability was bolstered against the
perceived threat of Soviet-backed aggression from Angola and other Black
African states. Border security had also been intensified against Black
nationalist guerrillas operating out of Mozambique and Botswana. The existence
of operational areas within South Africa reflected concern for stepped up
guerrilla activities. Moreover internal security had assumed new importance
after the Soweto riots of 1976, and the future of relations with neighboring
Zimbabwe also loomed large in Pretoria's planning.

     The South African government under Prime Minister P. W. Botha had
introduced a "total strategy" designed to cope with the perceived "total
threat." South Africa was geared up both materially and psychologically to
fight a prolonged war of low intensity, but it also had extended its sphere
of potential military commitment to all of subequatorial Africa. Fundamental
to the "total strategy," however, was the concept expressed by its chief
architect, Defense Minister Magnus Malan, that the conflict for South Africa's
survival went beyond war by military means. National security objectives had
been formulated whereby all of the country's resources would be available to
be mustered and managed on a coordinated level for defense. Every activity of
the state was to be understood as a function of the "total strategy." Also
essential to the task, according to Malan, was the attempt to give the Black
majority a larger share in the country's future and to involve them more in
maintaining its security.

     In 1980 the South African Defence Force (SADF) was the strongest in
Africa south of the Sahara in terms of leadership, training, technical
proficiency, equipment, and general fighting ability. Reputable foreign
analysts considered that this military capability was so awesome in relation
to that of neighboring Black states that it could meet any conceivable
aggressive threat from them and could not be defeated by conventional means
without significant intervention by the great powers (see fig. 20). The
SADF's standing force of 86,000 personnel was the third largest in sub-Saharan
Africa after distant Nigeria and Ethiopia, but no country in the region could
match the more than 400,000 regular and reserve personnel that the military
establishment and the paramilitary police forces could mobilize in the event
of an emergency. An effective logistical system assured all fighting units of
reliable support in supplies and equipment maintenance.

     Desired strength levels were achieved by a national system of two years
compulsory military service for qualified White males, followed by a ten-year
reserve commitment. Enlistment of Blacks was encouraged, and eligible White
women were recruited to form auxiliary units.

     As a result of frequent and prolonged call-ups of reservists for active
duty in operational areas, a large proportion of the SADF had gained combat
experience. Excellent training procedures emphasized endurance and individual
initiative as well as disciplined response to orders. South African
servicemen were credited as being physically tough, well motivated
psychologically, technically skilled, and patriotic. Service conditions were
considered excellent by modern military standards.

     Defense costs claimed nearly 20 percent of the annual national budget,
reflecting steep increases in expenditures during the 1970s, but this figure
was not excessive in relation to the country's expanding gross domestic
product (GDP-see Glossary). A mandatory embargo on the export to South Africa
of goods and technology capable of being used for military purposes was
imposed by the United Nations in 1977. Although most long-standing sources
of supply were cut off as a result of this action, the embargo did not appear
in 1980 to have damaged South Africa's defense posture. Adequate support for
the SADF was well within the capabilities of the diversified national
industrial base, and the armed forces were virtually self-sufficient in all
military materiel (except heavy tanks and large naval vessels) and in all
technical equipment (except the most advanced electronics gear). Most
observers conceded that South Africa had or could soon acquire the capability
to produce nuclear weapons.

     The South African Police (SAP), a national law enforcement agency of more
than 35,000 regular police and 20,000 police reservists in 1980, is the
primary instrument for maintaining law and order and for preserving internal
security in areas not assigned to the SADF. Trained and quipped to meet modern
law enforcement standards as well as paramilitary requirements, the SAP has a
reputation for efficiency. Although a large percentage of regular police
personnel are non-Whites, many Blacks and Coloureds regard the SAP as a symbol
of White domination and repressive regulation.

[See Figure 20.: Military Balance in Southern Africa, 1980 Source: Adapted
from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance,
1980-81, London, 1980.]

     The police have been granted extensive powers to invade private rights in
the course of exercising their prescribed functions, a significant part of
which deals with enforcing security laws and the large body of apartheid
legislation (see Apartheid and Its Evolution, ch. 2; The Legal System, ch. 4).

     In 1980 there was evidence that many Whites would concede some
modification in race relations for the sake of improving their country's
security. But they also appeared willing to make whatever sacrifices were
necessary to defend their way of life. In the words of General Constand
Viljoen, Chief of the SADF, they would have to be prepared to enter each day
"the plough in one hand, the gun in the other."

History of the Military Tradition

     The traditions of South Africa