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$Unique_ID{COW03167}
$Pretitle{384}
$Title{Singapore
Chapter 4A. Social Organization and Values}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Nena Vreeland}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{chinese
social
government
ethnic
groups
singapore
economic
community
malay
national}
$Date{1976}
$Log{}
Country: Singapore
Book: Singapore, A Country Study
Author: Nena Vreeland
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date: 1976
Chapter 4A. Social Organization and Values
When Singapore was separated from Malaysia in 1965 and became an
independent nation, its leaders were faced not only with the economic problems
of maintaining a metropolis without its hinterland but also with the problem
of creating a nation-state out of a population having seemingly insurmountable
differences of language, custom, values, and goals between and within three
major ethnic groups. According to Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and other
leaders of the ruling People's action Party (PAP), the survival of Singapore
depended on the decisive solution of these problems. To aid in the economic
transformation of Singapore into a modern industrial state, Lee called on the
population for tough self-discipline and social responsibility-what he called
a "rugged society." To carry out the nation-building process Lee called on the
people to create a "multiracial" society in which the languages and cultures
of the three major ethnic groups-Chinese, Malay, and Indian-were all respected
and in which all important social institutions-schools, military service,
housing, and the like-would be fully integrated. One government official has
characterized the ideal educated Singaporean as "vocationally adaptable,
mentally alert, morally disciplined, proficient at least in the use of one
language and able to communicate orally in two."
The society that evolved during the first decade of independence was very
different from the one Singaporeans had lived in before. The economic
transformation of the country created a situation of rapid social change and
occupational mobility supporting the emergence of a comparatively large and
growing middle sector. The wealth of Singapore is more evenly distributed
among the population than it has been in the past. In the mid-1970s one-half
of the population lived in integrated public housing, which was as great a
psychological change from the former pattern of crowded ethnic enclaves and
slums as it was a physical change. The school system, with integrated
facilities offering alternative languages of instruction, seemed to be
yielding to the dominance of English as the language of government, business,
the professions, and perhaps of higher education. Virtually all secondary
school graduates had come to expect middle-class, white-collar jobs, and by
the mid-1970s it was apparent that the demand for such jobs exceeded the
supply. Singapore had taken on many of the characteristics and the problems of
a modern, industrial, urban society and appeared to have reached a greater
level of national integration than its leaders had expected.
SOCIAL DIVISIONS
The makeup of Singapore's social organization is made considerably more
complex by the variety and depth of cleavages based on ethnic groups and by
cleavages within ethnic groups based on regional differences in their
ancestral homelands. Singaporeans of Chinese ancestry compose about 76 percent
of the population, those of Malay origin roughly 15 percent, and those
descending from inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent and Sri Lanka about 7
percent. These proportions had already reached a relatively stable
relationship by the mid-1970s and seemed unlikely to change drastically in the
foreseeable future (see ch. 2). The members of the three ethnic groups were
immigrants or the offspring of immigrants and, although by the end of World
War II a majority of the population had been born and raised in Singapore,
differences of language, religion, custom, and values pose a considerable
obstacle to the easy achievement of national cohesion and a feeling of common
identity and purpose.
Moreover each major ethnic group is divided into smaller groups, some of
which until relatively recent times knew no common language. Most Chinese
immigrants came from southern China and belonged to several groups speaking
mutually unintelligible dialects; the largest groups were, in descending order
of size, Hokkien, Teochew (Teochiu), Cantonese, Hainan, Hakka (Khek), and
Foochow. The first three are by far the largest groups; each of the three is
larger than either all Malays or all Indians.
The earliest Chinese immigrants married Malay women, adopted their own
patois, and took on some Malay customs but continued to identify themselves as
Chinese. Initially known as Baba Chinese, they tended toward English education
and Western life-styles earlier than most other immigrants; from the late
nineteenth century they were joined by other Chinese immigrants whose wealth
and inclinations led them to choose English education and anglicized ways.
Collectively they became known as the Straits Chinese and formed the backbone
of an anglicized elite that wielded great influence with the British colonial
authorities. They played an important role in the political leadership of
postcolonial Singapore. Prime Minister Lee is descended from an established
Straits Chinese family and, like most Straits Chinese, speaks English as his
first language.
Historically relations among the various Chinese dialect groups have not
always been amicable-group chauvinism leading Cantonese to regard Hokkienese
as country bumpkins, most groups looking down on Hakkas, and so on. Initially
different groups tended to divide economic specialties among themselves; that
is, most artisans were Cantonese, most shopkeepers Hokkienese, and the like.
These differences have largely been obviated by the changing structure of the
economy and by a sense of community as Chinese, which later expanded to a
sense of Singaporean identity.
Similar divisions exist among Malays and Indians. A large number of
Singaporean Malays have their origins in Sumatra, the Celebes, and elsewhere
in Indonesia as well as the Malay Peninsula. However, differences in dialect
are not as pronounced among Malays as among Chinese, and a common adherence to
Islam and proximity to two Malay nations-Malaysia and Indonesia-had already
given this group more coherence. A process of ethnic awakening also took place
among them as it did among Chinese. Indians are mostly Tamil speakers from
Southern India and Sri Lanka but are joined by Punjabis, Gujaratis, and
Bengalis as well.
In addition to economic, ethnic, and subethnic cleavages in the society,
there is a major division between those who have received their education in
English and those who have not. Although English, Chinese (Mandarin), Malay,
and Tamil are all official languages, in practical terms English is the
language of business, government, administration, and the professions. Even
though government policy provides parents with the option of sending their
children to schools in which any one of the official languages is the medium
of instruction and despite some efforts to promote the use of all the official
languages in public life, an English-language education retains an obvious
economic advantage. Consequently since the mid-1960s most Chinese parents and
almost all Indian parents have increasingly chosen to send their children to
English-language schools, and by 1970 almost one-fourth of the adult
population were conversant with English. As a result the division between the
English-educated and those educated in other languages does not correspond to
ethnic or even class differences, although it has in the past been associated
with political orientation, as when the Chinese-language schools were used as
focal points for action and recruitment by Communists and other leftists.
Given these cleavages within the society, the problems of achieving true
nation