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$Unique_ID{COW03087}
$Pretitle{251}
$Title{Saudi Arabia
Appendix C. Gulf Cooperation Council}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Eugene K. Keefe}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{gcc
states
gulf
united
council
economic
saudi
summit
yemen
oman}
$Date{1984}
$Log{}
Country: Saudi Arabia
Book: Saudi Arabia, A Country Study
Author: Eugene K. Keefe
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date: 1984
Appendix C. Gulf Cooperation Council
In January 1981, shortly after a summit meeting of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi leadership officially
announced the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an enterprise
initiated by Saudi Arabia and long in the planning stage. The GCC includes the
six states of the Arabian Peninsula that have similar political institutions,
social conditions, and economic resources: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Oman. The aim of the GCC is to
coordinate and unify economic, industrial, and defense policies. On May 24,
1981, the founding of the GCC was announced at the first meeting of the six
heads of state, which was held in Abu Dhabi, capital of the UAE (see fig. 1).
The GCC states have a combined population of 12 to 15 million, a land
area of about 2,653,000 square kilometers, and a combined annual gross
domestic product (GDP) of about US$210 billion. Rich in economic resources and
land, they are generally poor in trained manpower and also are beset by
problems endemic to nations with (in some cases) only a decade of independence
behind them. Most of the GCC population originates from the same region, Najd
in central Arabia, whence tribal migrations propelled many of them to the
Persian Gulf coast during the eighteenth century. The GCC states must still
contend with rivalries from that period as well as new conflicts and
competitiveness that have developed since the creation of their modern states.
Because the similarities and common interests far outweigh the differences,
the notion of a comprehensive, cooperative effort appeared a natural one.
Organization and Structure
The organization and structure of the GCC closely model the political
systems and hierarchies of the member states. Essentially, the combined
ministers of any single portfolio may function as a council. The Supreme
Council, composed of the six heads of state, is the principal policymaking
body of the GCC. The presidency of the group changes from year to year in
alphabetical order. The Supreme Council is enjoined to meet every six months,
but extraordinary meetings may be called by any of the six heads of state.
Biannual meetings are commonly referred to as summit meetings.
The Supreme Council is responsible for overall planning, policy, and
setting of priorities. The council reviews and must approve the deliberations
or recommendations of any secondary body or committee within the GCC. The six
foreign ministers, together called the Ministerial Council, meet bimonthly but
may also choose to meet for extraordinary sessions.
In addition to a secretary general, who has overall suzerainty, there are
two deputy secretary generals-one to concentrate on economic matters and the
other on political matters. At the council's inauguration in Abu Dhabi in May
1981, Abdullah Yakub Bisharah was announced as the GCC's first secretary
general, the head of the secretariat to be based in Riyadh. The unanimous
choice of the articulate Bishara was a felicitous one. A Kuwaiti, he had
represented Kuwait for more than a decade at the United Nations (UN). He is
known as a thorough but conciliatory negotiator who has always espoused a
supranational approach to problem solving. Because of his advocacy of Arab
causes, particularly the Palestinian issue, it was hoped that his appointment
would blunt criticism from the left. Although he is aware, as any Gulf
statesman must be, of the inherent rivalries within the GCC, he has preferred
to concentrate on the similarities. At the GCC summit in Bahrain in November
1982, Bishara noted that "the GCC is a modern articulation of an old
legitimacy for future unification.... The concept of national borders and
customs barriers are alien imports from the West."
Initially, reaction to the formation of the GCC was largely negative. As
expected, Iran castigated its formation. President Saddam Husayn of Iraq, who
had previously sought to form a similar grouping with Iraq as the preeminent
member, was undoubtedly displeased. In view of the enormous financial
subventions from the GCC states, however, Iraq was now in an embarrassingly
dependent financial position, and any displeasure was muted.
Both the Yemen Arab Republic (Yemen [Sanaa]) and the People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen (Yemen [Aden]) vociferously protested the formation. Each
cited the fact that only the two states of the Yemen were excluded among the
states of the Arabian Peninsula. They accused the GCC of essentially forming a
rich clique that would gang up on the two impoverished Yemeni states. Yemen
(Sanaa) was particularly disgruntled in view of its long and close
relationship with Saudi Arabia. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
excoriated the group's formation as a right-wing alliance of antiquated
political entities.
Diligent activity characterized the GCC's first year. The Ministerial
Council met in Oman in March 1981, in the UAE in May, and in Saudi Arabia in
August. At the initial meetings, the council commissioned Oman to draw up a
study of regional security and Kuwait to prepare a paper on regional economic
issues.
As of early 1984 there had been nine meetings of the Ministerial Council
and four GCC summits (meetings of the Supreme Council). The summit conferences
were held in May 1981 in Abu Dhabi, November 1981 in Riyadh, November 1982 in
Manama, Bahrain, and November 1983 in Doha, Qatar. The November 1983 summit
was preceded by a meeting of the Ministerial Council in which members approved
a working budget of US$25 million for the year. In addition to its hierarchy,
the GCC by that time had 238 full-time employees at its headquarters in
Riyadh.
In the decade before its founding, there had been several attempts to
form a group composed in part of the states that would ultimately compose the
GCC. The shah of Iran and Saddam Husayn of Iraq had individually and together
proposed such an alliance at various times. In each case, the smaller Gulf
states presumed that the overture was a thinly disguised attempt at Gulf
hegemony, and they were wary of certifying, or even appearing to acquiesce to,
the pretensions of hegemony of Iraq or Iran. The proposals were usually coolly
received, although some desultory discussions did take place.
The outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran in September 1980 provided
precisely the catalyst needed for the GCC states to create their own group.
The war itself reinforced the GCC cognizance of its own vulnerability.
Pan-Arab fellowship aside, in the opening days of the war the GCC states were
as concerned with the prospect of a victorious and possibly adventuristic Iraq
as they were with revolutionary Iran. Preceding Iraq's attack on Iran, Iraq
had been vociferous in its verbal forays against the GCC states. Sultan Qaboos
of Oman was particularly singled out and castigated for his relations with
Britain and the United States.
As the war alternately intensified and stalemated (with no clear victory
in sight for Iraq), GCC fears of aggressive Iraqi ambitions faded, to be
replaced by a pragmatic decision to opt for the lesser of two evils. Because
of increasing GCC vocal support for Iraq and concomitant indispensable funding
for the Iraqi war effort, a considerably humbled Saddam Husayn made an
about-face, even going to far as to congratulate Oman publicly for its tough
domestic policy on resident foreign workers.
Once committed to open support of Iraq in both cash and arms supplies,
the GCC states had no