Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0307/03071.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 21KB | 347 lines

$Unique_ID{COW03071}
$Pretitle{251}
$Title{Saudi Arabia
Chapter 2E.   Religion in Contemporary Saudi Arabia}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{P. A. Kluck}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{al
religious
shiites
haj
government
ulama
pilgrims
pilgrim
mecca
pilgrimage}
$Date{1984}
$Log{}
Country:     Saudi Arabia
Book:        Saudi Arabia, A Country Study
Author:      P. A. Kluck
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1984

Chapter 2E.   Religion in Contemporary Saudi Arabia

     Islam is a pervasive influence in contemporary society. As a religion
Islam places less emphasis on elaborating a systematic theology than on
understanding divine law; the concern is with ethics over doctrine. For the
devout Muslim the Quran is the perfection of all human knowledge, past and
future; it is inconceivable that the Quran would not have the solution to any
problem that might arise. The devout Saudi seeks the solution to contemporary
problems not in political or social theories, but in the "correct
interpretation and application of divine law." The Quran is the nation's
constitution, and the legal system rests on the sharia. Areas not covered by
traditional Muslim jurisprudence such as mineral leases, motor vehicle
registration, and aviation, are dealt with through administrative regulations
(see Legal Basis of Government, ch. 4).

     Despite the dramatic changes in some sectors in the 1970s, religious
practice and opinion remain firmly conservative both in Riyadh and in more
isolated localities. Public frivolity is frowned on throughout the kingdom;
businesses close for daily prayers and during the day in Ramadan. Public
sermons each Friday given by the ulama reinforce a conservative perspective
in religious matters. No public cinemas or theaters exist. Social and peer
pressure encourage at least outward conformity with religious prescriptions.

     Although there is not a formally constituted priesthood in Islam,
religious scholars and legal experts play a formative role in social and
religious affairs. Sharia colleges and universities provide education for
teachers and the imams who lead prayers in the mosques. Qadis and muftis
(jurists and lawyers) receive their training in Islamic jurisprudence at the
Higher Institute for the Judiciary. Lawyers and scholars who are particularly
successful become members of the religious leadership. The ulama hold their
position by virtue of their knowledge of the Quran and hadith, their
proficiency in Arabic, and their expertise in law. Many are members of Al ash
Shaykh, descendants of Abd al Wahhab. Traditionally, they were found in the
upper levels of government administration; the ministries of justice,
education, and higher education were all heavily influenced by the ulama; in
1984 the judiciary and women's education remained largely under their complete
control.

     Tension between religious conservatives and those who would modernize has
been a part of life since the kingdom's inception. The ulama have generally
been conservative in their readiness to accept technical innovation, although
they are not always of a single mind on specific issues. Nor are they the sole
source of conservatism. Abd al Aziz encountered opposition from religious
conservatives when he introduced telephones, radios, and automobiles.
Conservatives opposed the use and sale of coffee and, needless to say,
alcohol. The split between conservatives, who wished to ban cigarettes, and
merchants who wanted the tobacco trade had the makings of a political crisis
in the early years of the kingdom. Some conservatives opposed oil concessions
to foreigners, but Abd al Aziz countered their objections with the observation
that even the Prophet employed nonbelievers. The conservative ulama opposed
television, sought to limit educational opportunities and employment for
women, prohibited women from driving automobiles, and limited the
opportunities of Saudis to study abroad.

     The relationship between the forces of change and those favoring
conservatism was at the core of society. Saudis have sought to tread a path
between Wahhabi values and life-style and the changes brought by the
astronomical increase in oil revenues. The regime sought to improve the
populace's standard of living and acquire modern technology while maintaining
a commitment to Islam as a way of life. The goal has been to reject Western
culture while using industrial technology; the problem lies in finding
practical ways of doing this. Opinions on important issues differ.
Conservatives would limit women's employment to medicine, education, and
social work-fields where they would encounter only women; those of a more
liberal bent would expand the fields open to women in an effort to limit the
country's dependence on foreign workers (see The Challenge of Modernization,
ch. 4).

     Although the adoption of modern technology seems to some to contravene
Abd al Wahhab's injunction against bida, most scholars have agreed to
distinguish between worldly and religious innovations. Telephones,
automobiles, and coffee are said by most to have no bearing on religion and,
therefore, are permissible. The balance between conserving Islamic ideals and
the appropriate use of modern technology was again at issue in King Fahd's
call in June 1983 for a conference on ijtihad. Such an undertaking might well
permit more leeway to modernizers. Simply by virtue of being pan-Islamic and
including scholars from diverse countries, some observers thought, the
conference might offer a counterweight to conservative Wahhabi influence.

     The extent to which conservatives or modernizers have held sway has waxed
and waned over the years. Both Abd al Aziz and Faisal were extremely well
versed in the Quran and the Sunna; Faisal's mother came from Al ash Shaykh,
and her brothers had seen to his religious education in detail. Both monarchs
maintained close relations with the ulama and could hold their own in
discussions of proper practice. King Khalid also listened closely to religious
advisers, and his successor, Fahd, has continued to meet weekly with the
leading ulama.

     The influence of the Committees for Public Morality and the religious
police declined in the early 1970s following the death of the grand mufti in
1969. In 1970 the Higher Council of the Qadis (also called the Supreme
Judicial Council) replaced many of the functions of the office of the grand
mufti. The committees were more active in the late 1970s and early 1980s after
a decade in which oil money had brought extensive urbanization and
unprecedented numbers of foreigners to the kingdom. The seizure of the Grand
Mosque in November 1979 and the presence of a predatory extremist regime in
Iran contributed to the new wave of conservatism.

     Fahd began his reign by sanctioning the public enforcement of religious
strictures. The religious police forced non-Muslims out of shops at prayer
time, banned women from even private beaches, and made sure that Christians
neither proselytized nor worshiped publicly. The ulama continued to exercise
considerable influence in education, especially the education of women, and
television and radio programming. They managed to close video game arcades and
dictated that no further video shop licenses be issued. They attempted to
limit contacts between Saudis and foreigners, and, by the mid-1980s, there
were reports that social contacts between the two groups had declined.

     Although the ulama as a whole remained conservative in orientation and
critical of rapid social change, they continued to be generally supportive of
the regime. Other religious conservatives would be critical of both the regime
and, by their association with Al Saud, the ulama. The group that seized the
Grand Mosque, apparently significant more in their choice of Islamic symbols
than the degree of support they enjoyed among the populace at large,
represented such religiously based opposition. The participants were a
diverse group of disenchanted tribesmen, city dwellers, and M