Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0285/02852.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 25KB | 394 lines

$Unique_ID{COW02852}
$Pretitle{242}
$Title{Peru
Chapter 1D.   Phase I of the Revolutionary Government}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Jack Child}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{military
reform
government
reforms
social
political
law
peruvian
program
economic}
$Date{1980}
$Log{}
Country:     Peru
Book:        Peru, A Country Study
Author:      Jack Child
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1980

Chapter 1D.   Phase I of the Revolutionary Government

Velasco Alvarado, 1968-75

     The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces has had an impact and a
significance unique among military regimes in Peru and indeed in Latin
America. Although there is still debate about the permanence, depth, and
irreversibility of the changes, there is no question that changes were made
and that the political, economic, and social structure of Peru in 1980 was
appreciably different from that in 1968. Although it may or may not be valid
to call the Peruvian experience a "revolution," the military government did
institute the most sweeping changes of any Latin American government in the
period between Castro's 1959 triumph and that of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas
(see Glossary) twenty years later. Further, the regime's programs were
implemented mainly without violence or suppression of human rights and in a
framework repeatedly characterized as "neither communist nor capitalist, but
Peruvian." The government's reforms and plans were frequently unique and
innovative, a fact that partially accounts for some of its more interesting
successes and rather spectacular failures. What happened in Peru-particularly
from 1968 to 1975-was closely watched by many political observers and actors
in the hemisphere, especially among the military, who saw in the populism
of the Peruvian generals a possible solution to their own dilemmas of latent
insurgency.

     The novelty and general nature of the 1968-75 regime can perhaps be seen
in terms of what it was not. It was not, for example, a revolution in the
sense of a complete and violent upheaval of a society as were the Mexican
(1910), Cuban (1959), and Nicaraguan (1979) revolutions; nor was it a
revolution in the false sense of a simple replacement of a palace guard
without real structural change. The regime was neither socialistic nor
capitalistic, although it incorporated elements of both political and economic
systems. Nor was it either a personalist dictatorship or a fully
participative populist regime, although one can discern some tendencies in
both directions. The main features of the regime can be summarized as follows:
a strong attack on the oligarchy that had ruled Peru since colonial times;
a deliberate effort to undermine the appeal of the traditional political
parties by co-opting and broadening their reform programs; an attempt to
break the historic patterns of internal and external dependency; a greatly
increased role for the state in economic, political, social, and cultural
activities; a restructuring of political relationships along hierarchical
and corporatist lines; controlled and limited popular participation directed
by a small military elite; and a search for a new international order along
Third World models. What emerges from these considerations is a unique
attempt to create a new Peru in terms of a model called
"corporatist-organic-statist" in which the state would have much greater
responsibility for establishing new organic relationships among Peruvian
institutions and individuals in a hierarchical corporatist framework.

Goals of the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces

     Statements of the government's goals are contained in both the October
1968 Manifesto and Revolutionary Statute as well as Plan Inca, which carries
the same date but was not made public until 1974. The Manifesto briefly
outlines Peru's chaotic situation at the end of the Belaunde regime and speaks
in a general way of the goals of transforming the structure of the state in
its social, economic, and cultural dimensions and restoring the principle
of authority, respect for law, and the supremacy of justice and morality.
The Revolutionary Statute (Decree-Law 17063, October 3, 1968), which briefly
lays out the composition and attributes of the junta, elaborates somewhat on
the government's goals in Article 2. More specific goals of the government
emerged as each reform program was announced over the next few years (see
The Reform Program, this ch.).

     In the process of announcing reforms the government made frequent
references to a "secret plan" supposedly drafted before the October 1968
coup, but which would not be released because it would give enemies of the
reform process an opportunity to block change. The plan was finally revealed
in July 1974 as Plan Inca. It contains the most comprehensive statement of
the regime's analysis of specific problem areas, the reform objective sought,
and actions to be taken. The preamble to Plan Inca states that the military
junta will carry out a process of transforming economic, social, political,
and cultural structures to create a new society and that the revolution will
be nationalistic, independent, and humanistic and will not follow any foreign
dogmas or schemes. Based on the five general purposes sketched out in the
Revolutionary Statute, Plan Inca lays out specific objectives in thirty-one
categories, including oil, planning, international relations, agrarian
reform, business, industry, mining, fishing, transportation, communications,
fiscal matters, education, housing, health, social welfare, women's rights,
press freedom, popular participation, and public administration. Plan Inca
also speaks of a new constitution embodying these ideas that will correct
the deficiencies in the judicial and legislative branches. In commenting on
the latter, Plan Inca notes that "in one and a half centuries of republican
life the labors of the Legislative Power have been negative for the
nation...." The concluding section, on the armed forces, states that "they
will be the directors of the process of change until it has become
irreversible."

     Observers have noted that Plan Inca reads more like a list of goals
achieved by the time it was made public in 1974 than a plan written in the
days just prior to the 1968 coup. In particular, several sections in the
plan, such as women's rights, do not appear to have been an original concern
of the regime but only emerged as the reform process began. Despite the
questionable claim that it was drafted in its totality before October 1968,
Plan Inca stands as an important and impressive catalog of the goals of the
revolutionary government.

The Peruvian Military

     In assessing the military's motives in launching a reformist program it
is important to note that this phenomenon was not new. The 1962-63 military
interregnum had initiated some reforms (most notably in the areas of agrarian
reform and planning), and the generals were prepared to back the Belaunde
regime's reform program. In fact the failure of Belaunde to reach his
reformist goals and the perceived threat of latent insurgency were important
causes of the 1968 coup. Seen in this light the military's motives were
preventive-to remove the causes of potential subversion and guerrilla warfare
before more extreme elements could take advantage of them. A related
motivation is that in their antiguerrilla campaigns the military came to
know and deal with the "other Peru" of the Sierra Indian, so long looked down
on by traditional Peruvian politicians. Thus, the counter-insurgency campaign
raised the military's social, economic, and political consciousness.

     The motives of the revolutionary government can also be seen in terms of
the developmental "third mission" that various Latin American military
institutions began assuming in the 1960s (the first two missions were
conventional defense and counterinsurgency). The third mission concept
presented the military as one of the more efficient vehicles for change
and developmen