Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0266/02665.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 33KB | 528 lines

$Unique_ID{COW02665}
$Pretitle{281}
$Title{North Korea
Chapter 3C.   Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Stephan B. Wickman}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{production
management
government
agricultural
percent
cooperative
farms
land
work
chongbo}
$Date{1981}
$Log{}
Country:     North Korea
Book:        North Korea, A Country Study
Author:      Stephan B. Wickman
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1981

Chapter 3C.   Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery

     Despite agriculture's decreasing share of total economic output and
national income, it remained essential to the well-being of the economy for
several reasons. Well over 40 percent of the working population was still
engaged in agricultural work in the late 1970s, and the food processing,
construction, and other service industries still depended on agricultural
materials to supply their own production needs. Since self-reliance remained
an important pillar in Kim's ideology, self-sufficiency in food production was
one of the worthiest goals of the economy. Another aim of party policies-to
reduce the "gap" in living standards between the countryside and the
city-required continued investment in the agricultural sector. Finally, as in
most countries, changes in the supply or prices of foodstuffs were probably
the most conspicuous and sensitive economic concerns for the average citizen.
The stability of the country depended on steady, if not rapid, increases in
the availability of food items at reasonable prices.

     Kim's most far-reaching statement on agricultural policy has been his
1964 address, "Theses on the Socialist Agrarian Question in Our Country" (or
simply, the "Rural Theses"), which underscored the government's concern for
agricultural development. Kim's emphasis on technological and educational
progress in the countryside as well as collective forms of ownership and
management telescoped most of the government's efforts to encourage
agriculture in the 1960s and 1970s. The "Rural Theses" justified the energy
and capital spent on improving the technical inputs to agricultural
production. There were, of course, important organizational and managerial
reforms before and after Kim's "Rural Theses" address, and the government
continued to hold out the goal of transferring all assets in the countryside
to "all-people ownership." But efforts to turn cooperative farms into
state-run enterprises were almost nonexistent. The overwhelming thrust of
government policy was for technological change.

     The task of increasing production in the countryside beyond the simple
recovery from the Korean War was not easy, not the least because the country's
sparse agricultural resources put tight limits on the growth of production.
Neither the climate, terrain, nor the soil conditions were particularly
favorable to farming. Only 18 percent of the total landmass, or 2.2 million
hectares, was arable, the major portion of the country being rugged mountain
terrain. The weather varied markedly according to elevation, and lack of
precipitation along with infertile soil made land at elevations higher than
400 meters unsuitable for purposes other than grazing. Precipitation was
geographically and seasonally irregular, and in most parts of the country, as
much as half the annual rainfall occurred in the three summer months (see
Physical Environment, ch. 2). This pattern favored the cultivation of paddy
rice in warmer regions that were outfitted with irrigation and flood control
networks. Where these conditions were lacking, however, North Korean farmers
had to substitute other grains for the traditional favorite.

     As a result, farming was concentrated in the flatlands of the four west
coast provinces, where a longer growing season, level land, adequate rainfall,
and good, irrigated soil permitted the most intensive cultivation of crops. A
narrow strip of similarly fertile land ran through the eastern seaboard
provinces of North and South Hamgyong and Kangwon, but the interior provinces
of Chagang and Yanggang were too mountainous, cold, and dry to allow much
farming. The mountains, however, contained the bulk of North Korea's forest
reserves, while the foothills within and between the major agricultural
regions provided lands for livestock grazing and fruit tree cultivation.

Resource Development

     Recognizing that topography, climate, and soil conspired to block the
achievement of self-sufficiency in agriculture, North Korea invested in
several types of resource development programs. The major methods for what Kim
Il Sung called "nature remodelling" were irrigation, flood control, fertilizer
use, mechanization, electrification, and land reclamation. Uneven patterns of
investment in agriculture hindered the progress of some of these national
development efforts, but the country has improved many of its agricultural
resources.

     Although the thrust of the early development plans was to expand heavy
industry first, rural irrigation and electrification projects also received
substantial state investment. By 1961 the government claimed to have irrigated
800,000 chongbo of cultivated land, including all paddy rice fields. Foreign
observers discounted these claims, however, and one estimate suggested that
only 700,000 hectares were irrigated by 1973. With the continued investment in
irrigation projects during the Six-Year Plan, outside estimates rose to 1
million hectares of irrigated land by 1978. In that year the government
reported that the country had 1,500 reservoirs.

     Official statistics describing the progress of electrification have been
less controversial. The proportion of villages supplied with electricity
increased from 47 percent in 1953 to 92 percent of all villages by the end of
1961, and the whole process of extending electrical lines to the rural areas
was reportedly completed in 1970. Whether or not all farm households were
connected directly to power lines remained questionable, but there was little
doubt that consumption rose considerably. In 1976 Kim Il Sung boasted that the
rural areas utilized 1.6 million kilowatt-hours of electrical power, 83
percent more than in 1970.

     Complete statistics on the level of mechanization were not available in
1981, but the experience of tractor utilization implied that progress was not
as swift as had been planned. The goal of the First Seven-Year Plan,
70,000-80,000 tractors (counted in fifteen-horsepower units), was not
officially met until 1974, some three years behind an already delayed
schedule. In 1980 the average number of tractors per 100 chongbo of cultivated
land was seven on the plains and six in the intermediate and hilly areas. Both
these averages were lower than the goal of ten to twelve tractors per 100
chongbo, which Kim had foreseen by the beginning of the 1980s. Because of the
slow growth of tractor production, the target for the Second Seven-Year Plan
was still only ten tractors per 100 chongbo. Nonetheless, the government was
proud to announce that Farm-Machine Stations all over the countryside provided
"hundreds of, thousands of" tractors, trucks, and trailing farm machinery.

     The process of "chemicalization," North Korean terminology for the
increased utilization of chemical fertilizers, also faced difficulties. The
goal of the "Rural Theses"-to apply one-half ton of fertilizer to each chongbo
of cultivated land-was officially reached before 1970. The 1.5 million tons of
chemical fertilizers produced that year, however, was less than the target of
1.7 million tons. The government claimed that the average rate of chemical
fertilizer use was over one ton by the end of the Six-Year Plan and was 1.5
tons by 1979. In addition, chemical herbicides were in use in more than 97
percent of cultivated fields. Since official statistics were probably
calculated on the basis of gross weight rather than nutrient content,
comparisons with other countries were impossible. The government planned to
increase the amount of fertil