home
***
CD-ROM
|
disk
|
FTP
|
other
***
search
/
Countries of the World
/
COUNTRYS.BIN
/
dp
/
0262
/
02625.txt
< prev
next >
Wrap
Text File
|
1991-06-25
|
28KB
|
450 lines
$Unique_ID{COW02625}
$Pretitle{357}
$Title{Nigeria
Chapter 1F. The Gowon Regime}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Robert Rinehart}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{fmg
states
government
gowon
muhammed
nigeria
military
public
political
civilian}
$Date{1981}
$Log{}
Country: Nigeria
Book: Nigeria, A Country Study
Author: Robert Rinehart
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date: 1981
Chapter 1F. The Gowon Regime
In March 1967 the FMG issued a decree formally vesting all executive
and legislative power in the Supreme Military Council (SMC), whose chairman,
General Gowon, was head of state. In addition to the chairman the SMC
included top ranking staff officers, service and police heads, the state
military governors, and the civilian administrator of the East Central State.
Gowon also was head of government in his role as chairman of the Federal
Executive Council (FEC), the cabinet of ministers composed of military
officers and civilian technocrats. Under Gowon the FMG ruled by decree,
although the concurrence of state military governors was sought before decrees
were issued.
In October 1970 Gowon announced that the FMG intended to stay in power
until 1976, which was set as the target year for the completion of its
political program and the return to an elected civilian government. In setting
the target date Gowon outlined a nine-point program that the FMG felt must be
completed before it relinquished control. Included in the package were: (1)
reorganization of the armed forces; (2) implementation of a national economic
development plan and reconstruction of war damage; (3) eradication of
corruption; (4) settlement of the question of creating more new states; (5)
adoption of a new constitution; (6) introduction of a formula for allocating
revenue; (7) conducting a national census; (8) organization of genuinely
national political parties; and (9) installation of popularly elected
government at federal and state levels. Criticism of the six-year plan was
widespread, because some points were considered so broad that observers could
not imagine their being carried out even in a much longer period, and many
Nigerians concluded that military leaders would seek to retain power
indefinitely. The reaction of civilian politicians was particularly negative.
Muslim traditionalists also feared the effect of military rule, with its
modernizing tendencies, in eroding the social control they exercised in the
emirates.
Foreign Policy
The priorities in foreign policy established at independence remained in
effect under the FMG. These included active participation in the UN, advocacy
of pan-African solidarity through the Organization of African Unity (OAU),
regional cooperation, support for anticolonial and liberation
movements-particularly those in southern Africa, and nonalignment in the
East-West conflict. The role of Nigeria in world affairs, outside its African
concerns, was not, however, considered dynamic.
Nigeria had been admitted to the UN within a week of its having achieved
independence in 1960. It was represented on the committees of specialized
agencies and took its turn as a nonpermanent member of the Security Council.
One of Nigeria's earliest and most significant contributions to the UN was to
furnish troops for the peacekeeping operation in Congo (Leopoldville/Kinshasa,
later Zaire) in the early 1960s. By 1964 Nigerian army units formed the
backbone of the UN force, which had been under Ironsi's command.
The FMG was actively committed to eliminating white minority rule in
Africa and channeled financial and military aid to liberation movements
through the OAU. Despite its usually strong support for its activities,
however, the FMG resented OAU expressions of concern over the civil war as
interference in the country's internal affairs. An OAU statement in 1967
backing the FMG position on national unity assuaged Nigerian feelings to some
extent, but subsequent OAU efforts to bring about a cease-fire were rejected
by Lagos. When the war was concluded, Nigeria's participation in OAU
activities returned essentially to normal.
Some problems relating to border demarcations existed with neighboring
countries, but these did not constitute serious disputes and were resolved
to the mutual satisfaction of the parties involved. Relations were also
mended with African states that had recognized Biafra. Particularly close ties
were developed with the military regime in Ghana, which gave full support to
the FMG during the civil war. In 1975 the treaty was signed at Lagos creating
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to undertake the
reduction of trade barriers among countries in the region. Sponsored
personally by Gowon, the agreement was considered indicative of the FMG's
concern for improved interregional economic ties.
Another important element in its foreign relations was Nigeria's
association with the Commonwealth, of which it remained a member after
becoming a republic in 1963. The Commonwealth linked Nigeria in a special
relationship with leading developing countries outside Africa and complemented
regional ties to others that were also members of the OAU. Financial and
technical assistance was channeled to Nigeria through the Commonwealth from
Britain, Canada, and Australia, with whom Nigeria also enjoyed profitable
trade preferences. Relations with Britain, which supported the FMG during the
civil war, were cordial and cooperative, although the renewal of arms sales to
South Africa, permitted by the Conservative government in the early 1970s,
produced an adverse reaction from Nigeria. This temporary chilling in
relations between the two countries was sharpened by Nigeria's apprehension at
Britain's coincidental application for entry into the European Economic
Community (EEC).
The cornerstone of Nigerian foreign policy outside Africa was its strict
adherence to the principle of nonalignment. The great reliance placed by the
civilian government in its economic planning on Western aid-including
acceptance of US$225 million in assistance from the United States-tended to
belie this position, but other actions taken in the early 1960s gave every
indication that the country's leaders were determined to make political
decisions independent of foreign influence. In 1962, for example, Nigeria
abrogated the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact, which it had entered into at
independence, on grounds that it gave other African states the impression
that the country was cooperating with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO).
The nonalignment policy was continued by the FMG. The desirability of
keeping all foreign policy options open was confirmed by events during the
civil war. As if to demonstrate the value of independent action, aircraft
and heavy equipment was purchased from the Soviet Union when Britain and
the United States refused to make the type of aid available. No political
strings were attached to the deal, but the quick Soviet response brought a
warming of relations between the two countries. There was no evidence,
however, that through subsequent trade agreements and technical assistance
the Soviet Union had achieved any special influence with the FMG.
Nigeria's relations with the United States during the postindependence
period were good, resulting in large part from continuing United States
cooperation in the country's economic development plans. The United States
recognized the legitimacy of the FMG and refrained from any political or
military involvement during the civil war, but the use of chartered United
States cargo planes for relief flights to Biafra, as well as United States
economic ties with South Africa and its good relations with Portugal,
caused some friction on the official level and considerable criticism in
the Nigerian press.
Economic Development
The FMG inherited a six-year development plan inaugurated in 1962 by
the civilian government. The plan anticipated Nigeria's tra