Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0250/02500.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 29KB | 475 lines

$Unique_ID{COW02500}
$Pretitle{249}
$Title{Morocco
Chapter 5C.   The Military and the Economy}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Frederick Ehrenreich}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{military
far
officers
moroccan
army
king
general
service
sahara
staff}
$Date{1986}
$Log{}
Country:     Morocco
Book:        Morocco, a Country Study
Author:      Frederick Ehrenreich
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1986

Chapter 5C.   The Military and the Economy

     Defense costs, which have constituted a serious drain on the Moroccan
economy during the Western Sahara war, have been closely monitored by the
king. The military budget was prepared annually by the National Defense
Administration on the basis of the needs of the armed forces as interpreted by
the palace. The palace also coordinated discussions on the budget between the
National Defense Administration, the Ministry of Finance, elements of the
General Staff, and the commander of the Southern Zone, who was responsible for
nearly all of the FAR's fighting units. Since the reestablishment of
democratic institutions in 1977, adoption of the defense budget has been
subject to the approval of the parliament. In reality, however, the king has
been the key actor in formulating the defense budget by virtue of his de facto
control of the relevant institutions.

     In the period after Morocco's 1976 annexation of two-thirds of the
Western Sahara, defense spending and other costs associated with the war grew
astronomically. In 1975, according to figures supplied by the International
Monetary Fund, total spending classified as defense, which included all
security forces, was DH1.7 billion (for value of the dirham-see Glossary).
This accounted for 13.5 percent of total central government expenditures. By
1983 Moroccan government figures indicated that allocations in the current
budget earmarked for defense administration had grown to some DH4.24 billion,
which made up 21 percent of the current budget. Additionally, the capital
budget included DH2.77 billion-some 15 percent of the total-that was devoted
to the military. The DH7.01 billion in total military spending amounted to
some 18 percent of the government is capital and current budget and 7.4
percent of the estimated gross domestic product. In comparison, the Ministry
of National Education, which spent DH7.05 billion in 1983, was the only
government ministry that spent more than the National Defense Administration.
Central government expenditures on health, by contrast, amounted to DH1.2
million in 1983, only 2.7 percent of the total budget.

     Official figures on military spending, however, must be viewed with
caution. Estimates by local observers, which are generally given more credence
by analysts, put spending on the security forces at 35 percent to 40 percent
of the national budget during the early 1980s. Neither the official figures
nor the higher unofficial estimates include considerable expenditures for
arms financed by other states. Nor do they include investment in civilian
infrastructure projects in the Western Sahara, which themselves were estimated
to account for about 7 percent of central government spending.

     Defense costs weighed heavily on the Moroccan economy in the 1970s and
early 1980s. Hassan cited costs related to the war when in 1978 he put aside
Morocco's 1978-82 development plan in favor of a three-year austerity plan.
The military adversely affected the civilian economy mainly because scarce
foreign exchange was spent to purchase fuel, ammunition, and equipment abroad.
Despite significant foreign financial grants for military purchases-mainly
from Saudi Arabia and the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf-military
purchases contributed an unknown but significant amount to the country's
foreign debt. In the early 1980s defense costs appeared to level off after the
construction of the berm stabilized the front in the Western Sahara. The
prospects for a significant near-term decrease, however, appeared to be
slight. Although purchases of new military equipment declined between, 1982
and 1985, foreign exchange outlays to replace aging equipment and otherwise
supply an army that had ballooned to more than three times its prewar size
would likely remain high unless the government ordered large-scale
demobilizations, which could have dangerous security implications.

     Increased military spending had few demonstrably positive effects on the
economy. Because Morocco had no military-related industries, production was
not directly stimulated by government spending related to the war. The
increased size of the military, however did not constitute drain on the
labor force. To the contrary, it was asserted that any significant reduction
in the manned strength of the FAR would only exacerbate the country's acute
unemployment problem. The spending patterns of the 120,000 soldiers in the
Southern Zone were thought to be a major factor in stimulating development of
the Western Sahara economy, complementing other government investment in the
region.

     Before the Western Sahara war escalated in the mid-1970s, the costs of
defense had been eased somewhat by a coordinated policy to involve FAR units
in civic action projects. This policy began in the late 1960s at a time when
the king was appointing large numbers of FAR officers to civilian
administrativ positions. The program was launched in order to make the
military less of a burden on the economy, as well as to provide civilian job
skills to recruits. In addition, FAR units had been active in relief and
rescue work in times of natural disaster and in various aspects of public
works, such as roadbuilding, bridge construction, assistance on irrigation
projects, and similar activities. Later, after the attempted coups, the
program was intensified, presumably to divert unarmed units to isolated areas
and to discourage further plotting. As more and more units and military
resources were committed to the Western Sahara war, however, military
involvement in civilian projects practically ceased. In the mid-1980s it
appeared that FAR units might again be called upon to engage in civic action,
particularly construction in the Western Sahara.

Sources and Quality of Manpower

     Whether the FAR should be a professional force based solely on volunteers
or an institution dependent at least in part on a selective service system has
historically been a matter of great political concern. At issue in this
question have been two opposing viewpoints. On the one hand the king has been
determined to maintain personal control of a loyal armed force, and it is
generally believed that volunteer forces would be more likely to be
unswervingly dedicated to the monarchy. On the other hand the civilian
political parties and activists have favored obligatory military service,
which, they felt, would not only result in a truly national army but would
also afford their adherents access to influential ranks within the FAR. In the
early 1980s the struggle appeared to have been resolved: conscription was
enforced, the king maintained unquestioned control of the military, and the
politicians were apparently irrelevant in military affairs.

     At independence in March 1956 Hassan, backed by the newly created General
Staff, had decided that the army would be professional rather than
conscripted, a move recommended to and accepted by his father, Mohammed V.
Maintaining such a volunteer force at necessary manpower levels proved not to
be difficult. In a country beset with a high rate of unemployment, military
service offered considerable security; moreover the high prestige of a
military uniform was an attraction of some value in a society proud of its
long-standing fighting tradition. In the 1960s, during the few enlistment
periods that occurred to increase the size of the army, the commanding
officers of the military units operated their own recruiting services, a
system borrowed from the French. Under this system renewable enlistments of
five years' du