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$Unique_ID{COW02163}
$Pretitle{224}
$Title{Lebanon
Chapter 5C. The 1982 Israeli Invation and its Aftermath}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Robert Scott Mason}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{beirut
lebanese
syrian
israeli
idf
lebanon
army
states
united
forces}
$Date{1987}
$Log{Figure 10.*0216301.scf
}
Country: Lebanon
Book: Lebanon, A Country Study
Author: Robert Scott Mason
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date: 1987
Chapter 5C. The 1982 Israeli Invation and its Aftermath
[See Figure 10.: Lebanon on the Eve of the 1982 Israeli Invasion.]
Operation Peace for Galilee
Because of the limits imposed by the Israeli cabinet, the IDF implemented
its attack in increments, neither openly recognizing nor acknowledging its
destination and objectives. Had it been ordered from the outset to secure
Beirut, it could have done so in an effective and efficient manner. Instead,
the IDF advance unfolded in an ad hoc and disorganized fashion, greatly
increasing the difficulty of the operation.
When IDF ground forces crossed into Lebanon on June 6, they pursued a
battle strategy that entailed a three-pronged attack conducted by five
divisions and two reinforced brigade-size units. On the western axis, two
divisions converged on Tyre and proceeded north along the coastal road toward
Sidon, where they were to link up with an amphibious commando unit that had
secured a beachhead north of the city. In the central sector, a third division
veered diagonally across southern Lebanon, conquered the Palestinian-held
Beaufort Castle, located a few kilometers southwest of Marj Uyun, and headed
west toward Sidon, where it linked up with the coastal force in a classic
pincer movement. The IDF advanced rapidly in the first day of the war,
bypassing and enveloping pockets of PLO resistance. Most PLO military officers
fled, abandoning their men, who split into small roving guerrilla bands.
Moreover, it became clear that the PLO was fighting alone against the Israeli
onslaught. The Shia Amal guerrillas had been ordered by their leaders not to
fight and to surrender their weapons if necessary. Southern Lebanon's Shias
had long suffered under Palestinian domination, and Shia villagers welcomed
the advancing Israelis by showering them with rice and flowers. This
traditional form of homage, later repeated by the Druze and Christian
populations, lent credence to the Israeli claim that it was "liberating"
Lebanon.
But Palestinian resistance proved tenacious, particularly in the
sprawling refugee camps in the vicinity of Tyre and Sidon (see fig. 4).
Staging hit-and-run operations and fighting in house-to-house and hand-
to-hand combat, the Palestinians inflicted a high number of casualties on the
IDF and impeded the progress of the Israeli advance. The IDF was further
hampered because the refugee camps were inhabited by large numbers of civilian
noncombatants who harbored the Palestinian fighters. Although the IDF made
significant initial efforts to evacuate the civilians, it ultimately resorted
to saturation bombing to subdue the camps. Palestinian resistance was
especially fierce in the Ayn al Hulwah camp near Sidon, where several hundred
Palestinian fighters fought to the last man, delaying the IDF advance for
seven days. After the camp was leveled, the IDF stood poised to move against
Beirut.
Two days later in eastern Lebanon, two divisions thrust directly north on
parallel courses into Syrian-held territory with the mission of severing the
strategic Beirut-Damascus highway. On June 8, the IDF evicted the Syrian Army
from Jazzin and proceeded north. A brigade of Syrian commandos, however,
ambushed the Israeli column in the mountainous terrain near Ayn Zhalta,
approximately five kilometers short of the highway.
The IDF could not proceed further against the entrenched Syrian positions
without close air support, but Syria's air defense systems threatened Israeli
control of the skies. On June 9, the Israeli cabinet gave permission for an
air raid against the Syrian antiaircraft missile batteries in the Biqa Valley.
The Syrians, caught by surprise, sustained severe losses; of the nineteen
missile batteries, only two were left intact by the Israeli attack. The Syrian
Air Force made a desperate bid to protect the air defense system by sending up
scores of interceptors and fighters, resulting in what both sides described as
the biggest air battle in history, with over 200 aircraft engaged in
supersonic dogfights over a 2,500 square kilometer area. The Israeli Air Force
shot down twenty-nine Syrian aircraft that day (and later about fifty more)
without a single loss. The devastation of the Syrian air defense system and
the decimation of the Syrian Air Force provided the IDF with total air
superiority in Lebanon and left the Syrian infantry exposed to air attack.
For three more days, the IDF mauled Syria's First Armored Division. The
IDF was still stalled short of the Beirut-Damascus highway, but it was on the
verge of breaking through the last line of Syria's defense. Bowing to
political pressures, however, on June 11 Israel and Syria agreed to a truce
under United States auspices.
The Siege of Beirut
The cease-fire signaled the start of a new stage in the war, as Israel
focused on PLO forces trapped in Beirut. Although Israel had long adhered to
the axiom that conquering and occupying an Arab capital would be a political
and military disaster, key Israeli leaders were determined to drive the PLO
out of Beirut. According to the original plan, the Phalangists were to move
into West Beirut under the covering fire of Israeli artillery and reunite the
divided capital. Bashir Jumayyil concluded, however, that such overt collusion
with the IDF would prejudice his chance to become president, and he reneged on
the promises he had made.
Israel maintained the siege of Beirut for seventy days, unleashing a
relentless barrage of air, naval, and artillery bombardment. At times, the
Israeli bombardment appeared to be random and indiscriminate; at other times,
it was targeted with pinpoint precision. Israeli strategists believed that if
they could "decapitate" the Palestinian movement by killing its leaders,
Palestinian resistance would disappear. Therefore, the Israeli Air Force
conducted what has been called a "manhunt by air" for Arafat and his top
lieutenants and on several occasions bombed premises only minutes after the
PLO leadership had vacated them.
If the PLO was hurt physically by the bombardment, the political fallout
was just as damaging to Israel. The appalling civilian casualties earned
Israel world opprobrium. Morale plummeted among IDF officers and enlisted men,
many of whom personally opposed the war. Meanwhile, the highly publicized
plight of the Palestinian civilians garnered world attention for the
Palestinian cause. Furthermore, Arafat was negotiating, albeit through
intermediaries, with Ambassador Habib and other United States officials.
Negotiating with Arafat was thought by some to be tantamount to United States
recognition of the PLO.
Arafat had threatened to turn Beirut into a "second Stalingrad," to fight
the IDF to the last man. His negotiating stance grew tenuous, however, after
Lebanese leaders, who had previously expressed solidarity with the PLO,
petitioned him to abandon Beirut to spare the civilian population further
suffering. Arafat informed Habib of his agreement in principle to withdraw the
PLO from Beirut on condition that a multinational peacekeeping force be
deployed to protect the Palestinian families left behind. With the diplomatic
deadlock broken, Habib made a second breakthrough when Syria and Tunisia
agreed to host departing PLO fighters. An advance unit of the Multinational
Force (MNF), 350 French troops, arrived in Beirut on August 21. The
Palestinian evacuation by sea to Cyprus and by land to Damascus commenced on
the same day. On August 26, the remaining MNF troops arrived in Beirut,
including a continge