Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0216/02160.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 21KB | 359 lines

$Unique_ID{COW02160}
$Pretitle{224}
$Title{Lebanon
Chapter 4C.   Foreign Relations}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{As'ad AbuKhalil}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{lebanon
lebanese
syria
palestinian
war
syrian
states
israel
united
ch}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Country:     Lebanon
Book:        Lebanon, A Country Study
Author:      As'ad AbuKhalil
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1987

Chapter 4C.   Foreign Relations

     For Lebanon's first three decades or so of independence, the outstanding
feature of its foreign policy was its amicable relations with numerous
countries. In the early 1970s, about eighty diplomatic representatives were
accredited to Beirut. Not surprisingly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
one of the largest and most important ministries in the Council of Ministers.

     Before the 1975 Civil War, foreign relations were based to a large extent
on the National Pact. Under this covenant, Lebanon had to walk a thin line
between the desires of the Christian communities to associate more closely
with the West and the wishes of the Muslim communities to underscore Lebanon's
Arab identity. Indeed, when major crises struck, as they did in 1958 and in
the late 1960s, they were primarily generated by these sensitive foreign
policy issues. Try though Lebanon did to walk this line, its geographic
location near the center of the Arab-Israeli dispute has prevented it from
striking what, for a pluralistic society, was a very difficult balance.

     During the 1975 Civil War and afterward, the central government was only
one of many domestic actors involved in the making of foreign policy. It
shared this role with the various alliances and militias that were formed. In
the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, as central authority deterioriated,
external actors, including Syria, Israel, Iran, and the Palestinians, also
seized foreign-policy-making roles, although the first two were by far the
most influential.

Syria

     Historically under a variety of rulers, Syria and Lebanon (as well as
some other countries) were considered one territory--Greater Syria. It was
only in 1920, while under the French mandate, that Greater Lebanon, which
approximates the modern state, was separated from the larger entity. As a
consequence, Lebanon and Syria traditionally have had strong bonds. Following
World War II, after both had become independent, they shared a common currency
and customs union and discussed economic union. In fact, the two had always
been active trading partners, and when political disputes arose, each country
often used economic means to pressure the other.

     On a political level, the more powerful Syrian state has sometimes been
viewed with suspicion in Lebanon. But because of intrasectarian feuds, no
generalizations can be made in this regard; at one time or another, Syria has
developed or dissolved friendships with a number of factions, Christian as
well as Muslim.

     In the 1950s and 1960s, Syria was wrestling with its own internal
problems and was unable to focus on Lebanon's domestic ills. Even so, some
sources have ascribed to Syria a prominent role in aggravating the 1958
disturbances, claiming that it worked to unseat the Shamun regime. Then, in
the late 1960s the rise of Palestinian guerrilla activity in southern Lebanon
contributed to tense relations with Syria. Although the Syrian government was
reluctant to permit guerrilla attacks to originate from Syrian soil (for fear
of Israeli reprisals), it was much less reticent to see such activity occur in
southern Lebanon. Thus, in 1973, when the Lebanese Army finally engaged in
fighting against Palestinian guerrillas, Syria closed its borders in protest.

     Since the start of the 1975 Civil War, Syrian involvement in Lebanon has
been substantial, if inconsistent. On the one hand, the regime of President
Hafiz al Assad has opposed the permanent fragmentation of Lebanon, fearing
that the creation of a Maronite ministate would amount to the establishment of
"another Israel." On the other hand, Syria has resisted the notion of the
formation of a radical, left-wing state on its western border. Furthermore,
after having to deal with its own Muslim fundamentalist rebellion in the late
1970s and early 1980s, Syria was concerned that a radical Islamic state in
Lebanon would have negative domestic implications.

     In the early stages of the Civil War, Syria acted as mediator, arranging
several cease-fires. In February 1976 Syria helped formulate a political
reform package, known as the Constitutional Document, that granted more power
to Muslims; this compromise, however, was never implemented. When diplomacy
failed, Syria intervened militarily (see Syrian Intervention, ch. 5). In March
1976, as the battle was going badly for the largely Christian Lebanese Front,
Syria moved to prevent its total collapse, using Palestinian units under its
control. In May Syria was instrumental in having Ilyas Sarkis, a pro-Syrian
technocrat, elected president. By January 1977 about 27,000 Syrian troops were
in Lebanon, technically as the largest part of the Arab Deterrent Force, set
up by the League of Arab States (Arab League) in October 1976 (see The Riyadh
Conference and the Arab Deterrent Force, ch. 5).

     As the conflict wore on, the situation changed dramatically for Syria. In
1978 Bashir Jumayyil began his drive to incorporate all Christian militias
under his LF (see Political Parties and Groupings, this ch.; The Ascendancy of
Bashir Jumayyil, ch. 5). He provoked Syria's animosity by decimating in June
1978 the Marada Brigade, the pro-Syrian Franjiyah militia, and by his
increasingly close ties to Israel. In response, Syria began to attack
vigorously its erstwhile allies, the Christian forces, in effect making a
complete about-face.

     In the 1980s, Syria was the dominant external actor in Lebanon. It
physically controlled much of the country, over which it imposed its will. At
times, Syrian inaction, such as allowing one faction to war on another, had
just as much impact as its active measures. Nonetheless, Syrian influence has
had its limits. Its ability to impose stability--if, indeed, that was Assad's
intention--has been frustrated by the multiplicity of factions, each with a
different agenda. These limitations were visible during the 1982 invasion when
Syria--alone among the Arab nations-- opposed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
on Lebanese soil. Although it acquitted itself well, the Syrian Army was
unable to halt the IDF advance or to prevent its own ejection from Beirut.
Later, the insertion of the Multinational Force (MNF) also reduced Syrian
influence for a time. In 1983, when Israel pressured the government of Amin
Jumayyil to sign an accord, called the May 17 Agreement, that normalized
relations between the two countries, Syria vehemently objected. It sponsored
the formation of the National Salvation Front, a coalition of pro-Syrian
groups, both Christian and Muslim, to oppose the agreement. The Syrian effort
eventually succeeded, and on March 6, 1985, Jumayyil abrogated the May 17
Agreement and Israel finally withdrew some of its forces from parts of Lebanon
(see The May 17 Agreement, ch. 5).

     There were additional examples of the strengths and limitations of Syrian
influence in Lebanon. Syria brokered the Tripartite Accord, signed in late
1985 by the leaders of the main armed factions--Nabih Birri of Amal, Walid
Jumblatt of the PSP, and Elie Hubayka of the LF. The accord's aim was to
impose peace and to restructure the Lebanese Army (see Chaos in Beirut and
Syrian Peacemaking Efforts, ch. 5). But when Jumayyil and anti-Syrian elements
in the LF rebelled, the accord collapsed.

     As of late 1987, Syrian troops were back in Beirut trying to keep peace,
and Syrian influence was again significant. Even so, a true Syrian- imposed
stabilty had not been achieved.

Israel

     Although Lebanon joined with other Arab nations in the armed resistance
against the creation of Israel in 1948, be