Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0215/02159.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 39KB | 640 lines

$Unique_ID{COW02159}
$Pretitle{224}
$Title{Lebanon
Chapter 4B.   Political Parties and Groupings}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{As'ad AbuKhalil}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{party
lebanese
lebanon
parties
political
movement
amal
organization
jumayyil
phalange}
$Date{1987}
$Log{Figure 8.*0215901.scf
}
Country:     Lebanon
Book:        Lebanon, A Country Study
Author:      As'ad AbuKhalil
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1987

Chapter 4B.   Political Parties and Groupings

[See Figure 8.: The Cantons of Lebanon, 1986.]

     Historically, political parties in Lebanon have lacked traits common to
parties in most Western democracies. Lebanese parties often have had no
ideology, have devised no programs, and have made little effort at
transcending sectarian support. In fact, despite their claims, most parties
have been thinly disguised political machines for a particular confession or,
more often, a specific zaim. Although nondescript, broad titles have been
applied, such as National Bloc Party or Progressive Socialist Party, with the
exception of a handful of left-wing movements, most parties have been the
organizational personification of a few powerful politicians. Even Kamal
Jumblatt (also seen as Junblatt), the most ideologically oriented of the
zuama, derived his constituents' support principally because he was a Druze
leader, not because of his political beliefs. For this reason, any one party
could count on only a few votes in the Chamber of Deputies. This situation
brought about a continuous stream of coalitions, each often created to
represent a point of view on a particular issue. In this system, leaders could
not even rely on the support of their coreligionists; in fact, some of the
most severe acrimony has been intrasectarian. Nonetheless, in the face of
challenges to fundamental issues--such as the six-to-five formula or the
pan-Arab question--the various confessionally based parties generally closed
ranks.

     Before and during the 1975 Civil War, other political groupings were
formed (see Appendix B). Although ideology played some role in their
formation, for the most part these alliances--the Lebanese National Movement
and the Lebanese Front--tended to be temporary associations of politically
motivated militias under the leadership of powerful zuama, and divisions
generally followed sectarian lines. So ephemeral were these associations,
however, that after the heaviest fighting of the mid- and late 1970s ceased,
several of the groups in these coalitions turned their guns on each other (see
The Interwar Years, ch. 5).

     Nonetheless, ideology, rather than the power and charisma of a zaim, has
been the basis for the formation of a small number of political parties. These
multisectarian groups have espoused causes ranging from Marxism to
pan-Arabism. To a limited extent, several of these essentially leftist parties
also participated in the fighting of the 1970s.

     By 1987 political parties, in the sense of constitutionally legitimate
groups seeking office, had almost become an anachronism. By virtue of armed
strength, the various militias, surrogate armies, and foreign defense forces
that controlled the nation had divided Lebanon into several semiautonomous
"cantons," each having its own political, social, and economic structure (see
fig. 8).

Sectarian Groups

Phalange Party

     Formed in 1936 as a Maronite paramilitary youth organization by Pierre
Jumayyil (who modeled it on the fascist organizations he had observed while in
Berlin as an Olympic athlete), the Phalange, or Phalanxes (Kataib in Arabic),
was authoritarian and very centralized, and its leader was all powerful. It
quickly grew into a major political force in Mount Lebanon. After at first
allying itself with the French Mandate authorities, the Phalange sided with
those calling for independence; as a result, the party was dissolved in 1942
by the French high commissioner (it was restored after the French left
Lebanon). Despite this early dispute, over the years the Phalange has been
closely associated with France in particular and the West in general. In fact,
for many years the party newspaper, Al Amal, was printed in Arabic and French.

     Consistent with its authoritarian beginnings, Phalangist ideology has
been on the right of the political spectrum. Although it has embraced the need
to "modernize," it has always favored the preservation of the sectarian status
quo. The Phalange Party motto is "God, the Fatherland, and the Family," and
its doctrine emphasizes a free economy and private initiative. Phalangist
ideology focuses on the primacy of preserving the Lebanese nation, but with a
"Phoenician" identity, distinct from its Arab, Muslim neighbors. Party
policies have been uniformly anticommunist and anti-Palestinian and have
allowed no place for pan-Arab ideals.

     Unlike many zuama who achieved their status by virtue of inheriting
wealth, Jumayyil ascended because of his ability to instill discipline in his
organization and, by the mid-1950s, through the accumulation of military
might. By the outbreak of the 1958 Civil War, the Phalange Party was able to
further its growing power by means of its militia. In that year, when
President Shamun was unable to convince the army commander, Fuad Shihab, to
use the armed forces against Muslim demonstrators, the Phalange militia came
to his aid (see The 1958 Civil War, ch. 5). Encouraged by its efforts during
this conflict, later that year, principally through violence and the success
of general strikes in Beirut, the Phalange achieved what journalists dubbed
the "counterrevolution." By their actions the Phalangists brought down the
government of Prime Minister Karami and secured for their leader, Jumayyil, a
position in the four-man cabinet that was subsequently formed.

     The 1958 Civil War was a turning point for the Phalange Party. Whereas in
1936, the year of its formation, it had a following of around 300, by 1958 its
membership had swelled to almost 40,000. Meanwhile, the French newspaper
L'Orient estimated that the Phalange Party's nearest rival, the Syrian
Socialist Nationalist Party, had a membership of only 25,000 (see
Multisectarian Parties, this ch.). In addition, although until 1958 it had
been able to elect only 31 percent of its candidates to the Chamber of
Deputies, from 1959 through 1968 the Phalange placed 61 percent of its
candidates in office. Moreover, by the start of the disturbances in 1975, the
party's rolls may have included as many as 65,000 members, including a militia
approaching 10,000 men.

     Throughout the 1975 Civil War, the Phalange Party was the most formidable
force within the Christian camp, and its militia shouldered the brunt of the
fighting. As part of the Lebanese Front, the mostly Christian, rightist
coalition, the power of the Jumayyil family increased considerably (see
Appendix B). Ironically, as Pierre Jumayyil's son, Bashir, ascended as a
national figure, the role of the Phalange Party diminished (see The Ascendancy
of Bashir Jumayyil, ch. 5). This was true primarily because the relevance of
political entities declined as the importance of armed power grew. Through a
series of violent intrasectarian battles, Bashir seized control of the
Lebanese Forces (not to be confused with the Lebanese Front), a conglomeration
of the Phalange Party's military wing and some other Christian militias.

     During the 1980s, the Phalange lost much of its credibility and political
stature. In 1982, under pressure from Israel, which occupied a good deal of
Lebanon, Bashir was elected president. Later that year, before talking office,
Bashir was assassinated. Subsequently, his brother Amin was elected president,
again not so much for his Phalange Party connection as because of his support
from Israel. With the death of Pierre Jumayyil in 1984, the role of the party
declined further. When the deputy leader of the party, Elie Karamah, a Greek
Catholic, was named as its new head, many Maronite members b