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$Unique_ID{COW02151}
$Pretitle{224}
$Title{Lebanon
Chapter 2B. Sectarianism}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{As'ad AbuKhalil}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{lebanon
lebanese
religious
church
political
sects
community
muslim
orthodox
sect}
$Date{1987}
$Log{Figure 5.*0215101.scf
}
Country: Lebanon
Book: Lebanon, A Country Study
Author: As'ad AbuKhalil
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date: 1987
Chapter 2B. Sectarianism
In 1987 the dominant culture among the various communities was an Arab
culture influenced by Western themes. Lebanon's shared language, heritage,
history, and religion with its Arab neighbors, however, tended to minimize the
distinctiveness of the Lebanese culture. Ethnically, most Lebanese are Arabs,
many of whom can trace their lineage to ancient tribes in Arabia. This ethnic
majority constitutes more than 90 percent of the population. Muslim and
Christian Lebanese speak Arabic, and many of their families have lived in what
is now Lebanon for centuries. Moreover, the difference in dialects in Lebanon
is a function of geographical location and not of confessional affiliation.
Minority non-Arab ethnic groups include Armenians, Kurds, and Jews, although
some members of these groups have come to speak the language and identify with
the culture of the majority.
Despite the commonalities in Lebanese society, sectarianism (or
confessionalism--see Glossary) is the dominant social, economic, and political
reality. Divisiveness has come to define that which is Lebanon. Sects should
not be viewed as monolithic blocs, however, since strife within confessional
groups is as common as conflict with other sects. Even so, the paramount
schismatic tendency in modern Lebanon is that between Christian and Muslim.
Sectarianism is not a new issue in Lebanon. The disintegrative factors in
society preceded the creation of modern Lebanon in 1920. Before that date,
historical Lebanon, or Mount Lebanon, was shared primarily between the Druzes
and the Maronites. The two communities, distinguished by discrete religious
beliefs and separate cultural outlooks, did not coexist in peace and harmony.
Rather, the Druzes and Maronites often engaged in fierce battles over issues
ranging from landownership, distribution of political power, foreign
allegiances, and petty family feuds. At least twice in the last two centuries,
the conflicts between the two confessional communities developed into
full-scale civil wars, which were only ended by the intervention of foreign
powers. The Lebanese sectarian problem became more acute in 1920, when the
French authorities annexed territories to Mount Lebanon to form Greater
Lebanon. Although the new state comprised diverse confessional communities, a
political system favoring the majority Christians was established by the
French (see The Mandate Period, ch. 1).
Lebanese Confessional "Societies"
The Lebanese confessional "societies" reflect the tensions at the heart
of Lebanese society. Although Muslims and Christians have lived together in
Lebanon for centuries, their deep disagreements over the Lebanese political
formula and state make it unrealistic to treat all Lebanese as members of one
social unit.
Since the creation of the republic, the Lebanese have disagreed over the
identity of the new state. Although Muslims, specifically the Sunnis, were
inclined toward a close association with Greater Syria and the Arab world,
Christians, particularly the Maronites, opted for linking Lebanon culturally
and politically to the Western world. Christians were not opposed to economic
cooperation with Arab countries, to which Lebanon exported most of its
products, but they insisted on distinguishing Lebanon's foreign policy from
that of its Arab neighbors. The question was not whether Lebanon should be
Arab, since as early as 1943 the National Pact (the governing formula)
declared Lebanon as having "an Arab face." Rather, the postindependence debate
was really over how Arab Lebanon should be. This debate was exacerbated in the
1950s by Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser's pan-Arab activism on the one
hand and Lebanese president Camille Shamun's (also seen as Chamoun)
pro-Western administration on the other hand.
The controversy over the identity of Lebanon extended beyond the
political realm to encompass questions of culture and literature as these were
presented in school textbooks. Muslims in general, as well as the Greek
Orthodox, insisted that Arab and Islamic culture and literature should be
emphasized, whereas Uniate Christians (those in full communion with the Holy
See in Rome but separately organized and adhering to an Eastern Rite) refused
to commit Lebanese education to what they considered an inferior culture. The
Maronite political movement viewed Lebanon's culture as distinctively Lebanese
in its origins and values.
Regardless of sectarian affiliation, Lebanon has no civil code for
personal matters. Lebanese citizens therefore live and die according to
sectarian stipulations. Each sect has its own set of personal status laws that
encompass such matters as engagement, marriage, dowry, annulment of marriage,
divorce, adoption, and inheritance. These laws are binding on the individual,
whether the individual is a practicing member of the sect or not. The
confessional system of personal status laws strengthens the role of communal
religious leaders and impedes the evolution of Lebanese nationalist or
universalist secular ideas.
The economic history of Lebanon has been marred by an unequal
distribution of national income and misallocation of benefits and funds. The
central government tended to regard the regions that were annexed to what was
Mount Lebanon in 1920 as marginal parts of Lebanon. Furthermore, the
centralization of government in Beirut worsened the conditions of the rural
areas, luring many Lebanese to crowded, confessional-community, poverty belts
around the metropolitan center. The central government's neglect of southern
Lebanon, particularly, contributed to a feeling of humiliation by the Shias,
who in 1987 constituted the largest sectarian community.
The economic situation in peripheral Lebanon, which geographically
comprises Al Janub Province, Al Biqa Province, and the Akkar region in Ash
Shamal Province, differed sharply from that around Beirut. Economic
exploitation was more evident in these areas, where feudalistic production
patterns dominated. The land was divided among a small elite, and working
conditions on the large estates were harsh. In addition, state services were
scarce outside the capital. Beirut and its suburbs became politically and
socially explosive when people from the impoverished periphery migrated to the
city and came in contact with the affluent city dwellers.
Sectarian and Clan Consciousness
Lebanon's somewhat peculiar political system has reinforced sectarian
identification and consciousness. The tendency of the individual to identify
with his or her sect as the major political unit has characterized the
sectarian composition of political parties (see Sectarian Groups, ch. 4). That
most militias in the 1980s were organized along purely sectarian lines, or
that the army's brigades were also divided among the sects, indicated the
primacy of sectarian consciousness (see The Army, ch. 5).
In the late 1980s, there were other associational affiliations in
Lebanon. Shia families in the Biqa Valley were organized into clans (ashair)
that have existed for centuries. The politics of the region entailed typical
clan feuds, alliances, and themes of revenge, which local politicians
exploited. The rise in sectarian consciousness among Lebanese generally did
not necessarily conflict with clan solidarity.
Another pervasive primordial tie that characterized the Lebanese was
their fealty to a group of traditional leaders (zuama; sing., zaim--see
Glossary). The system of fealty involves utmost allegiance and loyalty
(including support in