Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0214/02149.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 24KB | 389 lines

$Unique_ID{COW02149}
$Pretitle{224}
$Title{Lebanon
Chapter 1C.   The 1970s and 1980s}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Afaf Sabeh McGowan}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{lebanese
lebanon
syria
army
beirut
war
national
sarkis
christian
government}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Country:     Lebanon
Book:        Lebanon, A Country Study
Author:      Afaf Sabeh McGowan
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1987

Chapter 1C.   The 1970s and 1980s

The Franjiyah Era, 1970-76

     By the summer of 1970, attention turned to the upcoming presidential
election of August 17. Sulayman Franjiyah (also seen as Franjieh), who had the
backing of the National Bloc Party and the center bloc in the Chamber of
Deputies, was elected president by one vote over Ilyas Sarkis, head of the
Central Bank, who had the support of the Shihabists (those favoring a strong
executive with ties to the military). Franjiyah was more conservative than his
predecessor, Hilu. A Maronite leader from northern Lebanon, he had a regional
power base resulting from clan allegiance and a private militia. Although
Franjiyah had a parochial outlook reflecting a lack of national and
international experience, he was the choice of such persons as Kamal Jumblatt,
who wanted a weaker president than Sarkis would have been. Franjiyah assumed
office on September 23, 1970, and in the first few months of his term the
general political atmosphere improved.

     The expulsion of large numbers of Palestinian guerrillas from Jordan in
late 1970 and 1971, as a result of severe clashes between the Jordanian army
and the PLO, had serious repercussions for Lebanon, however. Many of the
guerrillas entered Lebanon, seeing it as the most suitable base for launching
raids against Israel. The guerrillas tended to ally themselves with existing
leftist Lebanese organizations or to form various new leftist groups that
received support from the Lebanese Muslim community and caused further
splintering in the Lebanese body politic. Clashes between the Palestinians and
Lebanese right-wing groups, as well as demonstrations on behalf of the
guerrillas, occurred during the latter half of 1971. PLO head Arafat held
discussions with leading Lebanese government figures, who sought to establish
acceptable limits of guerrilla activity in Lebanon under the 1969 Cairo
Agreement.

     The Chamber of Deputies elections in April 1972 also were accompanied by
violence. The high rate of inflation and unemployment, as well as guerrilla
actions and retaliations, occasioned demonstrations, and the government
declared martial law in some areas. The government attempted to quiet the
unrest by taking legal action against the protesters, by initiating new social
and economic programs, and by negotiating with the guerrilla groups. However,
the pattern of guerrilla infiltration followed by Israeli counterattacks
continued throughout the Franjiyah era. Israel retaliated for any incursion by
guerrillas into Israeli territory and for any action anywhere against Israeli
nationals. An Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon, for example, was made
in retaliation for the massacre of Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich in
September 1972. Of particular significance was an Israeli commando raid on
Beirut on April 10, 1973, in which three leaders of the Palestinian Resistance
Movement were assassinated. The army's inaction brought the immediate
resignation of Prime Minister Saib Salam, a Sunni Muslim leader from Beirut.

     In May armed clashes between the army and the guerrillas in Beirut spread
to other parts of the country, resulting in the arrival of guerrilla
reinforcements from Syria, the declaration of martial law, and a new secret
agreement limiting guerrilla activity.

     The October 1973 War overshadowed disagreements about the role of the
guerrillas in Lebanon. Despite Lebanon's policy of noninvolvement, the war
deeply affected the country's subsequent history. As the PLO's military
influence in the south grew, so too did the disaffection of the Shia community
that lived there, which was exposed to varying degrees of unsympathetic
Lebanese control, indifferent or antipathetic PLO attitudes, and hostile
Israeli actions. The Franjiyah government proved less and less able to deal
with these rising tensions, and by the onset of the Civil War in April 1975,
political fragmentation was accelerating.

The Civil War, 1975-76

     The spark that ignited the war occurred in Beirut on April 13, 1975, when
gunmen killed four Phalangists during an attempt on Pierre Jumayyil's life.
Perhaps believing the assassins to have been Palestinian, the Phalangists
retaliated later that day by attacking a bus carrying Palestinian passengers
across a Christian neighborhood, killing about twenty-six of the occupants.
The next day fighting erupted in earnest, with Phalangists pitted against
Palestinian militiamen (thought by some observers to be from the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine). The confessional layout of Beirut's various
quarters facilitated random killing. Most Beirutis stayed inside their homes
during these early days of battle, and few imagined that the street fighting
they were witnessing was the beginning of a war that was to devastate their
city and divide the country.

     Despite the urgent need to control the fighting, the political machinery
of the government became paralyzed over the next few months. The inadequacies
of the political system, which the 1943 National Pact had only papered over
temporarily, reappeared more clearly than ever. For many observers, at the
bottom of the conflict was the issue of confessionalism (see Glossary) out of
balance--of a minority, specifically the Maronites, refusing to share power
and economic opportunity with the Muslim majority.

     The government could not act effectively because leaders were unable to
agree on whether or not to use the army to stop the bloodletting. When
Jumblatt and his leftist supporters tried to isolate the Phalangists
politically, other Christian sects rallied to Jumayyil's camp, creating a
further rift. Consequently, in May Prime Minister Rashid as Sulh and his
cabinet resigned, and a new government was formed under Rashid Karami.
Although there were many calls for his resignation, President Franjiyah
steadfastly retained his office.

     As various other groups took sides, the fighting spread to other areas of
the country, forcing residents in towns with mixed sectarian populations to
seek safety in regions where their sect was dominant. Even so, the militias
became embroiled in a pattern of attack followed by retaliation, including
acts against uninvolved civilians.

     Although the two warring factions were often characterized as Christian
versus Muslim, their individual composition was far more complex. Those in
favor of maintaining the status quo came to be known as the Lebanese Front.
The groups included primarily the Maronite militias of the Jumayyil, Shamun,
and Franjiyah clans, often led by the sons of zuama. Also in this camp were
various militias of Maronite religious orders. The side seeking change,
usually referred to as the Lebanese National Movement, was far less cohesive
and organized. For the most part it was led by Kamal Jumblatt and included a
variety of militias from leftist organizations and guerrillas from
rejectionist Palestinian (non-mainstream PLO) organizations (see Appendix B).

     By the end of 1975, no side held a decisive military advantage, but it
was generally acknowledged that the Lebanese Front had done less well than
expected against the disorganized Lebanese National Movement. The political
hierarchy, composed of the old zuama and politicians, still was incapable of
maintaining peace, except for occasional, short-lived cease-fires. Reform was
discussed, but little headway was made toward any significant improvements.
Syria, which was deeply concerned about the flow of events in Lebanon, also
proved powerless to enforce calm through diplomatic means. And, most ominous