Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0204/02042.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 34KB | 538 lines

$Unique_ID{COW02042}
$Pretitle{234}
$Title{Jordan
Chapter 1D.   The Guerrilla Crisis}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Robert Rinehart}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{hussein
jordan
arab
jordanian
bank
plo
west
palestinian
israel
states}
$Date{1979}
$Log{}
Country:     Jordan
Book:        Jordan, A Country Study
Author:      Robert Rinehart
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1979

Chapter 1D.   The Guerrilla Crisis

     In the wake of the six-day war Hussein and his government were confronted
with the critical problems of repairing a shattered economy, providing for the
welfare of the refugees, obtaining external aid, readjusting foreign policy,
and rebuilding the armed forces. Internally, however, the major problem was
the continuing confrontation with the several Palestinian guerrilla
organizations.

     The Arab League heads of state met at Khartoum at the end of August 1967.
The conference reached four major decisions generally considered to represent
the views of Arab moderates: resumption of oil production, suspended by some
oil states during the war; continued nonrecognition of and nonnegotiation with
Israel, individually and collectively; continued closure of the Suez Canal and
the elimination of all foreign military bases in Arab territory; and provision
of financial subsidy aid to Egypt and Jordan by the oil-rich states of Saudi
Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait. The total annual subsidy promised for the
indefinite future amounted to the equivalent of US$378 million, of which
Jordan was to receive about US$112 million. Donor states at first regularly
paid their shares in quarterly installments, but Libya and Kuwait withdrew
their support to Jordan during the 1970-71 war between the Jordanian
government and the guerrillas.

     In addition to the Khartoum subsidies, Jordan also received grants from
the oil shaykhdoms of Abu Dhabi and Qatar and a special grant of US$42 million
from Saudi Arabia for arms purchases. Aid came as well from Britain and
West Germany, with whom Jordan had resumed relations. Although direct United
States aid had been terminated, substantial long-term loans were extended to
Jordan for emergency relief, development, and military assistance, and in
February 1968 United States arms shipments to Jordan were resumed. By such
means and its own meager resources, Jordan averted financial disaster.

     After months of diplomatic wrangling, the UN Security Council adopted
Resolution 242 on November 22, 1967, as a guideline for a Middle East
settlement (see Appendix B). The principal provisions of this resolution
proclaimed the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by war; withdrawal
of Israeli forces from areas occupied in the six-day war; termination of all
states of belligerency; acknowledgment of the sovereignty of all states in
the area-including Israel-within secure and recognized boundaries; freedom of
navigation on all international waterways in the area; and a just settlement
of the refugee problem. Jordan, Egypt, and Israel accepted this resolution in
principle but put distinctly different interpretations on it (see Foreign
Policy, ch. 4). Hussein rested his case for a settlement of the six-day war
squarely on the resolution although such settlement would not imply an overall
solution to the general Arab-Israeli problem.

     The PLO had no role in the six-day war. However, after the succession of
Arab failures in conventional warfare against Israel, the Palestinians
decided to adopt guerrilla warfare tactics as the best and most effective
method of attacking and defeating Israel. In February 1969 Arafat became head
of the PLO and remained the leader of Al Fatah. By early 1970 at least seven
guerrilla organizations became identified in Jordan. Other than Al Fatah, one
of the most important was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) led by George Habbash. Although the PLO sought to integrate these
various bands, and announcements were made from time to time that this had
occurred, they were never effectively united (see fig. 11, ch. 4).

     At first by conviction and then by political necessity, Hussein sought
accommodation with the guerrillas and provided training sites and assistance.
In Jordan's internal politics, however, the main issue during the 1967-71
period was the struggle for political control of the  country between the
government and the guerrilla organizations. Based in the refugee camps, the
latter became virtually a state within a state, easily securing funds and arms
from both the Arab states and the Soviet bloc and openly flouting Jordanian
law.

     As the guerrilla effort mounted, Israel retaliated quickly and with
increasing effectiveness. In March 1968 an Israeli brigade attacked the
Jordanian village of Karamah, said to be the guerrilla capital. Although the
brigade inflicted damage, it was driven back and in the process suffered
substantial losses. The incident boosted Palestinian morale and gave the PLO
instant prestige within the Arab community. Israel in reprisal launched heavy
attacks at Irbid in June 1968 and at As Salt in August. It soon became obvious
to the PLO that the generally open terrain of the West Bank did not provide
the kind of concealment and refuge featured in classic guerrilla operations,
and the Palestinian population failed to provide the universal "friendly sea"
of Mao Tse-tung's doctrine in which the guerrilla could "swim like a fish." By
late 1968 the main activities of the guerrillas in Jordan seemed to shift from
fighting Israel and to be directed instead at the overthrow of Hussein.

     A major guerrilla-government confrontation occurred in November 1968 when
the government sought to disarm the refugee camps, but civil war was averted
by a compromise that favored the Palestinians. The threat to his authority
and the heavy Israeli reprisals against Jordanian territory that regularly
occurred after each guerrilla attack became a matter of grave concern to
Hussein. As a result of efforts by his loyal beduin army to suppress guerrilla
activity, sporadic outbursts of fighting between the guerrillas and the army
occurred during the first half of 1970. In June 1970 an Arab mediation
committee found it necessary to intervene in order to put a halt to two weeks
of serious fighting between the two sides.

     In June Hussein designated Abdul Munim Rifai to head a cabinet of
"reconciliation" that included more opposition elements than any other
government since that of Nabulsi in 1957. Although the composition of the
cabinet maintained a traditional balance between the East Bank and the West
Bank, it included a majority of guerrilla sympathizers, particularly in the
key portfolios of foreign affairs, interior, and defense. The king's action
did not reflect a new domestic policy but rather indicated Hussein's desire
for the support of a nationalist cabinet for any peace negotiations that might
result from the projected UN peace mission to be conducted by Gunnar Jarring.
An agreement conciliatory to the guerrillas was signed between Rifai and
Arafat, who claimed to represent all of the most influential guerrilla groups.
According to its provisions, the government allowed the commandos freedom of
movement within Jordan, agreed to refrain from antiguerrilla action, and
expressed its support for the guerrillas in the battle against Israel. In
return the commandos pledged to remove their bases from Amman and other major
cities, to withdraw armed personnel from the Jordanian capital, and to show
respect for law and order.

     Small-scale clashes continued throughout the summer of 1970, however, and
by early September the guerrilla groups were in control of several strategic
positions in Jordan, including the oil refinery near Az Zarqa. The guerrillas
at this time were also calling for a general strike of the Jordanian
population and were organizing a civil disobedience campaign. The internal
situation in Jordan became explosive when, as part of a guerrilla campaign to
undermine the J