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$Unique_ID{COW02006}
$Pretitle{230}
$Title{Japan
Chapter 6B. Relations with the United States}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Toshio George Tsukahira}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{united
states
japan
japanese
economic
security
treaty
defense
efforts
political}
$Date{1981}
$Log{}
Country: Japan
Book: Japan, A Country Study
Author: Toshio George Tsukahira
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date: 1981
Chapter 6B. Relations with the United States
United States-Japanese relations in 1981 remained basically close and
cooperative despite a series of incidents that in past years would have
created severe strains but which were rationalized without serious
consequences. These incidents included the sinking of a Japanese freighter and
the loss of two seamen in a collision with a United States nuclear-powered
submarine; a political uproar over a reference to "an alliance" between the
United States and Japan in an official communique; and a flare-up of Japan's
"nuclear allergy," following the public assertion by a former United States
ambassador to Japan that nuclear-armed United States warships had been
transiting Japanese waters or visiting its ports for years.
One reason for the sound state of the United States-Japan relationship
was the growing awareness on the part of the Japanese people and their leaders
that, as Japan seeks a more independent and assertive role in world affairs,
its fundamental interests coincide more and more with those of the United
States. While it was perceived that the United States military and economic
profile in the international arena had been lowered, particularly in East
Asia, and that Japan had to make adjustments accordingly, the Japanese still
saw their relations with the United States as being more important to their
national security and to their economic welfare than those with any other
country.
In the years after World War II, Japan's relations with the United States
were placed on an equal footing for the first time at the end of the
occupation by the Allied forces in April 1952. This equality, the legal basis
of which was laid down in the Peace Treaty signed by forty-eight Allied
nations and Japan, was initially largely nominal since in the early
post-occupation period Japan required direct United States economic
assistance. A favorable Japanese balance of payments with the United States
was achieved in 1954, but this was because of United States military and aid
spending in Japan, since the value of Japanese imports from the United States
was still higher than the value of exports to that country.
The Japanese people's feeling of dependence on a foreign power lessened
gradually as the disastrous results of World War II subsided into the
background and their trade with the United States expanded. National
self-confidence grew as the country applied its resources and organizational
skill in regaining economic health. This situation gave rise to a
nationalistic desire for greater independence from United States influence.
This was especially evident in the Japanese attitude toward United States
military bases on the four main islands of Japan and in Okinawa Prefecture,
occupying the southern two-thirds of the Ryukyu chain of islands.
During the 1950s and 1960s the government had to balance left-wing
pressure advocating disassociation from the United States against the
realities of the need for military protection. Recognizing popular desire for
the return of the Ryukyu and Bonin (Ogasawara) islands, the United States as
early as 1953 voluntarily relinquished its control of the Amami Island group
at the northern end of the Ryukyu chain but made no commitment to return
Okinawa, which was then under the United States military administration for an
indefinite period as provided in Article 3 of the Peace Treaty. Popular
agitation culminated in a unanimous resolution adopted by the Diet in June
1956, calling for a return of Okinawa to Japan, and an irredentist movement
developed in Okinawa itself under leftist leadership.
In June 1957 military rule in Okinawa was replaced by a civil
administration headed by a United States high commissioner. Under the high
commissioner's supervision, a local government of the Ryukyu Islands was
established to govern the area. It consisted of a unicameral legislature of
twenty-nine popularly elected legislators and a local chief executive
appointed by the high commissioner. The overall supervision of the Ryukyu
administration was made the responsibility of the United States secretary of
defense, while its foreign interests were represented by the United States
secretary of state. Also in June 1957 Japan and the United States agreed that
all United States combat forces would be withdrawn eventually from Japan
proper, or the four main islands, and that the then-existing security
arrangements would be reviewed.
Bilateral talks on revising the 1952 security treaty began in 1959, and
the new 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security-better known as the
Mutual Security Treaty (MST)-was signed in Washington on January 19, 1960.
When the pact was submitted to the Diet for ratification on February 5, it
became the subject of bitter debate and the occasion for violence in an
all-out effort of the leftist opposition to prevent its passage. It was
finally approved by the House of Representatives on May 20. Socialist deputies
boycotted the lower house session and tried to prevent the LDP deputies from
entering the chamber; they were forcibly removed by the police.
The lower house passage was followed by massive demonstrations and
rioting by students and trade union members for over a month; these outbursts
prevented a scheduled visit to Japan by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The
crisis also precipitated the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, but
not before the treaty was passed by default on June 19 when the House of
Councillors failed to vote on the issue within the required thirty days after
the lower house vote of approval.
The revised treaty emphasized United States-Japan reciprocity and
partnership. Both parties assumed an obligation to take action to assist each
other in case of armed attack on territories under Japanese administration.
(It was understood, however, that Japan could not come to the defense of the
United States because it was constitutionally forbidden to send armed forces
overseas.) The scope of the new treaty did not extend to the Ryukyu Islands,
but an appended minute made clear that in case of an armed attack on the
islands, both governments would consult and take appropriate action. Notes
accompanying the treaty provided for prior consultation between the two
governments before any major change occurred in the deployment of United
States troops or equipment in Japan. Unlike the 1952 security treaty, the new
pact provided for a ten-year duration, after which it could be revoked upon
one year's notice by either party. The treaty included general provisions on
the further development of international cooperation and free institutions and
on improved future economic cooperation.
Close cooperation and consultation in security and economic matters
continued between the two countries during the 1960s. Perhaps the most
important channel for economic matters-aside from the usual diplomatic
channel-was the Japan-United States Joint Committee on Trade and Economic
Affairs (ECONCOM), which was created following Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato's
official visit to the United States in June 1961. This cabinet-level body met
annually, alternately in Japan and the United States, to discuss and resolve
major economic issues arising between the two parties.
Both countries worked closely also in efforts to achieve the United
States promise to return all Japanese territories acquired by the United
States under Article 3 of the Peace Treaty. In June 1968 the United States
returned the Bonin Islands (including Iwo Jima) to Japanes