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$Unique_ID{COW01874}
$Pretitle{225}
$Title{Israel
Chapter 3F. Aspects of Foreign Relations}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Richard F. Nyrop}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{israel
israeli
peace
territories
arab
palestinian
security
occupied
war
west}
$Date{1979}
$Log{}
Country: Israel
Book: Israel, A Country Study
Author: Richard F. Nyrop
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date: 1979
Chapter 3F. Aspects of Foreign Relations
Resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict remains the constant and foremost
goal of Israel's foreign policy. Other policy objectives are to secure
recognition and diplomatic support by the greatest possible number of states;
to promote economic and cultural exchanges; to defend the existence of the
state by explaining Israel's policies and by publicizing its social and
democratic development; and to counteract Arab influence while inducing the
Arab states to enter into negotiations aimed toward durable, contractual
peace.
Equally important is the objective designed to strengthen the emotional,
religious, cultural, and historical bonds between Israel and world Jewry. This
is based on the concept that Israel is the spiritual center for Judaism and on
the tendency to regard the approximately 14 million Jews living outside the
country (as of 1975) as a great political and economic asset, especially the
Jews in the United States (roughly 5.6 million in 1975). Therefore the
country's leaders affirm that they have a responsibility to increase Jewish
consciousness among dispersed communities by such means as providing teachers
and textbooks and by fostering the study of Hebrew. Moreover, by increasing
the sense of Jewish identification in the Diaspora with Israel, the goal of
achieving active political and economic support is also served. Another
important aspect of Israel's policy toward the Diaspora is the consistent
concern shown for the human rights of Jews in the Arab countries, South
America, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. The government encourages
Aliyah (see Glossary) as a means of fulfilling Zionist ideology and of
increasing the Jewish state's security as well.
Israeli foreign policy has evolved principally as a function of
interactions with its Arab neighbors and the great powers. In 1948 the United
States and the Soviet Union recognized the state of Israel, whereas the Arab
states forcibly opposed it. These two salient features challenged the
ingenuity of the Israeli foreign policy establishment in the initial phase
of national diplomacy. Relations with the Soviet Union became strained by
1953 as the Arab-Israeli dispute became a more crucial part of the larger
confrontation between East and West. Hopes of ending Arab hostility fell
short of expectation despite serious attention given to the problem. Israel
managed to sign separate armistice agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and
Lebanon in 1949. The armistice, effected through the mediation of the United
Nations (UN), was interpreted by most members of the world organization as an
intermediate step in the transition from temporary truce to permanent peace.
Contrary to these expectations, further progress toward peace was not
made after 1949; the situation, instead, became rigid and volatile. The UN
sought to exert a moderating influence on the dispute, but the legacy of
enmity on all sides was overwhelming. The loss of territory compounded Arab
frustration and led to hardened attitudes opposing compromise with Israel,
whereas Israel rejected any solution that might call into question its right
to full sovereignty.
Hostility was mutual. The problems stemming from Arab refugees and the
Israeli expropriation of lands owned by Arabs aroused bitterness and rancor
on the part of both Arab residents in Israel and their brethren in the
neighboring capitals. For its part the Arab bloc rejected direct negotiation
with or recognition of Israel. Ships en route to or from Israel were prevented
from passing through the Suez Canal. Merchants and corporations investing in
Israel were boycotted. Information media within the Arab world warned of the
prospect of another war. The number of border incidents increased despite
the efforts of UN personnel assigned to the several mixed armistice
commissions under the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).
Both sides expended large sums for purchasing modern weapons.
The result was a deterioration of security. In 1955 repeated incursions
by armed Arab commandos, called fedayeen, and strong retaliatory measures by
Israel contributed to increased tension. Weapons deliveries to Egypt from the
Soviet Union through Czechoslovakia and signs of military coordination among
the Arab countries produced a sense of crisis leading Israel to seek possible
allies. The interests of France and Great Britain paralleled those of Israel
against President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt who had nationalized the Suez
Canal in July 1956; the result was the launching of an offensive by the three
nations against the Suez Canal in the fall of 1956 (see Security: A Persistent
National Concern, ch. 5).
In the eleven years after the 1956 campaign, Israel enjoyed a period of
normalcy, in spite of the fluid political situation in the Middle East. The
primary gain from the war was the comparative tranquility along the borders
that lasted until the third military confrontation in 1967. During this
interim Israel became more closely associated with the West, the United States
and France in particular, conversely relations with the Soviet Union became
more strained. Meanwhile, under the foreign ministership of Meir (1956-66),
Israel was able to broaden the scope of foreign relations. Growing foreign
trade and tourism, the inauguration of the assistance program to developing
countries, the visit of Pope Paul VI in 1964, and the selection of Shmuel
Yosef Agnon as recipient of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1966 all
enhanced the country's international stature. Further evidence of the
country's diplomatic achievement was the formal exchange of ambassadors
between the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and Israel in 1965.
At the beginning of 1966 Abba Eban succeeded Meir as foreign minister.
Maintaining the tradition of active, flexible diplomacy and serving as an
eloquent spokesman for Israel's interests, he began exploring opportunities
with the countries of Eastern Europe. Any hopes of improving relations with
the Soviet Union through improved ties with the other communist-bloc members
ended precipitously, however, in June 1967, when Israel launched a preemptive
attack against the Arabs, a war in which the Soviet Union again sided with the
Arabs (see Security: A Persistent National Concern, ch. 5).
Victory in the six-day war produced a set of new circumstances in which
Israel found itself occupying large territories. It also created diplomatic
challenges and opportunities. Reunification of Jerusalem under Israel control
during the war, opposition to reopening of the Suez Canal without guarantees
for Israeli shipping, and opening settlements in the occupied territories (a
violation of the Geneva Convention on Occupied Territories, which Israel had
ratified), all tended to alienate some who had supported Israel's position
previously.
Israel has also been faced by the growth of Palestinian nationalism. With
no stake in the status quo and a future clouded by an indefinite refugee
status, Palestinians in Arab lands-many of them stateless since the 1948-49
period-have increasingly turned to guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks
against Israel. Sporadic attacks on border settlements or patrols, planting
bombs in places of public assembly, attempts at interfering with operations
of El Al, killing Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich, and numerous air
hijackings as an attempt to dramatize the Palestinian cause have been answered
by security measures in affected areas and by severe retaliations that Israel
maintains a