Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0180/01800.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 35KB | 559 lines

$Unique_ID{COW01800}
$Pretitle{268}
$Title{Iran
Chapter 5E.   Internal Security}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Joseph A. Kechian and Houman Sadri}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{iran
regime
security
revolutionary
savak
khomeini
opposition
shah
mojahedin
national}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Country:     Iran
Book:        Iran, A Country Study
Author:      Joseph A. Kechian and Houman Sadri
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1987

Chapter 5E.   Internal Security

    The Islamic Revolution destroyed the structures on which the shah's
internal security policies depended. Mohammad Reza Shah had not tolerated
dissent, had reacted strongly when challenged, and had relied on an elaborate
internal security police force to enforce his absolute authority. Over the
years, Khomeini had vigorously condemned the shah's secret police operations
and continually called on Iranians to rise against a perceived tyrannical
ruler. By the late 1970s, the shah's internal security organizations were in
disgrace because of their abuses. In early 1979, the revolutionary regime
dismantled existing security organizations and called on loyal citizens to
protect the Revolution. Yet, like the shah, the revolutionary regime faced
clear opposition to its authority.

Internal Security in the 1970s

    The Pahlavi regime identified the Fadayan, the Tudeh, and several ethnic
groups as opponents to the shah's rule. To meet their rising challenge, the
shah relied on security forces whose agents infiltrated many underground
organizations. By early 1970, a sophisticated intelligence-gathering system
was in place, reporting all currents of political dissent directly to the
monarch.

    In 1970 opposition forces took the initiative by launching a terrorist
campaign against the regime. At the time, this was perceived as a nuisance and
an embarrassment to the shah, because the monarchy was not "threatened."
Nevertheless, opposition to the shah grew stronger when the monarch authorized
unrelenting punishment of those accused of security violations. Hundreds of
young Iranians were arrested, tried, and sentenced. Many were tortured and
some executed for their unwavering opposition. In 1976 opposition forces
clashed with the police in a series of gun battles that mobilized thousands in
the streets of Tehran. With heightened visibility, terrorist groups mounted
successful attacks on police posts, further threatening the regime's hold on
internal security. By 1978 organized opposition to the monarchy reached a high
point with ideologically incompatible groups joining in efforts to overthrow
the shah. Leftist guerrillas joined student and religious organizations in
calling for political change.

    The two most important leftist guerrilla groups operating in Iran in 1978
were the Mojahedin and the Fadayan (see Antiregime Opposition Groups, this
ch.). The Mojahedin had changed its name at least three times since its
formation in 1960 under the name of Nehzat-e Azadi-yi Iran, or the Iran
Freedom Movement (IFM). Although it was not formally a religious party, its
rank-and-file membership was religiously oriented, a fact that helped mobilize
clerical support in 1978. Unlike the clerical forces, however, the Mojahedin
and the Fadayan conducted a systematic assassination campaign in 1977 and 1978
against Iranian security officials and United States military and
defense-related personnel stationed in Tehran. The shah was also a target, as
evidenced by periodic uncoverings of assassination plots. This wave of
violence was met by an equally strong and determined campaign of arrests and
executions. Iranian students abroad also became part of a cycle of action and
counteraction: in the United States and Western Europe, students who protested
against the shah were kept under surveillance so that punitive action could
later be taken against them. In addition, the Mojahedin and the Fadayan
conducted a propaganda campaign in support of "the Iranian armed struggle" and
against the shah, SAVAK (see SAVAK, this ch.), and what was termed
"institutionalized repression in Iran."

    Within Iran's borders, stiff government security measures notwithstanding,
organized opposition was never eliminated. Although the shah had declared
illegal all opposition political parties, labor unions, peasant organizations,
and university student groups, antigovernment sentiments remained high,
especially among the clerical community. By late 1977, student demonstrations
increased in frequency, with a vocal minority calling on Iranians to "raise
their voices against absolute rule." These protests, timed to call President
Jimmy Carter's attention to the human rights situation in Iran, resulted in
the arrest of hundreds of demonstrators, many of whom were allegedly tortured
by SAVAK forces.

    In January 1978, conservative religious students demonstrated in the holy
city of Qom to express the long-standing clerical opposition to the shah's
land reform policies, which had resulted in the expropriation of vaqf
(religious endowment) and other lands. Religious leaders were also outraged at
what they perceived to be the shah's violations of sacred Islamic laws in such
areas as the role of women in society and the imposition of a secular legal
system that usurped clerical authority. Attempts by the police to disperse
demonstrators resulted in several deaths.

    The religious leadership called for a general strike across the country
for February 18, to highlight the forty-day mourning period for those killed
in Qom. Far more serious disturbances erupted on that day in Tabriz and
Tehran, precipitating the worst riots since 1963. After several days of
widespread arson directed at banks, movie theaters, and hotels in Tabriz, the
army moved in to restore order. Similar measures were taken in Tehran and
other major cities. According to the government 12 persons were killed in
Tabriz and 250 persons arrested. In reality, the casualty figure was much
higher and the arrests more numerous. Ironically, the deaths presented the
next opportunity for confrontation. When demonstrators, commemorating the
forty-day mourning period, defiantly marched through the streets of Tabriz,
the armed forces reacted as expected. To protect themselves and restore order,
they opened fire, killing and injuring more civilians. The result was a
sequence of events in which the opposition, led by influential clerics,
conducted "religious commemorations," and the government interpreted them as
challenges to law and order. With neither side relenting, the cycle of
violence spread.

    Observers of these tragic events pointed out that the reemergence of
large-scale protest demonstrations was only made possible because of the
shah's more liberal policies toward the nonviolent expression of dissent.
Indeed, the shah confirmed on several occasions his commitment to more
"liberal" political reforms, but at the same time he warned that the dissident
movement was "completely illegal" and that he would "not let it get out of
hand." Illegal or not, mass protest demonstrations did get out of control when
the shah openly chastised the clerics for "destroying the country." The shah
could not end these demonstrations, which gathered more support throughout
1978. Workers from the oil industry, heeding the call of the religious
authorities, slowly paralyzed Iran's economic sector. It became only a matter
of time before the shah lost control over Iran's internal security.

Law Enforcement Agencies

    Intensely concerned with matters of internal security in the post-1953
environment, the shah authorized the development of one of the most extensive
systems of law enforcement agencies in the developing world. The
Gendarmerie--the rural police--and the National Police gained in numbers and
responsibilities. The secret police organization, SAVAK, gained special
notoriety for its excessive zeal in "maintaining" internal security. But as in
the regular armed forces, the shah's management style virtually eliminated all
coord