Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0179/01798.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 24KB | 383 lines

$Unique_ID{COW01798}
$Pretitle{268}
$Title{Iran
Chapter 5C.   Foreign Influences in Weapons, Training, and Support Systems}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Joseph A. Kechian and Houman Sadri}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{pasdaran
military
iran
states
united
arms
forces
iranian
revolution
tehran}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Country:     Iran
Book:        Iran, A Country Study
Author:      Joseph A. Kechian and Houman Sadri
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1987

Chapter 5C.   Foreign Influences in Weapons, Training, and Support Systems

    Foreign influence on the regular armed forces has historically been
massive, vital, and controversial. Around the turn of the century, before Reza
Shah unified the military, officers from Sweden, Britain, and Russia commanded
various Iranian units (see Historical Background, this ch.). These officers
were unpopular because they were perceived as occupiers rather than as
advisers, and the seeds of xenophobia were planted. Aware of these sentiments,
Reza Shah tried to minimize direct foreign military influence, although an
exception was made for Swedish officers serving with the Gendarmerie. Between
the two world wars, a large number of Iranian officers attended military
academies in France and Germany, where they received command and technical
training. In a further effort to counter the influence of both Britain and
Russia (by that time, the Soviet Union) in Iranian affairs, Reza Shah
attempted to establish closer ties with Germany, a relationship that would be
controversial during World War II. After 1945 the United States gradually
became more influential and had a significant impact on the Pahlavi dynasty's
leadership and the military.

    With the establishment during World War II of a small United States
military mission to the Gendarmerie (known as GENMISH) in 1943, Washington
initiated a modest military advisory program. In 1947 the United States and
Tehran reached a more comprehensive agreement that established the United
States Army Mission Headquarters (ARMISH). Its purpose was to provide the
Ministry of War and the Iranian army with advisory and technical assistance to
enhance their efficiency. As a result, the first Iranian officers began
training in the United States, and they were followed by many more over the
next three decades. The United States initiated its military assistance grant
program to Iran in 1950 (the bilateral defense agreement between Iran and the
United States was not concluded until 1959) and established a Military
Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to administer the program. In 1962 the two
missions were consolidated into a single military organization, ARMISH-MAAG,
which remained active in Iran until the Islamic revolutionary regime came to
power in 1979. Between 1973 and 1979, the United States also provided military
support in the form of technical assistance field teams (TAFTs), through which
civilian experts instructed Iranians on specific equipment on a short-term
basis. Although the GENMISH program ended in 1973, United States military
assistance to Iran rose rapidly in the six years before the Revolution.

    United States military assistance to Iran between 1947 and 1969 exceeded
US $1.4 billion, mostly in the form of grant aid before 1965 and of Foreign
Military Sales credits during the late 1960s. The financial assistance
programs were terminated after 1969, when it was determined that Iran, by then
an important oil exporter, could assume its own military costs. Thereafter,
Iran paid cash for its arms purchases and covered the expenses of United
States military personnel serving in the ARMISH-MAAG and TAFT programs. Even
so, in terms of personnel the United States military mission in Iran in 1978
was the largest in the world. Department of Defense personnel in Iran totaled
over 1,500 in 1978, admittedly a small number compared with the 45,000 United
States citizens, mostly military and civilian technicians and their
dependents, living in Iran. Almost all of these individuals were evacuated by
early 1979 as the ARMISH-MAAG program came to an abrupt end. Ended also was
the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, under which
over 11,000 Iranian military personnel had received specialized instruction in
the United States.

    Washington broke its diplomatic ties with Tehran in April 1980, closing an
important chapter with a former CENTO ally whose security it had guaranteed
since 1959. The relationship had evolved dramatically from the early 1950s,
when Iran depended on the United States for security assistance, to the
mid-1970s, when the government-to-government Foreign Military Sales program
dominated other issues. Arms transfers increased significantly after the 1974
oil price rise, accelerating at a dizzying pace until 1979. From fiscal year
(FY--see Glossary) 1950 through FY 1979, United States arms sales to Iran
totaled approximately US $11.2 billion, of which US $10.7 billion were actually
delivered.

    The transfer of such large volumes of arms and the presence of thousands
of United States advisers had an unmistakable influence on the Iranian armed
forces. The preponderance of American weapons led to a dependence on the
United States for support systems and for spare parts. Technical advisers were
indispensable for weapons operations and maintenance.

    After the Revolution, Iranians continued to buy arms from the United
States using Israeli, European, and Latin American intermediaries to place
orders, despite the official United States embargo. Israeli sales, for
example, were recorded as early as 1979. On several occasions, attempted arms
sales to Iran have been thwarted by law enforcement operations or
broker-initiated leaks. One operation set up by the United States Department
of Justice foiled the shipment of more than US $2 billion of United States
weapons to Iran from Israel and other foreign countries. The materiel included
18 F-4 fighter-bombers, 46 Skyhawk fighter-bombers, and nearly 4,000 missiles.
But while the Department of Justice was attempting to prevent arms sales to
Iran, senior officials in the administration of President Ronald Reagan
admitted that 2,008 TOW missiles and 235 parts kits for Hawk missiles had been
sent to Iran via Israel. These were intended to be an incentive for the
release of American hostages held by pro-Iranian militiamen in Lebanon.
Unverified reports in 1987 indicated that Iranian officials claimed that
throughout 1986 the Reagan administration had sold Iran ammunition and parts
for F- 4s, F-5s, and F-14s. In addition, Tehran reportedly purchased United
States-made equipment from international arms dealers and captured United
States weapons from Vietnam.

    Despite official denials, it is believed that Israel has been a supplier
of weapons and spare parts for Iran's American-made arsenal. Reports indicate
that an initial order for 250 retread tires for F-4 Phantom jets was delivered
in 1979 for about US $27 million. Since that time, unverified reports have
alleged that Israel agreed to sell Iran Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, radar
equipment, mortar and machinegun ammunition, field telephones, M-60 tank
engines and artillery shells, and spare parts for C-130 transport planes.

    By 1986 Iran's largest arms suppliers were reportedly China and North
Korea. China, for example, is believed to have supplied Iran with military
equipment in sales funneled through North Korea. According to an unconfirmed
report in the Washington Post, one particular deal in the spring of 1983
netted Beijing close to US $1.3 billion for fighters, T-59 tanks, 130mm
artillery, and light arms. China also delivered a number of Silkworm HY-2
surface-to-surface missiles, presumably for use in defending the Strait of
Hormuz. As of early 1987, China denied all reported sales, possibly to enhance
its diminishing position in the Arab world. North Korea agreed to sell arms
and medical supplies to Iran as early as the summer of 1980. Using military
cargo versions o