Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0179/01796.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 34KB | 530 lines

$Unique_ID{COW01796}
$Pretitle{268}
$Title{Iran
Chapter 5A.   National Security}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Joseph A. Kechian and Houman Sadri}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{military
forces
shah
army
iranian
armed
iran
officers
pasdaran
reza}
$Date{1987}
$Log{Sword and Scabbard*0179601.scf
Figure 10.*0179602.scf
}
Country:     Iran
Book:        Iran, A Country Study
Author:      Joseph A. Kechian and Houman Sadri
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1987

Chapter 5A.   National Security

[See Sword and Scabbard: from bas-relief at Persepolis, cd. 500 B.C.]

     During the 1970s, imperial Iran developed one of the most impressive
military forces in the Middle East, and it used those forces to assume a
security role in the Persian Gulf after the British military withdrawal in
1971. The defense of the strategic Strait of Hormuz preoccupied the shah, as
it did the other conservative monarchs in the area. Freedom of navigation in
the Gulf was important for international shipping, and the shah was perceived,
at least in certain quarters, as the undeclared "policeman of the West in the
Gulf." When independent observers concluded that Iran's military buildup
exceeded its defensive needs, the shah declared that his responsibilities
extended beyond Iran and included the protection of the Gulf. Increasingly,
the military played a pivotal role in promoting this policy and, in doing so,
gained a privileged position in society. Under the Nixon Doctrine of 1969,
according to which aiding local armed forces was considered preferable to
direct United States military intervention, Washington played an important
part in upgrading the Iranian military forces. The United States supplied Iran
with sophisticated hardware and sent thousands of military advisers and
technicians to help Iran absorb the technology.

    By 1979 the United States military presence in Iran had drawn the wrath of
Iranians. Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini specifically identified
the shah's pro-American policies as detrimental to Iranian interests and
called on his supporters to oppose the United States presence. He cited
special legal privileges granted United States personnel in Iran as an example
of the shah's excessive identification of Iran's interests with those of
Washington.

    Following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the armed forces underwent
fundamental changes. The revolutionary government purged high-ranking
officials as well as many mid-ranking officers identified with the Pahlavi
regime and created a loyal military force, the Pasdaran (Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e
Islami, or Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or Revolutionary Guards), whose
purpose was to defend the Revolution. When the Iran-Iraq War began, however,
the revolutionary government had to acknowledge its need for the professional
services of many of the purged officers to lead the armed forces in defending
the country against Iraq. The army was unexpectedly successful in the war,
even though, as of 1987, the regular armed forces continued to be regarded
with considerable suspicion. Within the Iranian military there was competition
between the regular and irregular armed forces. The Islamic clergy (see
Glossary) continued to rely more heavily on the loyal Pasdaran to defend the
regime. Moreover, most of the casualties were members of the Pasdaran and
Basij volunteers who composed the irregular armed forces. In the late 1980s,
in addition to defending the Revolution, Iran continued to follow certain
national security policies that had remained constant during the previous four
decades.

Armed Forces

[See Figure 10.: Strait of Hormuz and Vicinity.]

Historical Background

    The importance of the armed forces in Iran flows from Iran's long history
of successive military empires. For over 2,500 years, starting with the
conquests of the Achaemenid rulers of the sixth century B.C., Iran developed a
strong military tradition. Drawing on a vast manpower pool in western Asia,
the Achaemenid rulers raised an army of 360,000, from which they could send
expeditions to Europe and Africa.

    Iranian early military history boasts the epic performances of such great
leaders as Cyrus the Great and Darius I. The last great Iranian military ruler
was Nader Shah, whose army defeated the Mughals of India in 1739. Since then,
however, nearly all efforts to conquer more territory or check encroaching
empires have failed. During much of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Iran was divided and occupied by British and Russian military
forces. When their interests coincided in 1907, London and St. Petersburg
entered into the Anglo-Russian Agreement, which formally divided Iran into two
spheres of influence. During World War I, the weak and ineffective Qajar
Dynasty, allegedly hindered by the effects of the Constitutional Revolution of
1905-1907, could not prevent increasing British and Russian military
interventions, despite Iran's declaration of neutrality (see World War I, ch.
1).

    In 1918 the Qajar armed forces consisted of four separate
foreign-commanded military units. Several provincial and tribal forces could
also be called on during an emergency, but their reliability was highly
questionable. More often than not, provincial and tribal forces opposed the
government's centralization efforts, particularly because Tehran was perceived
to be under the dictate of foreign powers. Having foreign officers in
commanding positions over Iranian troops added to these tribal and religious
concerns. Loyal, disciplined, and well trained, the most effective government
unit was the 8,000-man Persian Cossacks Brigade. Created in 1879 and commanded
by Russian officers until the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, after which its
command passed into Iranian hands, the brigade represented the core of the new
Iranian armed forces. Swedish officers commanded the 8,400-man Gendarmerie
(later the Imperial Gendarmerie and after 1979 the Islamic Iranian
Gendarmerie), organized in 1911 as the first internal security force. The
6,000-man South Persia Rifles unit was financed by Britain and commanded by
British officers from its inception in 1916. Its primary task was to combat
tribal forces allegedly stirred up by German agents during World War I. The
Qajar palace guard, the Nizam, commanded by a Swedish officer, was a force
originally consisting of 2,000 men, although it deteriorated rapidly in
numbers because of rivalries. Thus, during World War I the 24,400 troops in
these four separate military units made up one of the weakest forces in
Iranian history.

    Upon signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany and Turkey on
December 15, 1917, Russia put in motion its eventual withdrawal from Iran,
preparing the way for an indigenous Iranian military. A hitherto little-known
colonel, Reza Khan (later known as Reza Shah Pahlavi, founder of the Pahlavi
dynasty), assumed leadership of the Persian Cossacks Brigade in November 1918,
after the expulsion of its Russian commanders. In February 1921, Reza Khan and
Sayyid Zia ad Din Tabatabai, a powerful civilian conspirator, entered Tehran
at the head of 1,500 to 2,500 Persian Cossacks and overthrew the Qajar regime.
Within a week, Tabatabai formed a new government and made Reza Khan the army
chief. Recognizing the importance of a strong and unified army for the modern
state, Reza Khan rapidly dissolved all "independent" military units and
prepared to create a single national army for the first time in Iranian
history.

    Riding on a strong nationalist wave, Reza Khan was determined to create an
indigenous officer corps for the new army, though an exception was made for a
few Swedish officers serving in the Gendarmerie. Within a matter of months,
officers drawn from the Persian Cossacks represented the majority.
Nevertheless, Reza Khan recognized the need for Western military expertise and
sent Iranian officers to European military academies, particularly St. Cyr in
France, to acquire modern technical know-how. In doing