Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0173/01732.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 31KB | 486 lines

$Unique_ID{COW01732}
$Pretitle{239}
$Title{Indonesia
Chapter 5B.   Political and Administrative Role}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Riga Adiwoso-Suprapto}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{armed
forces
military
national
officers
defense
early
late
1980s
government}
$Date{1982}
$Log{}
Country:     Indonesia
Book:        Indonesia, A Country Study
Author:      Riga Adiwoso-Suprapto
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1982

Chapter 5B.   Political and Administrative Role

     ABRI's perception of its political role in the 1980s was that of a
national institution that was above partisan interests and closely tied
to the people, with a duty to foster conditions of order and security in
which the habits of a stable and institutionalized political process could
develop. Political excesses during the first two decades of the republic
had, in ABRI's view, discredited party politics as a proper outlet for
grass-roots expression in the nation and had forced the armed forces to act
as the principal guarantor of internal security and political stability.
As officially expressed in 1966, the armed forces "have an interest to
participate in the efforts to form and manage a government with authority,
a strong and progressive government."

     In consequence, throughout the 1970s and early 1980s the armed forces
were intertwined with the civilian side of government at every level. Military
officers, active duty and retired, served in the highest organs of policy
and administration (see the Power Structure, ch. 4). As a major functional
group, the military was allotted blocs of appointive seats in both the
People's Consultative Assembly and the House of People's Representatives (see
Legislative Bodies, ch. 4). Active duty personnel were not enfranchised, but
retired members were; and most of the latter belonged to an association of
retired officers that formed one of the functional groups under Golkar.
Military officers in mufti sometimes served as heads of territorial and
administrative divisions at the province and district levels.

Participation in the Economy

     Total military expenditures as a percentage of gross national product
(GNP-see Glossary) have declined steadily since the 1960s, and the military
has never been as dominant in the economic sphere as it has been in the
political. Nevertheless, because of historical circumstances, economic
necessity, and some doctrinal predisposition, the armed forces were deeply
enmeshed in the workings of the national economy in the early 1980s. They
had a pervasive and, critics charged, a sometimes detrimental influence
over economic life.

     The armed forces' economic role had its beginnings when some military
personnel were assigned managerial or advisory positions in Dutch enterprises
and agricultural estates seized by the government in late 1957. This projected
the army, in particular, into a new sphere of activity by which it acquired
entrepreneurial expertise, a vast patronage, and a source of personal
enrichment for many. The role of the armed services in the national economic
life greatly expanded under conditions of a rapidly deteriorating economy
during the Sukarno era in the 1960s, when the services, like many other
government departments, were caught in a tightening fiscal squeeze between
costs and depreciating monies allotted them in a period of serious inflation.
Nominal military pay, for example, depreciated to a point well below
subsistence for privates and generals alike; commodities and other tangible
emoluments were what counted. Left largely to their own devices to find
support, local military units secured their needs by operating business
enterprises, levying unofficial "taxes," smuggling, and other methods
suggested by human resourcefulness and available opportunities. At the
central command level, the preferred procedure was to divert to military
use funds from state corporations in which military officers held
controlling positions. In the early 1980s extrabudgetary resources still
were believed to account for substantial portions of the annual fiscal
needs of the armed forces (see Defense Spending and Defense Industry, this
ch.).

     The armed forces also played a hand in the selection of the economic
policies of the Soeharto regime through their ties with its most important
economic technocrats. In late 1962 the curriculum at the Army Staff and
Command School was broadened to include lectures on a wide range of
nonmilitary subjects. In 1965 some of these lectures were presented by a
group of economists trained at the University of California at Berkeley,
including Widjojo Nitisastro (see Role of Government, ch. 3). It was to
these technocrats that Soeharto turned when seeking economic guidelines for
the New Order and when setting up and running his government. The armed
forces have strongly supported their programs, and many analysts refer to
the military-technocrat alliance as providing one foundation of the
Soeharto regime.

     Although not the only state institution that engaged in business in
order to generate extrabudgetary income, the armed forces certainly were
the most energetic and successful in that regard. Commercial activities
under the various territorial commands in the early 1980s commonly included
the use of military trucks for the transport of passengers and freight for
hire. Military-owned companies that operated in the open market, much as
any private company, were a common form of enterprise. The Dharma Putra
Foundation, a holding company connected with the Army Strategic Reserve
Command (Kostrad), included a film company, an airline, and the Volkswagen
assembly franchise. Another company, under the sponsorship of the Department
of Defense and Security (Hankam), controlled affiliates involved in logging,
trade, industry, and textiles. In late 1980 a report issued by the provincial
assembly in East Timor, whose members were appointed by the central
government, charged that an enterprise controlled by the local army command
had developed a forced monopoly on the province's main export
commodities-coffee and sandalwood-and was reaping profits at the expense of
local producers.

     Another kind of military enterprise was the command-integrated factory,
which had as its primary purpose the production of ordnance and equipment for
the armed forces. In a category by itself was the state-owned National Oil and
Natural Gas Mining Company (Pertamina). Under the managing directorship of
army general Ibnu Sutowo from the late 1950s until 1976 when he was eased out
of office following the spectacular near-collapse of the company, Pertamina
became a commercial colossus and Ibnu Sutowo himself one of Indonesia's
richest and most powerful men.

     Although they could not be singled out in this respect from other actors
in the national economy, the armed forces of the 1980s continued to face the
problem of coping with a legacy of corruption. The government has recognized
the special military aspect of this national problem and has made repeated
calls for military officers to act with special care in their business
dealings and to avoid the appearance of nepotism when engaged in civilian
duties. In late 1979, in an effort to limit ABRI's influence in the economy
to retired personnel and thereby to cleanse the image of the armed forces,
General Jusuf announced that a 1974 directive banning active duty military
officers from engaging directly in business would thenceforth be enforced.
Some 150 officers were given the choice either to retire and continue in the
positions they held or to be reassigned elsewhere: fewer than 10 stayed in
ABRI. At the same time officers above the rank of captain were told they could
only be regular stockholders without voting rights in private economic
enterprises-a directive that also specifically applied to the spouses of all
flag rank officers.

National Defense and Internal Security

     ABRI's operations relating to its military function were based on a
well-develope