Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0172/01729.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 34KB | 518 lines

$Unique_ID{COW01729}
$Pretitle{239}
$Title{Indonesia
Chapter 4C.   Political Organizations}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Riga Adiwoso-Suprapto}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{political
party
pancasila
government
golkar
indonesian
ppp
soeharto
parties
leadership}
$Date{1982}
$Log{}
Country:     Indonesia
Book:        Indonesia, A Country Study
Author:      Riga Adiwoso-Suprapto
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1982

Chapter 4C.   Political Organizations

     Political activities must be channeled through a legally prescribed
system consisting of what Soeharto has called "the three legitimate political
organizations"-the ruling Golkar and the two opposition parties. Any activity
taking place outside this tripartite arrangement is illegal. The rationale
behind the arrangement, in place since 1973, is that, given the country's
ethnic, cultural, and regional diversity, the multiplicity of political
parties catering to parochial interests would hinder the process of political
and economic stabilization. Unmitigated partisan political strife would be
seen as hardening and even widening the country's sociopolitical cleavages. In
the early 1980s the tripartite system continued to fulfill the political
requirement of the Soeharto leadership as the best possible means of
developing "pancasila democracy." Opposition groups were guarded, however,
because any criticism of the system would be viewed as an attempt to undermine
the constitutional and ideological foundation of the state.

     Party politics were among the major targets of reforms after Soeharto's
rise to power in 1966. Initially, the official intention was to create a
two-party structure, but in view of strong objections by various party
leaders, a new plan was offered so that all parties could come under three
major groupings. As a prelude to a reorganization, the government in 1970
called on all parties to contest the parliamentary elections of July 1971 on
the basis of a three-way realignment. The first grouping would be associated
with the supposedly neutral, nonpolitical, and secularist Golkar, whose
officially assigned mission was to "engage in politics to suppress politics";
the second grouping, described as "spiritual," would embrace all Muslim
parties; and the third, identified as "nationalist," would represent the
remaining parties. Despite serious reservations, the nine parties of the day-
five nationalist and four religious-agreed to contest the elections under the
new format, provided that they were allowed to retain their individual party
identities. In the first test of electoral strength in 1971, Golkar-little
known then outside Jakarta and other major cities-surprised many by scoring a
landslide victory.

     Golkar's victory proved demoralizing for the other parties, and in fact
it signaled the collapse of multiparty politics. Weakened by internal fissures
within each party, not to mention government pressure, the nine parties
finally in January 1973 were obliged to merge into two new parties: the
Development Unity Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). In
doing so the two parties have pledged-over muted protests within each group-
that they would no longer question the validity of pancasila and the
Constitution and that their political programs would be formulated
accordingly.

     Interestingly, whereas the PPP and the PDI are officially referred to as
"parties," Golkar is not. Apparently, this practice derives from the negative
image the government attaches to the term "political party" as an instrument
of self-seeking associated with parochial interests. Another interesting
aspect is the government's refraining from using the term "opposition."
Evidently, this stems from the belief that politics should be guided by, as
Soeharto put it, "a true family spirit" of consultation, consensus, unity, and
mutual aid; such family spirit has been officially extolled as the
quintessence of pancasila. Viewed from the official perspective, there can be
no manifestations of opposition or adversary politicking in the "big family"
that is Indonesia. There may be political differences, but according to Amir
Murtono, a retired major general who in 1982 directed Golkar under the title
of general chairman, "different opinions do not imply an attitude of
opposition."

     Indeed, the concept of family togetherness has been embraced with utmost
seriousness by the Soeharto leadership. Efforts to induce the PPP and the PDI
to cooperate with Golkar have been extensive-these in addition to measures
taken to reinforce Golkar's already formidable grip on the political
structure. A familiar part of these efforts has been to lend support to
"nonpolitical" moderates within each party and to undercut the strength of
those elements still disposed toward "old-fashioned" politics. Evidently,
this tactic has worked, as indicated by the ascendancy of factions in both
parties considered to be amenable to the government's wishes. In the early
1980s Soeharto readily acknowledged that some people were not satisfied with
the existing tripartite party system, without which, he warned the nation in
August 1981, the country would revert to "the bitter times of the past, the
era of dozens of parties." In the following month he let it be known that any
attempt to create a new party outside the existing framework would be in
violation of the law.

Golkar

     Golkar is a creation of the military and remains under its dominance. The
organization had its beginning in 1964 when army officers formed it to counter
the growing power of the Indonesian Communist Party and that group's front
organizations. By 1969 it had been brought under government control as a
political machine with which to co-opt various social groups and provide a
broad base for the military-dominated Soeharto government. In that year Golkar
claimed to speak for about 270 groups supposedly representing farmers,
workers, youths and students, women, fishermen, crewmen, businessmen, civil
servants, professionals, intellectuals, veterans, and members of the armed
forces. After the 1971 elections this loose federation of functional groups
was reorganized on a "nonpartisan" basis in an effort to tighten internal
discipline and to make it more responsive to unified leadership under a
central executive board, which was to be assisted by a central advisory board,
of which Soeharto remained chairman in 1982. These two bodies in late 1982
continued to be composed of generals, cabinet ministers, and senior civilian
technocrats.

     Golkar's rapid ascendancy is not surprising, given ABRI's active support
for the organization. All civil servants were urged to join Golkar, for
there was to be no neutrality or nonpartisanship where the government's
development strategy was concerned. The government at the regional level saw
to it that credits, loans, and fertilizers were given preferentially to those
willing to be, or believed to be, supporters of Golkar. Furthermore, Golkar
benefited considerably from the ban on organizing mass support at the village
level. This measure kept all political workers out of the rural areas-a
potential reservoir of support for the PPP-so that the mass of the people
would remain unpoliticized between elections every five years. Yet Golkar was
able to bring its "nonpartisan" influence to bear on the people, if
indirectly, through local military and civil authorities who maintained an
extensive web of patron-client relations with local leaders.

     Golkar influence was strengthened under a political party law that went
into effect in August 1975. Adopted after several months of acrimonious debate
between Golkar and the PPP, this law formally recognized Golkar, the PPP, and
the PDI as the only three legal political organizations with rights to
participate in parliamentary and regional elections. Any activity other than
that permitted within the tripartite party structure would constitute
"opposition" to the state, its pancasila, and the Constitutio