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$Unique_ID{COW01697}
$Pretitle{221}
$Title{India
Chapter 10A. National Security}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Melinda W. Cooke}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{indian
india
military
forces
british
army
pakistan
war
defense
armed}
$Date{1985}
$Log{Cavalry*0169701.scf
}
Country: India
Book: India, A Country Study
Author: Melinda W. Cooke
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date: 1985
Chapter 10A. National Security
[See Cavalry: Member of 61st Lancers, New Delhi, dressed in ceremonial cavalry
uniform]
The preeminent military power on the subcontinent since partition in
1947, India as of 1985 was continuing to expand and modernize its armed
forces, seeking to develop a military capability commensurate with its
self-perceived status as a great power and natural arbiter of regional
affairs. The army was the world's third largest in terms of manpower, the air
force the eighth largest in terms of combat aircraft, and the navy the most
powerful of any of the Indian Ocean littoral nations. Both the army and the
air force were essentially organized to defend two fronts: the western border
with Pakistan, against which India fought in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971, and the
northern border with China, where India suffered a humiliating defeat in 1962.
That defeat prompted a reevaluation of the nation's security requirements and
a new commitment to expand and improve the armed forces. Initially, priority
went to the air and ground forces, which were required to defend the nation's
land borders; during the 1970s; however, the navy was built up to achieve blue
water capability in order to meet the challenge of increased superpower
activity in the Indian Ocean-an area the government considered to be within
its rightful sphere of influence.
India's highly developed domestic defense industry not only met the
armed force's requirements for virtually all conventional arms but also
produced them for export. Self-sufficiency in arms production has been an
illusory goal, however, and most high-technology items continued to be made
under licensed production or were imported. The Soviet Union, with which India
signed a treaty in 1971, has since the mid-1960s supplied an estimated 80
percent of military equipment imported by India, largely because of the
Soviet Union's willingness to turn over technology, its relatively easy credit
terms, and the fact that few strings were attached to its weapons deliveries.
National defense policy called for diversification of import sources, and
major purchases were also made from France and Britain during the early 1980s.
Nonetheless, these purchases continued to be more than offset by arms deals
with the Soviet Union.
Although trained and equipped primarily to provide external defense, the
armed forces-particularly the army-have also regularly filled internal
security missions. These have included counterinsurgency operations against
ethnic separatists and, under the control of civilian authorities, restoration
of order when civil disturbances escalated beyond the control of police or
paramilitary units. In June 1984 the central government ordered the army to
conduct an antiterrorist campaign against Sikh terrorists in Punjab and to
restore order there; in a departure from previous practice, military
commanders, although under nominal civilian control, effectively ran the
operation.
Sikh aspirations for increased autonomy or the creation of a separate
Sikh nation, terrorist support for these goals, and the Sikh community's sense
of isolation and outrage in the wake of army operations posed perhaps the most
serious problem for the nation from 1980 to early 1985. The anti-Sikh riots
that broke out after two Sikh security guards assassinated Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi in October 1984 only deepened the division between the Sikh
community and the rest of India. This was but one of a number of internal
security problems the government faced, however. Minority ethnic separatist
movements have long simmered throughout the country, and omnipresent communal
tension, which since independence has sporadically flared into violence,
appeared to have resulted from attempts to polarize communal relations and
manipulate violence for political ends. As in the past, however, most
outbreaks of communal violence were sparked by economic, social, or political
tension that inflamed linguistic, communal, or religious passions. As such,
they were probably resistant to government control, except over the long term.
Such challenges notwithstanding, as of early 1985 the government
remained committed to enforcing a basic level of order and preserving
national unity within a democratic framework. The Constitution guarantees
fundamental rights and freedoms to all citizens, and a vigorous national press
monitored compliance. Legal responsibility for maintenance of law and order
was vested in state police forces; law enforcement agencies at the national
level were also maintained to augment the effectiveness of the state forces.
The police at all levels, however, faced an increasingly onerous burden in
growing urban unrest and rising rates of ordinary crime. The widespread public
perception of partiality and corruption in the police and criminal justice
systems compounded the problems of law enforcement. Moreover, the lengthy
delays that characterized the legal process-and indeed came close to
paralyzing it-contributed to a growing public lack of faith in the rule of
law.
The Development of the Armed Forces
Archaeological evidence indicates that the story of human conflict on the
subcontinent is as old as the human presence on the land. The earliest written
records of the Vedic period (about 1500 to 500 B.C) show continuous wars and,
from about 600 B.C., the formal organization of standing armies. Subsequent
military history up to the time of the European incursions in the sixteenth
century is characterized by repeated major invasions, mostly by land from the
north and west-and by innumerable conflicts between local rulers. These wars
produced a pantheon of military heroes in Indian history and legend-such as
Asoka in the third century B.C.-who have been invoked since independence as
symbols of national unity.
When the Europeans arrived and began to set up trading posts, most armies
in India were raised under a system whereby a central ruler assigned to a
subordinate the right to collect taxes from a specified portion of land. In
return, the subordinate at his own expense maintained an armed contingent that
served at the behest of the ruler. When called to service, these forces-
consisting primarily of a cavalry made up of local landowners, their
relatives, and retainers-were joined by a small corps of professional troops
maintained by the central ruler. A vast "infantry" element supported the
whole.
When the power of the central authority declined, however, as did that of
the Mughal Empire, beginning in the late seventeenth century, these military
forces fell under the authority of independent power centers. During the
eighteenth century, European trading companies used their own military forces,
along with wealth, guile, and diplomacy, to establish themselves as minor
local powers, contending with indigenous forces and one another for trade and
influence. The superior military organization and technology of the European
forces generally enabled them to prevail over their opponents, and the scope
of European power expanded steadily. Contemporary Indian military tradition
owes its greatest influence to the most successful of the European military
models-that of the British.
The British Heritage
The origin of the modern Indian army can be traced to the forces employed
by the East India Company-chartered in London in 1600-and trained in the use
of arms for the protection of company trade. Employed first as guards and
watchmen, Indians later were grouped into military formations and employed as
auxiliaries to the company's Europ