Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0145/01453.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 39KB | 605 lines

$Unique_ID{COW01453}
$Pretitle{287}
$Title{Greece
Chapter 1E.   The Military Dictatorship, 1967-74}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{greece
political
military
junta
greek
united
states
karamanlis
party
new}
$Date{1986}
$Log{}
Country:     Greece
Book:        Greece, A Country Study
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1986

Chapter 1E.   The Military Dictatorship, 1967-74

The Disintegration of the Political System

     The political system that had been stable since 1952 and had seemed well
on its way to becoming a robust two-party democracy in 1964 disintegrated in
less than three years. Most of the controversy that undermined the system can
be attributed to a tragic misunderstanding and a personality clash between
George Papandreou and King Constantine II, who succeeded to the throne after
Paul's death in 1964. The conflict resembles in many ways the national schism
of the early part of the century and the feud between Venizelos and the first
Constantine. Papandreou suspected the king of harboring thoughts of
unconstitutional interference in the political process, while Constantine
believed that Papandreou was plotting the reestablishment of a republic. What
should have been a relatively minor political scandal-the ASPIDA affair and
its aftermath-escalated into a major crisis, owing largely to the
intransigence and arrogance of the prime minister and the monarch.

     Considerable responsibility for the deterioriation of relations probably
rests with Andreas Papandreou. He was a unique character in Greek politics. A
former American citizen and resident of the United States for more than 20
years, he was well known as a distinguished professor of economics at the
University of California at Berkeley. He returned to Greece in 1959 and became
a respected technocrat as head of the Centre of Planning and Economic
Research. In 1963 he began a political career with his election to the
parliament and quickly emerged as his father's chief aide, minister to the
prime minister. It was an open secret that Andreas was being groomed to
succeed his father as the leader of the CU. That revelation stirred
considerable resentment among many political veterans, and their ire was
exacerbated by Andreas' blatant flirtation with left-wing and communist
causes.

     He had in the space of about five years become a major political figure,
propelled into the public eye by a deliberate emphasis on controversial
issues, particularly those favored by the left. He openly advocated a
remaking of the social and economic structures of Greece and, sensitive to
the potential charge of pro-Americanism because of his history, he outdid
almost everybody in the vehemence of his anti-Americanism, unambiguously
calling for Greek "independence" in foreign policy. No one outside the
communist left had talked this way since 1944, and Andreas' outspokenness,
combined with his proximity to real power, sent shock waves throughout the
conservative community. In this context the ASPIDA accusations merely
confirmed for many their suspicions.

     Following George Papandreou's resignation in July 1965 the contest with
the king became daily more rancorous. New elections would have been the
logical solution to the conflict, but the king refused to permit what he
believed would be seen as a referendum on the institution of the monarchy. For
18 months a series of governments tried in vain to restore calm. By late 1966
Andreas had practically eclipsed his father in the public consciousness, and
the issue was apparently transformed into a battle between the right and the
left for control of the government.

     The probability of a military coup was openly discussed in cafes and in
political circles, but no political party took serious steps to counter any
possible action. Andreas and his supporters dismissed the possibility of any
action by the military independent of the conservative political parties, and
the military's adherence to electoral politics was unquestioned. Furthermore,
perhaps unconsciously drawing on the precedent of the national schism, they
believed that the political divisions had infiltrated the army, effectively
destroying it as a political unit. Finally, they believed that the army was
controlled by the top echelon of officers, whose movements could be easily
followed, and that lower ranks were not capable of independent action.

     As it turned out, Papandreou and his associates were wrong on all three
counts. The autonomy of the military as a political actor had been firmly
established during the Civil War, and the experience of the following 20
years-particularly its relationship to the United States, which gave it an
essentially independent source of funding-had served only to reinforce that
autonomy. Ideologically, the military throughout the postwar period remained
overwhelmingly unified in its conservative orientation, although some factions
distinguished themselves by their right-wing extremism. Finally, they had
completely ignored the Greek military's penchant for coups as instruments of
political action. The disintegration of the political system at the hands of
the politicians themselves was an open invitation to the military to fulfill
its historical role since 1909 as the "vigilant guardian of the national honor
and ideals."

     Comparing the situation to that in 1936 when the Metaxas dictatorship had
declared the necessity of forestalling an imminent "communist takeover," a
group of army officers, led by colonels Papadopoulos and Nikolaos Makarezos
and Brigadier Stylianos Pattakos, invoked the Promotheus Plan, a NATO-prepared
contingency plan designed to strengthen internal security in the event of a
serious external threat. The coup of April 21, 1967, less than one month
before elections, surprised everyone, both politicians and generals (who were
planning their own coup), and succeeded virtually unopposed.

The "Revolution of 21 April"

     The 12 members of the junta were all middle-ranking army officers and
members of Papadopoulos' EENA, and most, if not all, had been members of
IDEA, the secret organization that launched an abortive coup in 1951. They all
had similar military and personal backgrounds-sons of peasants or petit
bourgeois parents. Their formative military experiences had been defeat by
the Germans, followed by a mutiny against the collaborationist regime, the
battle for Crete, the chaos of the MEAF and, finally, the Civil War. They
shared a contempt for politicians, parliamentary politics, the top leadership
of the army, and the oligarchy of which it was the representative. In place of
the former regime, the junta installed a collective dictatorship through a
"revolutionary council" led by a triumvirate, but Papadopoulos was first
among equals.

     The revolutionary council introduced martial law throughout the country
but continued to reorganize the monarchy and a civilian prime minister for the
first eight months. Constantine mounted an abortive countercoup on December
13, and his subsequent flight to Rome ended the charade of civilian control,
although a regent was appointed to preserve the king's constitutional role.

     A new constitution was announced and adopted by plebiscite on October 29,
1968, replacing the 1952 constitution. The "crowned democracy" was preserved,
but the king's powers were greatly circumscribed. It provided for the
restoration of the multiparty system at some later date, but under strict
controls. The most important articles of the constitution and of associated
laws concerned the role of the military. The de facto autonomy of the postwar
era was institutionalized, not only in the administration of purely military
matters (appointments, salary, etc.) but also in all political matters. The
armed forces were required to pay allegiance to "the Country, the national
ideals and traditions, and [to] serve the Nation," but there was pointedly no
mention of allegiance to civilian authorities, who, for their