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$Unique_ID{COW01382}
$Pretitle{416}
$Title{France
The Diplomacy of a Self-Assured Middle Power}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Michael M. Harrison}
$Affiliation{Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs}
$Subject{french
france
de
diplomacy
style
foreign
power
policy
diplomatic
international}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Country: France
Book: National Negotiating Styles
Author: Michael M. Harrison
Affiliation: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs
Date: 1987
The Diplomacy of a Self-Assured Middle Power
France is the oldest ally of the United States and one of the most
important in the Western world. It is also probably the most contentious and
least understood nation with which this country has had continuous and
essentially friendly relations throughout its history. The modern conflictual
relationship is rooted in wartime discord between Washington and Charles de
Gaulle, which continued through the period of the Fourth Republic until it
escalated into the dramatic clashes between Paris and Washington that
characterized de Gaulle's tenure as president of the Fifth Republic. Although
French-American relations improved toward the end of de Gaulle's time in
office and, after notable oscillations under his successors, assumed an
unusually friendly nature during the presidency of Francois Mitterrand, France
is still widely considered potentially the most troublesome of principal U.S.
allies.
The conditional nature of the French-American alliance and the strong
likelihood of conflict breaking out in this relationship stem mainly from
divergent national interests that determine French and American approaches to
foreign policy and diplomacy. A secondary but nevertheless important cause of
tensions between France and the United States are some of the peculiarities of
a French "style" in diplomatic behavior that exacerbates conflicts based on
different interests and policies. As one of Europe's oldest states with an
ancient diplomatic tradition, France and its statesmen have had centuries to
cultivate a style of diplomacy and negotiating behavior that reflects
national elite cultural values and can serve as a bulwark against the vagaries
of domestic as well as international politics. At times, as with de Gaulle,
style achieves such an unusual symbiosis with substance that it becomes a
major feature of foreign policy and a weapon against both internal decay and
foreign adversaries. The Gaullist style and era represent a watershed in
French diplomacy, creating a synthesis of pre-existing stylistic elements and
setting a standard for the future. Despite a necessary adaptation to reduced
ambitions and a less heroic profile in international relations, France
therefore retains a distinctive foreign policy behavior that constitutes an
enduring challenge to the skill and patience of its interlocutors.
The French Setting: The Evolution of French-American Relations
The volatile mixture of amity and enmity in the twentieth century
French-American relationship can be traced to many factors, but at the root of
the dilemma is the declining international power of France and the rise of the
United States to a position of dominance and temporary hegemony within the
West. This has made the Anglo-Saxon state an inevitable object of resentment
on the part of a country that has resisted both its loss of status in
international politics and a global system dominated by other, more powerful,
and often arrogant states, especially the United States in the West. Much of
the style and substance of French diplomacy can be traced either to
frustration caused by national decay and decline on the part of a former great
power, or to a reaction against subordination as France has attempted to
manipulate its dwindling resources to block the moves of dominant states. In
many instances the United States has occupied a special position as a target
of French diplomacy, primarily because of the lack of rapport between a
dominant power and a dissatisfied dependent one. The key to understanding
modern French diplomacy, then, is to be found, first, in the legacy of
national decline and political decay that characterized France after 1870 and
especially after World War II; and , second, in the post-1958 Gaullist
reaction to this syndrome of domestic immobilism and international weakness.
Although France's decline from great power status dates back to the
country's defeat by Prussia in 1870, itself a result of accumulating
political, economic, and demographic weaknesses, the sense of decay and
frustration at failed attempts to reverse the process became predominant after
the Pyrrhic victory that left France morally and economically exhausted in the
wake of World War I. Between the two world wars, the immobilist and unstable
political system of the Third Republic proved unable to cope with the dual
challenge of internal political polarization between right and left and an
international system in which a weak and vulnerable France found itself
increasingly dependent on the Anglo-Saxon powers in its losing struggle to
retain preeminence over a vigorous Germany. At crucial moments when France's
international position depended on astute diplomacy, its capricious political
system produced statesmen of limited vision or outright incompetence. France
was "unable to compensate for an inherently weak substantive position with
diplomatic skill and coordination" so that the events of the mid-1920s were
the decisive stage in a process marking "the end of French predominance in
Europe." By the 1930s, the political system of the Third Republic was
unravelling under the pressure of an economic crisis and conflicts between
left and right that were only temporarily abated during the short-lived
Popular Front government of 1936. The Third Republic collapsed in 1940
because of moral exhaustion and an unmanageable political system that had
accelerated France's international decline and put no serious obstacles in the
way of Germany's drive for continental supremacy.
During World War II, the Vichy regime of Marshall Philippe Petain
accepted subordination in a German-dominated Europe but tried unsuccessfully
to achieve recognition as a privileged junior partner of the Third Reich,
while de Gaulle's Free French doggedly insisted on securing allied recognition
as an equal partner in the postwar international system. With a policy
"inspired by sentiment as much as by reason," de Gaulle brilliantly wielded a
diplomacy based on the contention that "France cannot be France without
greatness" and was therefore entitled to independence and superior rank among
the victorious allies. De Gaulle temporarily achieved his goals, but after
1945 the full emergence of a bipolar system dominated by two superpowers
and the weakness of Fourth Republic politics and diplomacy put France back
on the path of decline and subordination.
With the exception of Pierre Mendes-France's brief term as both prime
minister and foreign minister during 1954-1955, the Fourth Republic's foreign
policy consisted mostly of reacting to the demands of other states, often
stalling as long as possible in order to salvage appearances, but usually
caving in because of an inability to negotiate a compromise acceptable to both
France and its partners. According to Alfred Grosser, the Fourth Republic's
diplomacy was characterized by a "refusal to adapt to the modern world" so
that French leaders reacted to their sense of unwarranted dependence by
cultivating a "nationalism of resentment" expressed in outbursts of passionate
defiance and refusals to accommodate the policies of stronger partners.
Obstruction was raised to an art by French leaders and, except in European
economic affairs, the immobilist political system was unable to produce
positive and creative foreign policy initiatives; instead, it resisted the
demands of others by resorting to what Raymond Aron termed "the blackmail of
the weak." This failure of style as well as substance alienated France's
Western partners and eroded th