Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0129/01293.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 37KB | 603 lines

$Unique_ID{COW01293}
$Pretitle{228}
$Title{Ethiopia
Chapter 5B.   Command and Force Structures}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Robert Rinehart}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{military
training
army
soviet
officers
air
units
militia
ethiopian
armed}
$Date{1980}
$Log{Ethiopian Troops*0129301.scf
Figure 15.*0129302.scf
}
Country:     Ethiopia
Book:        Ethiopia, A Country Study
Author:      Robert Rinehart
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1980

Chapter 5B.   Command and Force Structures

     The organizational structure of the military establishment after the
1974 coup was largely determined by the political requirements of the PMAC.
Since 1977, however, command procedures have increasingly reflected a Soviet
influence.

     Formulation of military policy and all important decisions emanated
officially from committees of the PMAC designated to deal with political
and military affairs, defense, militia affairs, and security. Policy
affecting national security was administered by the Council of Ministers
through the ministries of Defense, Interior, and Public and National
Security. The line of command in the armed forces ran formally from the PMAC
through the defense ministry to the chiefs of staff of the army, air force,
and navy and through the Ministry of Interior to the chief of the militia.
In practice the service commanders, who operated from individual headquarters
without an intermediate chairman, reported directly to Mengistu, who was also
commander in chief of the armed forces and presided over the Joint Council
of Commanders. Joint operations were coordinated by four regional commanders.
The commander of operations in Eritrea was also the administrator of martial
law in the region.

     In August 1977 the National Revolutionary Operations Command (NROC) was
instituted by proclamation of the PMAC in response to unrest in the armed
forces, political resistance from leftist opposition to the military regime,
and the worsening military situation in Eritrea and the Ogaden. It replaced
the revolution and development committees founded earlier in the year to
mobilize militia units on a regional basis and to direct regional internal
security operations against "reactionaries." Direction of these missions was
centralized in the NROC. The new command's immediate concern was to
coordinate the recruiting, training, and equipping of the People's Militia,
but it soon emerged as the central command structure and arrogated sweeping
civilian as well as military powers. Headed by a twenty-eight-member
council-consisting of representatives of the PMAC, the Council of Ministers,
the Provisional Office for Mass Organization Affairs (POMOA), and the
official trade union as well as the services' chiefs of staff-the NROC was
put in charge of the armed forces and empowered to commandeer resources,
public utilities, and manpower for the war effort as it determined necessary.
Mengistu served as its chairman.

     In December the Supreme Military Strategic Committee (SMSC) was also
set up by the PMAC to map strategy for Eritrea and the Ogaden and to direct
counterinsurgency operations elsewhere in the country. Subsequently, the SMSC
took on responsibility for raising the technical efficiency of the armed
forces. Committee members included eight Soviet officers, including a
lieutenant general, and three Cubans in addition to seven Ethiopian
representatives.

Army

     In mid-1980 the army, known officially as the Ethiopian Ground Force,
was organized in eight divisions, which were supported by twelve tank
battalions and thirty artillery battalions. It had expanded in size from
41,000 in 1974 to 50,000 in 1977 and to 65,000 in 1979. Ground order of battle
was difficult to ascertain because of the rapid increase in size, frequent
reorganization and deployment of units, and constant reshuffling within the
command structure. In Eritrea and the Ogaden, army divisions were augmented by
elements of the People's Militia.

[See Ethiopian Troops: Display their reliance on Soviet weapons. Courtesy
SYGMA (William Campbell)]

     Nevertheless the 2d Division was headquartered in Asmera and the 3d
Division (Mechanized) in Harer; they were responsible respectively for
Eritrea and the Ogaden. The 1st Division-incorporating units from the former
Imperial Bodyguard-and the 4th, 6th, and 7th divisions were commanded from
headquarters in Addis Ababa. The 4th Division was deployed in the southern
regions, and elements of the other divisions were utilized as reinforcements
in Eritrea. The 5th (Nebelbal or Flame) Division was composed of paratroop
and counterinsurgency units formerly trained by Israeli advisers and was
still recognized as the army's elite corps. It provided the PMGSE's bodyguard
and has been involved in police activities. Elements of the division have also
been assigned to Eritrea. The 8th Division was a police commando unit under
army command. A women's army corps had been organized and trained to provide
logistical support, but little information was available on its structure or
operations.

     Line strength of an Ethiopian army division was 8,000 officers and
enlisted personnel. Divisions were normally composed of three brigades, plus
supporting elements; but because of the integration of militia units,
manpower allocations in practice varied considerably from division to
division. In Eritrea a combat task force had been formed from the 15,000-man
2d Division, incorporating one regular army brigade, two militia brigades, two
mechanized brigades, and two artillery brigades.

     There were more than 1,000 Soviet military advisers stationed in Ethiopia
in 1980, and about 400 from the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).
From 13,000 to 15,000 Cuban troops were engaged in training, construction,
and garrison duties.

     Until 1976 the United States was the principal supplier of weapons to
Ethiopia. Although initial negotiations were concluded in 1976, the massive
infusion of Soviet military aid did not begin until 1977. Since then, the
Soviet Union has undertaken the complete refitting of the ground force.
United States materiel, particularly armor, was steadily disappearing from
inventory because of attrition and lack of spare parts. The AK-47
Kalashnikov had become the standard infantry weapon, although the M-1
Garand (United States) was still found in some units. Small-unit fire
support was provided by Soviet individually manned rocket-propelled grenade
launchers (RPG 2s and 7s) and the Dutscka light machine gun.

     Ethiopian armored and mechanized units had approximately 600 Soviet T-34
and T-54/T-55 tanks and 500 armored personnel carriers (APC), but combat
losses and constant resupply by the Soviets made estimates unreliable.
Artillery units deployed a variety of Soviet light and medium guns and
howitzers, rocket launchers, and heavy mortars. Air defense was provided both
by quick-firing antiaircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles (see table 14,
Appendix).

     The training of personnel in maintenance techniques could not keep pace
with the massive inflow of new Soviet equipment in 1977-78. As a result
weapons maintenance in the army was poor, and new systems were often
introduced into combat by troops unfamiliar with their operation. In their
training programs, Soviet advisers have directed particular attention to
improving the quality of maintenance procedures and logistical support.

Air Force

     Ethiopian military aviation dates from the formation of a small air
section in 1929. Haile Selassie assigned a high priority to the expansion
of the air force after World War II and, with the aid of Swedish instructors,
a flying school was established. A Swedish officer commanded the air arm and
remained responsible for its operation until the early 1960s. The military
assistance agreement with the United States resulted in the delivery of the
first jet combat aircraft-a squadron of F-86s-in 1960. Northrop F-5A/Es,
supplied by the United States, were the main