Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0129/01291.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 36KB | 564 lines

$Unique_ID{COW01291}
$Pretitle{228}
$Title{Ethiopia
Chapter 4D.   Foreign Relations}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Harold D. Nelson}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{states
ethiopia
military
ethiopian
united
soviet
relations
american
aid
foreign}
$Date{1980}
$Log{}
Country:     Ethiopia
Book:        Ethiopia, A Country Study
Author:      Harold D. Nelson
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1980

Chapter 4D.   Foreign Relations

     The major change in Ethiopia's relations with foreign powers since the
revolution has been its alignment with the Soviet Union. Haile Selassie's
government had cast its lot with the West, and its chief supplier of aid had
been the United States followed by other Western states and multinational
institutions such as the World Bank (see Emerging Role in World Politics,
ch. 1; see Foreign Trade, Aid, and Balance of Payments, ch. 3; see United
States Aid, ch. 5). The change did not take place immediately after the
overthrow of the old regime. But by 1977 the Soviet Union had demonstrated
its willingness to supply arms, military advice, and personnel, and Cuba had
sent combat troops and training specialists (see Soviet and Cuban Aid, ch. 5).

     The decisionmakers in matters of foreign relations had been Mengistu and
the members of the PMAC Standing Committee during the years since 1974. In
1980 the role was being assumed by the new COPWE executive committee, which
Mengistu chaired. Unlike the PMGSE's (see Glossary) Marxist-Leninist domestic
policy, which has not adhered to all of the Soviet precedents, the regime's
foreign policy has increasingly followed guidelines established by Moscow.

United States and Western Europe

     In the first two years of the new regime, the PMAC seemed to anticipate
the continuing economic and military support of the United States and other
noncommunist powers and international institutions. Its members were used to
American military equipment, and some had received American training in the
United States. In fact there was little overt change until 1977 when a complex
set of actions and reactions that began in 1976 led to a breach between
Ethiopia's new rulers and the United States and, to a lesser extent, some
other noncommunist countries.

     From 1975 to 1978 Ethiopia's military government generally was unwilling
to sign new economic development assistance projects with the United States.
Disagreements arose in 1976 concerning the terms of American Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) credits agreements, and a new credit agreement was not signed.
Military equipment programs that had averaged US $10 million annually under
the empire were increasing after the revolution in response to the emperor's
request in 1972 that his armed forces be modernized. The program, largely
cash sales rather than grants, was to be US $26 million in fiscal year (FY)
1976 and US $62 million in FY 1977. A disagreement with the Ethiopian
government arose in 1976, however, over an additional US $60 million of
ammunition, which Mengistu needed for replacement of stocks expended in the
various Eritrean campaigns, and over the rate of deliveries which, as in the
Ethiopian case, generally tended to lag behind expectations in all countries
receiving American military aid. As a result, by mid-1976, Mengistu entered
into military equipment procurement talks with the Soviet Union and signed
the first hardware purchase agreement with Moscow in December.

     In 1976 the United States showed some signs of reconsidering its
support of Ethiopia. Its assistant secretary for African affairs told a
subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August that the
United States was keeping its Ethiopian policy under constant review and
described the PMAC as "unstable, prone to violations of human rights,
incapable of managing Ethiopia's deteriorating economy, and beset by
insurgencies and incipient insurgencies." The United States government was
particularly concerned about human rights and Ethiopia's failure to
compensate American citizens and corporations for property seized since
1975. The United States abstained in several votes in international lending
organizations to demonstrate the concern.

     Independently of these developments, technological advances in the
satellite and communications fields had made the communications station
at Kagnew increasingly unnecessary, and early in 1977 the United States
informed the Ethiopian government that it would close down the station
and withdraw the remaining personnel by September 30. The Ethiopians had
always made a close psychological connection between the communication
station and American military assistance and viewed the two as inextricably
linked. The demise of one was interpreted as leading to the inevitable
demise of the other in the near future, and this was enhanced by the disputes
over military sales credits and military equipment deliveries from earlier
years of the revolution. By December 31, 1976, Ethiopia decided not to
continue to make the scheduled repayments of the 1974 and 1975 military sales
agreements, and no further repayments had been made as of mid-1980. This
default led to the invocation of the Brooke Amendment (see Glossary) in
February 1979 terminating all further new economic assistance projects to
Ethiopia, because it was over a year in default in obligations to the United
States. While the Brooke Amendment was temporarily lifted in 1980 by the
application to the arrearages of balances held by the United States for
Ethiopia, it was to be reimposed by Washington in January 1981, unless the
payments that had been due in December 1979 and January 1980 were made.

     In February 1977 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance testified before a
congressional committee that the United States proposed to eliminate grant
military assistance to three countries, of which Ethiopia was one, on the
grounds that they had persistently violated human rights. Because of
Ethiopia's extensive foreign exchange reserves deriving from large receipts
from the high prices of coffee (the result of the 1975 frost in Brazil) and
worldwide United States policies of eliminating grant military assistance to
countries other than those with which the United States had multilateral
treaty commitments, most of the American military equipment assistance
programs to Ethiopia had already been converted to cash sales rather than
grants. Vance's statement, which came just after the consolidation of
power in Mengistu's hands earlier that month-an event publicly hailed by the
Soviet Union-and Mengistu's confirmation that Ethiopia would seek arms from
the "socialist countries," aroused Ethiopian nationalism and appeared to be
a direct attack on Mengistu.

     In April 1977 immediately preceding Mengistu's trip to the Soviet Union
in May to negotiate additional arms deliveries, the military regime ordered
the closure of four American agencies: the Military Assistance Advisory
Group (MAAG-already down to forty-seven persons), the Kagnew Communications
Center (manned by a few civilian technicians and scheduled to close by the
end of September 1977 in any case), the Naval Medical Research Unit, and
the United States Information Service (USIS). The closure order stated in
part: "The existence of an American Military Assistance Advisory Group is
useless at a time when the American government takes every opportunity to
create hatred against revolutionary Ethiopia by depicting her as a country
in which human rights are violated." The USIS was said to be "transmitting
the cheap culture of imperialism."

     The Mengistu government also unilaterally abrogated the 1953 Mutual
Defense Assistance Agreement, and the United States was thus without legal
authority to deliver the US $75 million of military equipment for which
Ethiopia had already made about US $12 million in deposits. When the Somali
invaded Ethiopia in mid-1977, the military regime claimed that the United
States, its traditional ally, had deserted Ethiopia in its hour of