Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0124/01246.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 19KB | 293 lines

$Unique_ID{COW01246}
$Pretitle{350}
$Title{El Salvador
Chapter 1D.   The Civil Conflict Begins}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Richard A. Haggerty}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{el
salvador
united
states
salvadoran
political
aid
military
guerrilla
offensive}
$Date{1988}
$Log{}
Country:     El Salvador
Book:        El Salvador, A Country Study
Author:      Richard A. Haggerty
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1988

Chapter 1D.   The Civil Conflict Begins

     The early reaction of the Salvadoran radical left to the progression of
reformist junta governments was characteristically fractious. The PCES
expressed initial support for the first junta. Other groups, such as the ERP,
condemned such impulses as collaborationist and renewed their call for an
insurrection. Although some dialogue apparently took place between Colonel
Majano and his supporters and some members of the radical left, the erosion of
Majano's position within the military and the inability of the junta
governments to stem the tide of right-wing violence, not to mention a certain
suspicion among the Majanists themselves of the leftists' ultimate goals,
worked against any effort to incorporate them into the governmental structure.
Some observers have noted this failure to bring the left into the political
process as a major shortcoming of the reformist juntas. It appears, however,
that the political will to do so was lacking on both sides. This was
particularly true of the Marxist guerrilla groups that had expanded their
membership and their aspirations since their establishment as urban terrorist
cells in the mid-1970s.

     Foreign influences on these Salvadoran guerrilla groups served in large
part to convince their leadership of the need to sublimate old ideological
quarrels in favor of a coordinated and cooperative effort to arouse the
Salvadoran masses. The example of the Nicaraguan revolution served as both an
inspiration and a loose blueprint for the Salvadorans. Nicaragua demonstrated
the importance of incorporating as many sectors of society as possible into a
revolutionary movement while still ensuring the predominance of a
Marxist-Leninist "vanguard" group within the coalition. In Nicaragua the
vanguard role was played by the FSLN, a group that had represented
singlehandedly the pro-Cuban insurrectionist left in that country since the
early 1960s. In El Salvador, the situation was more complicated. Clearly,
several ideologically diverse (Maoist, pro-Soviet, and pro-Cuban) guerrilla
groups could not fulfill simultaneously the role of revolutionary vanguard.
Salvadorans recognized a need for unity that was not achieved until Cuba's
Fidel Castro took a direct hand in the matter. The negotiating process began
in Havana in December 1979, some two months after the reformist coup in El
Salvador, and was concluded by May 1980, when the major guerrilla groups
announced their unity under the banner of the Unified Revolutionary
Directorate (Direccion Revolucionario Unificada-- DRU). Despite some continued
infighting, the DRU succeeded in coordinating the groups' efforts to organize
and equip their forces.

     While the military strategy of the left was proceeding along one path,
some opposition parties and the mass organizations were following a similar
and eventually convergent course. On April 1, 1980, the Revolutionary
Democratic Front (Frente Democratico Revolucionario--FDR) was established by
the CRM, the umbrella group of the mass organizations. It brought together all
five of the mass organizations associated with the DRU guerrilla groups as
well as Ungo's MNR, Zamora's MPSC, another party known as the Popular
Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberacion Popular-- MLP), forty-nine labor
unions, and several student groups. FDR political leaders such as Ungo and
Zamora began to travel abroad, where they found political and moral support,
particularly in Mexico and among the social democratic parties of Western
Europe. Meanwhile, the mass organizations began a campaign of general strikes
in an effort to pave the way for a full or partial leftist assumption of
power, either through insurrection or through negotiations.

     In November 1980, the FDR was struck a traumatic blow when one of its
leaders, Enrique Alvarez, was killed along with five other members of the
front by a right-wing death squad. This incident underscored the danger of the
FDR's strategy of open organization and opposition and contributed to its
formal unification with the DRU. Although the leadership of the mass
organizations had long been cooperating with the guerrilla groups, the
politicians of the MNR and MPSC had sought to steer a slightly more
independent path. After the Alvarez murder, however, they felt compelled to
make common cause with the DRU; they took this action not only for their own
protection but also because they believed that the prevailing level of
violence in the country legitimized a violent response. By 1981 the FDR had
been united formally with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
(Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional--FMLN), the successor
organization to the DRU. The first public announcement of the FMLN-FDR was
made in Mexico City in January 1981, some four days after the FMLN guerrollas
initiated an operation that they dubbed, prematurely and inaccurately, the
"final offensive."

     The guerrilla offensive began on January 10, 1981. From the perspective
of the FMLN, its timing proved to be premature in a number of respects. The
guerrillas' logistics network was not prepared to support an operation on an
almost countrywide level; the rebels generally were not well armed and clearly
were not well trained. The Salvadoran armed forces, although initially taken
by surprise, were sufficiently cohesive to rally and beat back the guerrilla
attacks. The FMLN hoped to establish operational control over Morazan
Department and to declare it a "liberated territory." This major objective
never was achieved. On a basic level, the final offensive demonstrated the
limited extent of the guerrillas' support among the Salvadoran population. The
anticipated countrywide insurrection on which the FMLN had staked so much of
its hopes for victory never materialized.

     The final offensive was not a total loss for the FMLN, however. It
retained military strongholds, especially in Chalatenango Department, where
its forces settled in for a protracted guerrilla conflict. The offensive
focused further international attention on El Salvador and established the
FMLN-FDR as a formidable force both politically and militarily; in August
1981, the governments of France and Mexico recognized the front as a
"representative political force" and called for a negotiated settlement
between the rebels and the government. Seeking to capitalize on such support,
FDR representatives carried on a "political offensive" abroad while the FMLN
forces dug in, resupplied, and continued their organizational and operational
efforts in the field (see Left-Wing Extremism, ch. 5).

     On the down side for the guerrillas, however, the armed forces continued
to repulse their assaults with relative ease, even without the benefit of
United States military aid. The timing of the final offensive had in large
part reflected the desire of the FMLN to take power before the inauguration of
United States president Ronald Reagan. Although it failed militarily, the
offensive still drew considerable attention from observers and policymakers in
Washington.

The United States Takes a Hand

     The Carter administration had lost considerable leverage in El Salvador
when the Romero government renounced United States aid in 1977. The United
States therefore welcomed the October 1979 coup and backed up its approval
with an economic aid package that by 1980 had become the largest among Western
Hemisphere recipients. A small amount of military aid also was provided.
United States advisers contributed to the third junta's agrarian reform
program, particularl