Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0097/00979.txt

Text File | 1991-06-24 | 37KB | 562 lines

$Unique_ID{COW00979}
$Pretitle{290}
$Title{Costa Rica
Chapter 5A.   National Security}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Donald P. Whitaker}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{costa
government
rica
nicaraguan
rican
security
political
country
forces
national}
$Date{1983}
$Log{Juan Santamaria*0097901.scf
Upala*0097902.scf
}
Country:     Costa Rica
Book:        Costa Rica, A Country Study
Author:      Donald P. Whitaker
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1983

Chapter 5A.   National Security

[See Juan Santamaria: Statue in Alajuela of national hero Juan Santamaria, who
died in the battle at Rivas in 1856]

     In 1949, after a brief civil war that shook the nation's self-perception
as a peaceful, stable democracy, Costa Rican lawmakers adopted a constitution
that prohibited the establishment of a national army. Since that time Costa
Rica's basic security forces, the Civil Guard (Guardia Civil, a small
national constabulary) and the smaller Rural Assistance Guard (Guardia de
Asistencia Rural, known generally as the Rural Guard), have been composed of
nonprofessionals who are appointed after elections on the basis of political
patronage. Because of its democratic political system and demilitarization
policies, Costa Rica has stood out for more than 30 years as the most
peaceful and stable country in the region.

     By 1983, however, the country appeared to be overtaken by the political
tumult that has embroiled Central America since the Nicaraguan revolution of
1978-79. Costa Rica experienced a ripple of political terrorism caused mostly
by foreigners who had been granted a haven in the country or who opposed its
sociopolitical order. Relations with Nicaragua's increasingly leftist
revolutionary Sandinista government deteriorated sharply despite the fact that
Costa Rica had provided the Sandinistas logistical support and sanctuary
during their struggle against Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle.
Tensions between the two countries were heightened by mutual ideological
hostility, by Costa Rican's fear that heavily armed Nicaragua was attempting
to destabilize their government, and by the military activities of
anti-Sandinista Nicaraguan insurgents who had established themselves in Costa
Rica. With armed groups ranging on both sides of a porous international
border, it appeared that many of Nicaragua's battles were being fought from or
on Costa Rican soil.

     Despite the mounting security concerns, "militarization" of the public
security forces was strongly opposed by virtually all Costa Rican politicians
and by the public at large. The government of President Luis Alberto Monge
Alvarez prepared to increase the size and capabilities of the police
forces-which in 1983 numbered some 4,300 Civil Guardsmen and 3,000 Rural
Guardsmen-without changing their nonprofessional nature. Despite an
ideological affinity for the democratically oriented insurgent forces
opposing the Sandinista government, the Monge government began to use its
police forces to locate the rebels, curtail their military activities, and
confiscate their weapons. Monge attempted to separate Costa Rica from the
conflict between the Sandinistas and their enemies and declared his country's
"active and perpetual neutrality." At the same time, his government sought
assistance, primarily from the United States, to assist in restoring economic
health and to help in training and reequipping the police.

National Security Concerns

     For much of its history Costa Rica has managed, with the notable
exception of the 1948 civil war, a degree of internal cohesion that has
distinguished it from other countries in the region and has provided its best
defense against foreign aggression. In the early 1980s Costa Rica appeared to
have maintained its social cohesiveness, but it was seriously tested by
regional and domestic security problems.

Costa Rica and the Conflict in Central America

     Since independence most Costa Rican governments have generally not had
close relations with nearby Central American states-Nicaragua in
particular-and have attempted to insulate their country from often violent
economic, social, and racial conflicts that frequently characterized politics
beyond its borders. (According to political scientist Charles D. Ameringer,
Costa Ricans joke that all the roads in their country are good except those
leading to Nicaragua, and that is to keep the Nicaraguans out.) Costa Rica
suspended its customary aloofness from the region's conflicts, however, during
the 1940s and 1950s under the leadership of President Jose Figueres Ferrer,
when the government gave assistance to groups attempting to overthrow
dictatorships in Nicaragua, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and other
countries. In return for its efforts, Costa Rica was invaded in 1948 and 1955
by insurgents sponsored by Nicaraguan strongman Anastasio Somoza Garcia, but
they were quickly repelled (see The Junta and the 1949 Constitution; The 1955
Invasion, ch. 1).

     Lacking an army, Costa Rica has relied on collective security
arrangements, including the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
(Rio Treaty) for protection from possible invaders. Close ties with the United
States, whose military and economic strength has long given it a measure of
power and influence throughout the region, also helped ensure the country's
security against external enemies. This was demonstrated in 1955 by the rapid
dispatch of American military equipment, including fighter
aircraft, that Costa Rica used to help thwart Nicaragua's military invasion
that year. Costa Rica's defense against aggression has also been strengthened
by its internal stability, relative social harmony, and a national pride
deriving in part from the fact that these characteristics have made the
country unique in Central America.

     Costa Rica's peaceful distinctiveness, however, has been threatened in
the aftermath of the Nicaraguan revolution. Most of the Costa Rican public
had supported the struggle of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente
Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional-FSLN) against Somoza Garcia's son, Somoza
Debayle. The government of President Rodrigo Carazo Odio gave the guerrillas
sanctuary and served as a conduit for significant numbers of Cuban- and
European-supplied arms. Although relations with the new Sandinista government
were initially excellent, Costa Ricans were soon disappointed by the results
of the Nicaraguan revolution. From an ideological point of view, it became
apparent during 1980 that Nicaraguan leaders were not seeking to establish a
pluralist democracy. Policymaking was dominated by the Marxist-oriented FSLN
National Directorate rather than the more broadly representative Junta of the
Government of National Reconstruction, which theoretically held executive
power in Nicaragua. Furthermore, elections were postponed, press censorship
began to be imposed, and the government was increasingly accused of repression
and human rights violations.

     From a security point of view as well, the new Nicaraguan government
heightened Costa Rican suspicions. After the revolution, instead of cutting
back on its armed forces, the Sandinista regime undertook to expand greatly
conventional military power and to mobilize the society as a whole. By 1983,
according to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Nicaragua's armed forces included 48,000 soldiers and reservists on active
duty and were supplemented by the Sandinista People's Militia, numbering
approximately 30,000. Costa Rica, by contrast, had no soldiers or professional
policemen but only some 7,300 members of the public security forces (see
The Public Security Forces, this ch.). Beginning in 1980, Nicaraguan troops
challenged Costa Rica's right to operate vessels on the Rio San Juan, which
separates the two countries; in one instance in October of that year, they
fired on a craft carrying Costa Rican government health officials. At the
same time, the Carazo government began t