Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0084/00847.txt

Text File | 1991-06-24 | 24KB | 378 lines

$Unique_ID{COW00847}
$Pretitle{260}
$Title{China
Chapter 11B.  The First Wave of Reform, 1979-84}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Marica R. Ristaino}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{reform
party
political
program
system
economic
leaders
campaign
deng
leadership}
$Date{1989}
$Log{}
Country:     China
Book:        China, A Country Study
Author:      Marica R. Ristaino
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1989

Chapter 11B.  The First Wave of Reform, 1979-84

     In the process of introducing reforms, China's leaders for the most part
have acted cautiously and introduced new programs incrementally. In the period
of the Four Modernizations, they began a broad search of foreign sources for
ideas to introduce and test in the Chinese environment. Their pragmatic approach
entailed following the progress of newly introduced concepts closely in order to
make any necessary mid-course corrections or deletions. Maintaining the momentum
of the reform program required the leaders to interact constantly to meet the
challenges, failures, and setbacks inherent in their experiment.

     The major changes introduced by key reforms inevitably provoked tensions in
the political system. Strains developed between those who would not benefit or
could not adjust to the new conditions and those who saw the new opportunities
afforded. The resulting pressures on the system required constant attention of
and mediation by the top party leaders. The goals, contents, and progress of the
reform program reportedly were reviewed and discussed regularly at the
highest-level party meetings. Leaders on the Political Bureau Standing Committee
strove for consensus on the contents of the reform program and its agenda and
participated in an ongoing process of bargaining to reconcile different policy
orientations and institutional interests. The competing interests that emerged
throughout the country when a new wave of reform was introduced appeared to have
spokesmen or advocates in the highest party circles. The issues that emerged
were debated in authoritative party meetings with the aim of arriving at a
consensus and preserving harmony on the reform agenda. If this became
impossible, personnel changes tended to follow, as was the case when Hu Yaobang
apparently broke the consensus, moving ahead of what the cautious and
stability-minded leadership could accept as a safe and reasonable course.

     In this way China, under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, appeared to follow the
tenets of democratic centralism (see Glossary). Policies that originated at the
authoritative party center were tested and evaluated in practice, and reports of
their results, including problems and setbacks, were then channeled back to the
system's center for debate. In the 1980s it became something of a leadership art
to keep the reform program going, balance the tensions it provoked, and maintain
the political system intact. Seen in this context, a key question became whether
or not political leaders other than Deng Xiaoping would have the prestige and
political skill needed to direct and preserve this delicate balance, especially
after Deng passed from the scene.

The Opening Up Policy and Reform in the Countryside

     The first reforms to affect China's economy were instituted between 1979
and 1984. The programs were systemic economic reforms aimed at revising China's
foreign economic relations and refocusing the country's agricultural system. The
desire to purchase foreign equipment and technology needed for China's
modernization led to a policy of opening up to the outside world that would earn
foreign exchange through tourism, exports, and arms sales (see Reform of the
Economic System, Beginning in 1979, ch. 5). The opening up policy included
sending large numbers of students abroad to acquire special training and needed
skills. The effect was to make China more dependent on major sectors of the
world economy and reverse the Maoist commitment to the ideal of self- reliance.
Not everyone was satisfied with this radical departure. The conservative
reformers were especially apprehensive about the corrupting cultural and
ideological influences that they believed accompanied foreign exposure and
imports.

     In China's rural areas, the economic reform program decollectivized
agriculture through a contract responsibility system (see Glossary) based on
individual households (see Rural Society, ch. 3; Agricultural Policies, ch. 6).
The people's communes (see Glossary) established under Mao were largely replaced
with a system of family-based farming. The rural reforms successfully increased
productivity, the amount of available arable land, and peasant per capita
income. All of these were major reform achievements. Their success stimulated
substantial support in the countryside for the expansion and deepening of the
reform agenda.

     While the opening up policy and rural reform produced significant benefits
to the Chinese economy and won enthusiastic support for the Deng reformers, they
also generated substantial problems and brought political opposition from
conservative leaders. The Maoist ideal of self- reliance still had proponents
among the leadership in the 1980s, and many were openly critical of the
expanding foreign influences, especially in such areas as the special economic
zones (see Glossary).

     In rural areas, economic reform led to inequalities among economic regions
and appeared in some instances to produce a new, potentially exploitative class
of rich peasants. The official press contained accounts of peasants who carried
the profit motive far beyond the intent of the reform program, engaging in
smuggling, embezzlement, and blatant displays of newly acquired wealth. Thus, on
the one hand, top leaders fully supporting the reform agenda could show major
successes as they promoted further reform. On the other hand, those more
concerned with ideological continuity and social stability could identify
problems and areas of risk. The differing perceptions and responses of these
reformist and conservative groups produced considerable tension in the political
system.

Rectification and Reform

     These results of the opening up policy and rural reform programs had
important political repercussions at the national level. The question of
borrowing from the West has been debated vigorously since the early nineteenth
century. The concern has always been the impact of Western social, political,
and cultural traditions, sometimes referred to derisively as the "flies and
insects" that blow in along with culturally neutral scientific and technical
information. This concern was especially prevalent among conservatives in the
highest leadership circles and extended to the possibly corrosive effect of
Western traditions on the party's Marxist- Leninist ideological foundation. To
meet this challenge, in October 1983 the party launched a national program to
improve "party style," organization, and ideology.

     According to Chen Yun, a leading conservative and major figure in party
rectification, the question of party style was crucial for the organization's
very survival, especially because of the party's tarnished image and the
perceived crisis of confidence and loss of prestige during the Cultural
Revolution period. Improving party style required that organizational norms be
restored, which entailed ridding the party of factionalism. It also demanded
that measures be taken to counter corruption and the exercise of privilege.
These frequently had taken the form of abuses by cadres who used personal
relations and "back-door" benefits to further their own interests. Finally,
improved party style required that political discipline be enforced in
implementing party programs.

     These goals were accomplished over the next three years, accompanied by
thorough ideological education. The Second Plenum of the Twelfth Central
Committee (October 11-12, 1983) affirmed that the policy of opening up to the
outside world was entirely correct but con